DISSENT

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WINTER 1957 75c

DISSENT

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The following cable has been sent to the Yugoslav government, December 1, 1956:

Meeting New York City readers of DISSENT, an independent democratic socialist journal, unanimously demands immediate freedom for Milovan Djilas. Your claims to oppose Stalinist tyranny are made a mockery by arrest of Djilas, whose only crime is that he has freed himself from the mental oppression of totalitarianism and worked his way through to support of democratic socialism. We urge all democrats and socialists everywhere to join in demand for Djilas freedom.

(Djilas has since been sentenced to three years after a quick "trial.")

Among Our New Contributors: *Stanley Diamond* (see page 8) is at work on a study of the *Kibbutz* as a social institution; an article by him on the *Kibbutz* will appear in our next issue. . . . *Margaret Halsey* is of course the well-known author of *With Malice Toward Some, Color Blind* and other books. . . . *William Neumann* is an historian who has specialized in studies of American foreign policy and has written for a variety of scholarly and liberal journals. . . . *Gabriel Kolko* is a young economist whose previous study on income distribution trends was published as a booklet by the Student League for Industrial Democracy. . . . *Max Awner* is a Colorado labor editor, presently in Europe to study the Scandinavian labor movement.

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DISSENT

VOLUME IV
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Winter 1957

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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LETTER TO RUSSIAN WRITERS

Jean-Paul Sartre, and others

In the first days of the Hungarian Revolution, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Vercors and 19 other well-known French writers and intellectuals associated with the Communist movement produced a statement which, timidly and with much circumlocution, nevertheless questioned the Russian intervention. Cautious though it was, this statement broke the ice; a deluge followed, indicating a major crisis in the ranks of France's Communist-inspired and influenced intellectuals.

A group of Russian writers, including M. Sholokhov, K. Fedyn and the inevitable Ilya Ehrenbourg, replied in a letter published by the Soviet *Literaturnaia Gazeta* on November 22.

The contents of the Russian reply are familiar enough and rest upon the charge that "Hungarian fascists" had seized control of the nation, making Soviet intervention a justified step. The tone of the reply, as the following excerpt should make clear, is likewise familiar:

> It seems to us that during these difficult days you believed in the calumnies, lies and misinformation about our country and its friends which were spread in France. It was precisely during these days that you published your statement against us, calling for the "triumph of truth" when Soviet soldiers, at the sacrifice of their lives, were saving dozens and perhaps even hundreds of lives from fascist terror.

The reply to the Russians given by Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and the other signers of the original statement goes far beyond their previous stand; we present it in its entirety (omitting only the opening paragraph which, noting this is the first time that Russian writers have engaged in a real debate with foreign colleagues, expresses the hope the discussion will continue). Not only does it indicate the profound crisis caused by the Hungarian revolt, but also the progress being made by significant intellectual voices engaged in the difficult task of breaking out of the darkness in which they have too long lived. (The letter follows.)

Your letter, however, has not convinced us; partly because several of your observations seem to us neither sufficiently well-grounded nor complete enough; and partly, in consequence, because our appreciation of the facts differs from yours:

1. We know, to be sure, that numerous reactionary elements profited from the popular insurrection to fight the socialist régime; we were acquainted with Mindszenty's speech; we are not unaware of the fact that Horthyist emigré circles abroad were very active; we believe that these same circles nursed the hope of a restoration of the former régime and that they strove

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AND STILL THEY FIGHT BACK!

The crisis of the Communist world has not come to an end; it has only begun.

That the Russians, by spilling enough blood, could reestablish military control over Budapest, was never in doubt. But their reduction of Hungary to the status of an occupied country merely intensifies those contradictions that had led to such bitter struggles within the realm of totalitarian power. The reverberations of the Hungarian revolution will remain with us for years to come.

In the special issue of DISSENT* we tried to compose a preliminary analysis of the East European events; we hope in the spring issue to print an "outline history" of the Hungarian revolution. Meanwhile, a few additional points:

• The Hungarian people have fought not merely with a heroism beyond praise but with a resourcefulness that requires the most careful study.

In their few days of freedom, the workers and students of Budapest quickly improvised emergency and representative institutions of their own. How rich was their capacity for creating new social forms that no one had anticipated: the Petofi Circle, a club of Communist writers became... a center of revolutionary opposition and dual power!

Together with this ingenuity born of desperation there was a stubborn loyalty to more traditional social forms. No sooner did a little freedom shine across Budapest than there reappeared the traditional parties of Hungarian democracy which the Communists had so brutally suppressed—and which various dim-witted or malicious apologists for Stalinism in the United States have declared to be "obsolete." Not only were the traditional parties of democracy reconstituted; there also appeared in Hungary organs of proletarian action, the workers' councils. These, with the soldiers' committees and the student organizations, came together in a spontaneous popular expression, the main goal of which was the ouster of the Russians and the reestablishment of Hungarian democracy. So powerful was this upsurge from below—an elemental pressure that came from *both* the ranks of the Hungarian Communist Party and the masses outside it—that the Nagy government, originally created to resist the masses, was soon swept along. It was, so to speak, inundated by waves of dual power.

Three major social techniques or kinds of social struggle were observ-

* A special 16-page issue of DISSENT, mailed free to all subscribers. (see p. 94).

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December 15, 1956

In a manner unparalleled in history, the workers of Budapest have continued to defy the Russian imperialist occupation. An imprisoned 23-year-old worker—younger, it is worth noting, than Trotsky was when he led the St. Petersburg Soviet in 1905—is the leader of the Budapest Workers' Council. (The striking workers are threatened with slave labor in the mines.) The peasants of Hungary continue to feed Budapest. So powerful is the self-discipline of the Hungarian workers and peasants that no black market of any significance can be found in the city. By the sheer power of their will and their solidarity, the Budapest workers, backed by the unexampled cohesion of workers and peasants throughout Hungary, have brought the Russians to an impossible predicament; and they may yet wring concessions from the armed conquerors.

This is an example of what man, even in the twentieth century, can still do. Every socialist, every democrat, every human being devoted to liberty must today align himself with the Hungarian people. Those who, in the face of Hungary, still dare to describe Russian totalitarianism and imperialism as "socialist" make a mockery of the most fundamental values of socialism. The Russian system is the enemy of socialism, the enemy of freedom, the enemy of man. Our respect for the blood of the Budapest workers, if nothing else, should burn this fact into our memories forever!

able in the single month of Hungarian freedom. The revolution began by employing the methods of a *national* struggle, for the moment uniting all classes as in the revolutions of 1848. But it was immediately infused with a *social* content, that is, the methods of the class struggle. (It may well be that this is merely an analytical distinction, that in practice these two "stages" were simultaneous in time.) The Hungarian revolution began to reflect the needs and complaints of those classes—the workers and peasants—which had suffered most from the absence of democracy and the forced collectivization. And then, after the Russian intervention, the Hungarian revolution, defeated but not broken, entered its third phase: it went over to the tactics of passive resistance perfected in India.

Yet it was not the same kind of passive resistance that the Indian nationalists had used. For from the beginning it had a distinctly class character. It became the weapon of the Budapest workers who conducted a general strike, not as a revolutionary offensive, but as a last-ditch resistance —by means of which they have in part already negated the effect of Russian intervention. For the consequence of this extraordinary resourcefulness in combining the traditional with improvised techniques of social rebellion—to say nothing of a heroism that our century can forget only at its moral peril—now seems to be that *a measure of dual power remains in Budapest.*

At first, as the most inflammable section of the population, the students had been the ones to lead the demonstrations, voice the demands and express the will of the Hungarian people. They had exposed themselves with remarkable fearlessness, and because they were both more vulnerable and expendable than the workers—factories could run without students

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but not without workers—they were more easily crushed by the Russians. Less quick to move but bringing to bear a greater "social seriousness" than the students, the workers of Budapest took over the struggle and to this day they continue to resist.

Beaten as they have been by the Russian tanks, numbering their dead in the thousands, further deprived of allies who have been deported to Russia or have had to flee to Austria, the workers of Budapest retain a sufficiently high level of fighting spirit, a sufficiently intense awareness of their moral claims and historical possibilities, to be able to force the puppet Kadar regime to negotiate with them. The workers' councils of Budapest remain; continue to function; demand that Nagy, so barbarously kidnapped by the Russians, be returned to Hungarian political life; keep insisting that the Russians leave.

And this, remember, *after* defeat; *after* blood; *after* deportations; *after* plague and hunger. Many revolutions have been defeated in our century, but can anyone remember a revolution in which the spirit of the vanquished remained so high as in Hungary today? It is unbelievable; sublime.

• How deeply the crisis has cut into the Communist world, no one has yet surmised. For if the revolts broke out in Hungary and Poland, it should be remembered that the possibility for their outbreak was partly created in Moscow, itself, by the "relaxation" proclaimed at the 20th Party Congress. As Richard Lowenthal has written (*Problems of Communism,* Nov.-Dec.):

> Totalitarian regimes can stand up to the most bitter discontent of the masses for a long time; but once authority gets weakened or divided at the top, long-standing grievances suddenly become motors of action. It is at the moment of loosening, of "liberalization," that the masses start moving and refuse to tolerate the old oppressive gesture which now no longer appears to be part of an unalterable order of things.

The formula fits Hungary exactly. And that, in their clumsy oafish way, is exactly what Khrushchev and Bulganin have begun to sense. We have no evidence, but I submit that the most plausible explanation for the recent behavior of the Russian leadership, its violent oscillations between repression and concession, threats and inducements, is fear, perhaps even panic. They have discovered that, with one or another variation, the "historical laws" that lead to conflict and clash in the capitalist countries, also operate behind the Iron Curtain.

The problem thus posed for the Russian leadership is ultimately insoluble—though they can count upon the imperialist adventures of Eden and Mollet, together with the diplomatic accomplishments of Dulles, to help bail them out. Either they must return to outright repression, which means to transform Hungary into a mere colony and to repress all those forces they *had* to let loose in eastern Europe; or they must risk the possibility that the "national Communism" they are ready to tolerate will become a national revolution against their empire.

• Internationally, the Communist movement continues to suffer severe losses. Jean Paul Sartre's statement denouncing the Russian intervention; the resignation from the British CP of several trade union leaders; statements

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of alarm from French fellow-traveling writers; the tearing-up of party cards by Austrian workers; the resignation of two members of the Canadian party's national committee; a full-scale faction fight inside the American party —these are a few of the known symptons. There must be many more.

It would be premature and facile to write off the Communist parties: they remain, in some countries, mass movements of consequence, and they continue to survive largely because the genuine socialist left in Europe and Asia is so frequently weak and spiritless. But heavy blows have been struck: new opportunities exist.

• And Tito? The Hungarian revolution has forced him to show his true political colors. On the one hand, he has been alarmed at the new signs of Russian belligerence, and this has resulted in a crisis of relations—upon a strictly *state-to-state* basis—between Russia and Yugoslavia. On the other hand, he has approved the second Russian intervention in Hungary, accepting the pretense that "counter-revolutionaries" had taken over the Hungarian revolution and going so far as to declare that the puppet Kadar and his handful of supporters represent "that which is most honest in Hungary." For Tito, like *any* dictator, must recognize that the Hungarian revolution threatened not only Khrushchev but himself: it threatened the very structure of totalitarian rule.

This fact is behind the recent arrest of Milovan Djilas, Tito's former second-in-command, who has broken with the whole political-intellectual structure of Communism. The immediate occasion for his arrest was his first-rate article in the *New Leader* (Nov. 19, 1956), in which he spoke as an unambiguous defender of the Hungarian revolution but also, for the first time, analyzed the Tito government in terms that recognize its basic social kinship with the Russian autocracy. And this was too much: the lonely rebel, who had by his own efforts moved from totalitarian Stalinism to an independent democratic socialism for eastern Europe, had to be silenced.

In Poland, too, the limits of "national Communism" have begun to emerge. Gomulka has made clear that, whether by his desire or not, there will not be genuinely free elections this winter in Poland. Multi-party listings will not be permitted on the ballot, though an "arrangement" will be worked out between the Polish CP and the farcical puppet "parties" for joint slates. Genuine democracy, the absolute prerequisite for genuine socialism, is not close at hand in Poland today. But that does not exhaust the meaning of that strange phenomenon which goes under the name of "national Communism." For it is not only a question of what Gomulka does; it is also a question of what his supporters and his critic-supporters in the Polish factories and among the Polish intellectuals want.

• Let me raise briefly a political question. It is generally assumed that there was nothing for the world to do but see the Hungarians go down in defeat. Perhaps this is so; but we should not be so ready to assume it.

There was one political slogan that could have been raised with great effectiveness by the West. Let Richard Lowenthal speak on this matter again:

The West, he writes "could have offered to make the loss of the satellite empire strategically tolerable for

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Russia by matching a Soviet withdrawal from eastern Europe with an American withdrawal from Western Europe.... [I might add that this is a valuable political demand in its own right, regardless of whether it makes things "tolerable" for the Russians.—I. H.] In a situation where Soviet Communist control of eastern Europe was actually crumbling, the offer of an American withdrawal on condition of full freedom for eastern Europe would have transformed the situation; not only would it have given immense encouragement to the freedom movements throughout the satellite states, but it would have added to the calculations of the Soviet leaders the one consideration which might have induced them to give in [to the Hungarians.]"

• If anyone still had any doubt as to the political-moral nature of the whole Communist world, let the events in Hungary teach him the truth. Even Nehru was finally compelled to say something in defense of the Hungarians—forced by pressure from within India, mainly pressure exerted by the Indian Socialist leaders, Jayaprakash Narayan and Asoka Mehta. Only the appalling Isaac Deutscher, while not supporting the Russian intervention, has dared to say, without a shred of evidence, that Cardinal Mindszenty became "the spiritual head of the insurrection" (*The Reporter*, Nov. 15, 1956). Mr. Deutscher is a cynic who cannot distinguish between his infatuation with power and the Laws of History.

But the trend is all the other way. Consider how significant it is that even the *New Statesman and Nation*, long a receptacle for genteel fellow-traveling, was driven to write these words in its November 10 issue:

> We have been watching not only the end of the Hungarian bid for freedom, but the end of the Soviet myth ... Why then have the Russians been prepared to throw away all the fruits of their post-Stalin diplomacy?... The only sane explanation is that the political consequences of the escape of one of the satellites would be too grave for the Soviet system to stand. If one goes, the Russians seem to believe, others—perhaps all—will follow. And why should such a dash for freedom stop short on the Soviet frontier?... Their dilemma is one which springs directly from the decisions of the 20th Congress: how do you give people freedom and at the same time limit it to prescribed doses? Their answer is now clear. Within the limits of the Warsaw Pact and a Communist system, but only within those limits, individual Communist Parties are to be permitted a good deal of national independence... But one step outside the Warsaw Pact, and the Russian tanks will move. The Soviet Empire is still held together with bonds of steel.

Let this be remembered in the coming days. A line of blood has been drawn. A line of blood, in Hungary, as wide as a river. And it is not yet dry.

December 1, 1956 IRVING HOWE

P.S. It is frustrating, and impossible, to try to keep up with the Hungarian events in a quarterly. But to provide DISSENT readers with some information that is particularly important in view of the campaign that has already begun in both Communist and certain non-Communist circles to discredit the Hungarian revolution, here is a section from an excellent dispatch to the *New Statesman*, Nov. 17, 1956, which deals with some of the standard accusations against the Hungarians:

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Nobody who was in Hungary during the revolution could escape the overwhelming impression that the Hungarian people had no desire or intention to return to the capitalist system... Particularly significant was the call of the [Hungarian] Council of Free Trade Unions. On November 1 it declared:

"As from today we are no longer the tool of a colonialism disguised as Socialism, not a figure on the chess board of some conqueror or other..."

No greater evidence could be found that this was no "white" revolution than the message of Hungarian Jewry, signed by the Budapest Board of Rabbis, and broadcast by Radio Budapest on November 2:

"Hungarian Jewry enthusiastically salutes the achievements of the revolution, pays reverent homage to the heroes, and identifies itself with the free and independent homeland..."

The Socialist leader, Anna Kethly, in the first issue of the revived party organ *Nepszava*, described the nature of the revolution:

"The Social Democratic party... with its own bare hands, has won its chance of living and it has won this from a regime which called itself a popular democracy, but which in form and essence was neither popular nor democratic. We greet with profound respect the heroes who have made possible this rebirth of the party, thousands of young intellectuals and workers who have fought, starving and in rags, spurred on by the idea of a free and independent Hungary."

At the same time she issued a warning.

"Freed from prison, let us not allow the country to become a prison of another color. Let us watch over the factories, mines and land, which must remain in the hands of the people."

December 7, 1956

ERUPTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The combined, and probably premeditated, Anglo-French-Israeli punitive expedition against Egypt has again illuminated the narrow track we walk between survival and extinction. If, for many of us, this information has become fearfully redundant, for others it may have the salutary effect of making it clear that the challenge confronting the human race in our century cannot be resolved by recourse to past modes of political behavior or to a detached faith in History, blind and deified, like Justice. Such abstractions convert themselves into weapons for the concrete murder of humanity.

Politics used to be defined as the science of power, or the art of the possible; and, as such, politics is dead. We are learning, and it is a bitter lesson, that the people we used to call Utopians because they insisted that the spheres of public and private morality could not be kept apart without finally corrupting both were, if ineffectual in their time, prescient for ours. Politics, in its most *practical* and *experiential* definition, now becomes the art and science of human survival, that is, the practice of pub-

[The author of this article is an American anthropologist who recently spent time in Israel studying the Kibbutz and an Arab village. Readers are invited to send in their comments on the topic discussed by Mr. Diamond.]

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lic morality. If this seems *merely* homiletic, it is a measure of the tragedy of our time that it should seem so. It is a homily come home to roost, for good. It is the handwriting on the wall, the damned spot that defies erasure.

We should, therefore, condemn the combined attack on Egypt as a special instance of immoral, read impractical, antiquated, and ultimately ineffectual political behavior. This nineteenth century punitive expedition calculated the risk of a third world war, and in the face of that reality, no counter-argument can rise above the level of rationalization.

In making this point we do not, of course, interpret the crisis in the Middle East, but, first things first, we take a position against *this* attempt at resolution. The crisis itself, now acute, now chronic, cannot be fully explored here, but certain important and usually neglected issues can be raised.

FIRST—concerning Israel. We refer to the state of Israel, and not to Zionism, or Jews in general, because these are not synonymous, despite the propaganda to the contrary. Israel's position is tragic. The country is tied to the West economically, culturally, and sentimentally. This is the present necessary condition for her national existence, but it is not, to anywhere near the same degree, the necessary condition for the emergent nationalisms in the ex-colonial Afro-Asian world.

Hence Israel is viewed with suspicion not only by the Arab effendis and demagogues, but by many of the more sober and progressive elements among the Afro-Asians. The image of Israel held in these quarters is that of an outpost, military, economic, and cultural, of Western colonialism. This was certainly *one* reason why Israel was not invited to the Bandung Conference; and the Egyptian adventure has only served to confirm such suspicions. There is a nuance here which should not be neglected. In a world dangerously split along parallel ethnic, cultural and economic lines, the cultural chauvinism of many Israelis, their lack of insight into or sympathy with Arab culture, generates a type of hostility even more explosive than that arising from other factors.

Israel tends to consider itself a beacon of civilization in a benighted area in much the same way that early American settlers viewed the Indians. Where Arab fury against Israel is genuine, that is, felt by ordinary Arabs and not simply manufactured by the effendis, it is, in part, ultimately traceable to this Israeli version of the "white man's burden." In defense of Israel it can be said that these, and other, obsolescent attitudes were not invented by her, and in another time and place would have proven viable, even if inappropriate. But the dilemma lies precisely in the impossibility of pursuing well worn channels of political behavior under contemporary conditions.

PERTINENT here is the "power vacuum" that exists in the Near East. Given Israel's mobile and efficient army, her technicians, her bustling population, and her quasi-messianic sense of manifest destiny, she could have multiplied her land area many times over —that is, if this were the 19th century. The "vacuum" drawing her out is tempting, and the pressure from within, especially but not exclusively from right-wing, quasi-fascist elements such as the Herut is real enough. There is, in short, an undercurrent of ex-

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pansionism in Israel which is part of the very dynamic of state formation. This undercurrent is a fact to be borne in mind, though I would not claim that it is presently at all decisive.

But what of the more immediate situation? Wasn't the Israeli attack provoked? Certainly, border incidents were frequent and bloody. Although most of these incidents were initiated by the Arabs, the probability is that they did not constitute a threat to Israel's immediate survival. Israel had and has the best army in the Near East. The bluster of the effendis and demagogues to the contrary, none of the Arab nations possessed sufficient organizational or technical know-how, nor sufficient national morale, to launch an attack on Israel with any real hope of success.

And if we seem to be asking too much of a sorely tried Israel, it is no less than an aware mankind must ask of itself in these times. Israel's dilemma is that it must behave, not like other nations, but better than other nations have acted in the past, *in order to survive.*

Nothing short of, say, Soviet troops manning Soviet machines could possibly have altered the situation. And there is no evidence that an international Communist plot of *this* character was being hatched. On the contrary, both the Soviet Union and the United States, for reasons of their own, want and need peace in the Near East desperately, although the formula has not yet been found. We should remember that, on the outbreak of hostilities, both Russia and America immediately exerted all possible pressure towards their cessation, along with most of the rest of the world. Whatever the motivations of individual nations may have been, the fact is that the war in the Near East was not permitted to spread or continue. And I believe the same result would have been achieved had Egypt been the immediate aggressor.

THE MOTIVES and results of the British and French participation in the expedition are too well known to require extended comment. Suffice it to say that the Canal is blocked, the essential imperialism of British and French foreign policy stands out, both nations are now more dependent than ever on the United States, the British Commonwealth suffered a near fatal blow, and France has worsened its position vis-a-vis North Africa, if that is still possible. Furthermore, the thieves fell out when caught in the spotlight of world opinion and gave feeble, conflicting accounts of the origin and course of their movements.

Above all, the most reactionary elements in Russia were strengthened with particular reference to the attack on Hungary. Whether the attack on Egypt provided a convenient cover for brutality in Hungary, or whether the Russians decided it better not to take chances by relaxing further in a fluid situation is hard to say, but it is at least clear that in the eyes of the Afro-Asian world one immorality tended to cancel out the other.

Nasser is still in power, and seems assured of greater support in Egypt than before the invasion. Egypt's right to nationalize the Canal, which Egypt was operating quite efficiently prior to the attack, will undoubtedly be recognized by most nations, as indeed it should be. Although Nasser is a blustering, para-military dictator, he is not, strictly speaking, a Fascist; he is an ultra-nationalist leader thrown up during the first phase in the re-

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structuring of a feudal country. The quickest way to get rid of him, if we do not like his behavior, is to extend large-scale aid to the terribly depressed Egyptian masses.

The indicated immediate solutions seem rather obvious. First, the Arab refugee situations must be quickly ameliorated. These people are rotting away in an irredentist no-man's land, and most of the border incidents are rooted in their disaffection. It is important to note here, although we cannot pursue the matter, that most of these refugees fled Israel because they were caught between two fires. In so doing, they made Israel a viable political entity, from the Zionist point of view, and whatever the intentions of the Israeli Government may have been prior to their emigration, it quickly took advantage of the situation. Actually, the refugees were no more welcome on a permanent basis in Egpyt or Jordan than they would have been in Israel.

THEIR RESETTLEMENT is a project of major dimensions, requiring extensive international aid. For at present there is *physical space* to accommodate them in the Arab countries, but little *economic room*. The latter has literally to be created via irrigation projects, soil amelioration programs, and so on. Hindsight may be easy, but as the bearer of Western enlightenment to the heathen, Israel might well have avoided a part of its present dilemma by confronting the refugee question boldly, that is, by insisting relentlessly in the United Nations and other channels, despite rebuffs, that action be taken on the international level, while it continued to absorb the few hardship cases that it could, given its swollen population. Had Israel acknowledged that the refugee problem was the central problem in its relations with the Arab world, it would have been in a better moral and political position, and might have been able to neutralize the demagogic use to which the Arab leaders put the refugees.

The second necessary step is the extension of aid, preferably administered through an international agency, to all nations of the Near East who request it. Such aid should be given for specific purposes, but with no political strings or secret clauses attached. The only condition would be the guarantee that all nations, including Israel, can freely use the Canal.

Finally, military aid to all Near Eastern countries should be cut off at once, through international agreement, double-checked by U.N. inspection teams.

These, of course, are realistic proposals, whose sound is idealistic only in the context of our customary political behaviour. The degree to which they could be realized depends, in the last analysis, on how willing Russia and the United States are to experiment in reaching an agreement in favor of nobody but the people of the Middle East.

It is only under such favorable conditions that Israel will finally get the chance to reveal whether those Jews who became Zionists have read deeply into the tragic scroll of Jewish history.

STANLEY DIAMOND

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1. THERE WAS A SOUND OF REVELRY BY NIGHT...

Margaret Halsey

We have the word of fashion writers and gossip columnists that Mr. Eisenhower's second inaugural, like his first, is going to be the reverse of ascetic. According to present plans, the occasion will be celebrated with furs, diamonds, gowns by famous designers and every conceivable luxury short of Adlai Stevenson walking in chains behind the Eisenhower chariot. And if the world stands still long enough, this conspicuous consumption will be reported in considerable detail, as having what is called "human interest."

To the sociologist or the cultural anthropologist, however, the celebration of Mr. Eisenhower's second inaugural may very well have a significance somewhat transcending ordinary newsworthiness. Washington correspondents—possibly through an understandable professional bias—tend to interpret everything in terms of politics. But this is sometimes a constricting approach. The observer whose interest is psychological rather than political is already toying with the idea that the inaugural festivities may be, for Mr. Eisenhower's popularity, what the Battle of Gettysburg was to the Confederacy—a high water mark that will be seen in retrospect to have been the turn of the tide. It is one of the imbalances of American life that we spend too much time on Presidential elections before they take place and too little time on them after they are over. The 1956 Presidentiad, to use Walt Whitman's word, went into the deep freeze even faster than usual because of Hungary and the Middle East. And yet the very fact that there is such a phrase as "the Eisenhower magic" shows that the political comments on Mr. Eisenhower's popularity—voluminous as they have been—have not yet completely explained the President's triumphant return to office.

It would have taken superhuman perspicuity to have foreseen, before the election, what was immediately apparent after it—namely, that the old, familiar blocs like the Jewish vote and the labor vote and the Negro vote had been imperceptibly supplanted by a new dispensation. Many people have already written about the fact that the old groupings were shown by the 1956 election returns to have been extensively dissolved away. The new alignment, however, has as yet been only tentatively defined. It is an alignment of contrasting personality structures, and

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Mr. Eisenhower, in himself, is less deeply involved in it than might be supposed.

There is general agreement that a substantial element in Mr. Eisenhower's appeal is the circumstance that he is a father image in the minds of many voters. But several things about both the past and the future come more clearly into focus if this idea is critically re-examined. It is possible that the image of Mr. Eisenhower, in the minds of the voters who returned him to office in 1956, was not the image of a father, but the image of the typical American Consumer—complete with golf, cipher-wife, cowboy stories and all.

In this view, it was not a pater-familias that many of those citizens were voting for. It was themselves they were endorsing—their own confusion, superficiality, amorphous good intentions and evasiveness of responsibility magnified as on a huge screen in the personality of the President. Hence Mr. Eisenhower did not attract their votes because they think of him as a father *to* them.

He attracted—indeed, magnetized—their votes because he has the same surface cheerfulness, the too-easy permissiveness, the vagueness of standards and the basic inability to cope that they have themselves in their roles as parents. Similarly, many women sensed in the Republican candidate just the same glib, plausible, lightweight, feathery quality they have grown familiar with in the television stereotypes of fatherhood—in Ozzie and Harriet, for instance, or Father Knows Best.

IN REAL life, there has always been something a little unsatisfactory about the idea of Mr. Eisenhower as a parent figure. It is not merely that you do not call a father "Ike." It is also that politically Mr. Eisenhower has been and still is the most uncustodial of men; and he resembles in very few particulars those other father-image Presidents, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt.

Indeed, if a father image was involved in the last election, then Mr. Stevenson provided it. He did, that is, if a father is conceived of as the one who educates, who imposes the necessary disciplines, who beckons onward toward growth and development and maturity. Viewed this way, then, the voters who were attracted by Mr. Stevenson as a candidate were perhaps, in many cases, people who see themselves as more complex and more energetic than the passive, drifting consumer so grimly and admirably outlined in the books of C. Wright Mills.

When the Eisenhower image is seen in this different perspective, then it was not Mr. Eisenhower's competence, but his lack of competence that many of those millions of people voted for. If magic is supposed to imply the presence of some unknowable quality, then there is no such thing as "the Eisenhower magic." What has been called that is merely the President and the Consumer facing each other and saying, "Whew! For a minute there, I was scared. But if you're here, I must be real."

The relationship between the Consumer and the President being one of mutual recognition and identification, it then becomes clear, paradoxically enough, that for all the talk about Mr. Eisenhower's being a leader, it was precisely because he is not a leader that he acquired what has since been referred to as a man-

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date. Ever since last November, the liberals and the uncaptured Democrats have been stunned and partially immobilized—not because they lost the election, but because they lost it by so much. But a mandate in the dictionary sense is "an instruction as to policy," and if words are to be used accurately, a mandate is just what Mr. Eisenhower did *not* get.

THE NEW SOCIOLOGY has given us both the vocabulary and the equipment to dissect such cloudy phrases as "the Eisenhower magic." The social phenomenon which goes by that name has to be understood in terms of the Consumer. Many sociologists, some of them quite widely read, have written about the Consumer—that colorless, rudderless, rootless American whose life consists of very little more than the obedient using up of all the multitudinous products turned out by a business society. That interpretation of Mr. Eisenhower's appeal which sees it, not as some inexplicable mystique, but as the President and the Consumer reassuring each other, explains many things.

It explains why a man in fragile health and with no observable compulsion in the direction of hard work should have wanted to assume for another four years even the nominal responsibility for a great state in time of crisis. It explains why Mr. Eisenhower would not—indeed, could not—campaign on the basis of issues. It explains the Republicans' election eve television program, which was an incredible bacchanal for a chief of state, but just what the doctor ordered for a Consumer.

It explains why it was only the people who voted for Mr. Stevenson who resented the President's delegation of power to anonymous assistants. The Consumer did not resent this determined abdication. On the contrary, he liked it. What Mr. Eisenhower did for the Consumer was to make the Presidency seem like a job that any not particularly talented white-collar worker could handle.

The Consumer could identify with the President, because Mr. Eisenhower reduced his high office to the simplicity and the proportions of working for the Community Chest or the P. T. A. This is not to derogate either of those institutions—both of which fill a felt need—but merely to point up the difference between a local responsibility and an office upon whose conduct racial survival may hinge.

To see Mr. Eisenhower and his followers, not as father and children, but as identical kinds of people worried about their own shadowiness is to understand at once the suffocating popularity of the phrase, "I like Ike." In essence, "I like Ike" was a sentence which was neither jubilant nor affirmative, but wistful. Mr. Eisenhower's inability to stand up for a friend or a supporter, and his unwillingness to arouse the hostility of a foe, are qualities which he and the shallow-rooted Consumer have very much in common.

What they also have in common is a considerable anxiety to have these deficiencies interpreted, not as deficiencies, but as the ingredients of winsomeness and charm. It was because all the phrases about "liking Ike" were based, not on a reality, but on a hope, that they had such a monotonous and reiterative currency.

Mr. Eisenhower likes to think of himself as a conciliator, but there is

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a world of difference between the professional conciliator and the amateur. A genuine, bona fide conciliator is a man who knows something about anger. Competent psychiatrists, for example, are the targets of a good deal of anger and they school themselves to react impersonally. But Mr. Eisenhower's reaction to anger is approximately the reaction of an old-fashioned spinster to sex. He does not handle anger; he flees from it—which accounts for the fact that in the last four years American policy, both at home and abroad, has been above everything else virginal.

THE OBSERVER whose interest is psychological rather than political will be reminded, by the glittering celebrations attendant upon the inaugural, of four unsparkling circumstances which were involved in the Consumer-President's return to office. The first is Mr. Eisenhower's real personality structure. The second is the image of his personality as it was projected by mass communications—the image of leadership and responsibility. The third is that image as it was received by the audience. The fourth is the real character of that audience.

Mr. Eisenhower's real character—in spite of the fanfare about his wisdom and experience and maturity—got through to millions of people, and so far from being put off by it, they recognized it happily as being in almost exact conformity to their own. What the one-party press accomplished, in building up a picture of leadership where no leadership existed, was to give the Consumer—on the unconscious level — a moral excuse for identifying with a man whose basic orientation is narcissistic.

But just how perdurable is a relationship like the one between Mr. Eisenhower and his Consumer-followers? That relationship has no roots in problems shared or missions accomplished. Like an orchid, it subsists on air. There has been no real exchange between Mr. Eisenhower and the Consumer comparable to the real exchange which has taken place between the electorate and some of our preceding Presidents.

On other occasions, the relationship between the President and the electorate has successfully weathered some rude shocks, ranging from personal scandal to declarations of war. But no real exchange is possible between a mirror and the person who looks in it. Mr. Eisenhower has never asked the Consumer to do anything more than vote for him, and the Consumer is now legally inhibited from ever voting for him again.

With Chaos and old Night the order of things abroad, it has become apparent to even the most wishful thinker that "the Eisenhower magic" stops at Sandy Hook. People who are in the market for magic at all, do not want that magic to be localized or part-time—particularly when it has been explicitly and implicitly heralded as unfailing. It is therefore by no means absurd to wonder whether Mr. Eisenhower's Inaugural Ball may not prove to be the last consumptive blooming of an over-extended celebrity.

Whether the so-called Eisenhower image dims and loses some of its force in the months ahead depends also, to a certain extent, on the behavior of the liberals. One pathetically amusing aspect of Mr. Eisenhower's first term was the way in which Republican editors and commentators got out their bicycle pumps and tried to inject programs into a

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man as innocent of programming as the anopheles mosquito. A less amusing, but much more curious aspect of those four years was the fact that most of the spokesmen for the opposition handled the President as if he were radioactive. Even his severest critics—whose name was not legion—never failed to temper their astringencies with the comment that Eisenhower is a man of good will.

But Mr. Eisenhower, like all Consumers, is not a man of good will. He is a man of no will. Like the Consumer, he is not actively malevolent. But he stands passively by while the Arabs raid the Israelis or Senator McCarthy masterminds a drive to wreck the careers and dismember the reputations of many people who really are men of good will. How did the liberals and unseduced Democrats—who are professionally not lacking in either human experience or native shrewdness—come to describe as benevolent what was merely inert and uninflected?

THERE WERE probably several reasons. So far, a rather arbitrary distinction has been made between two contrasting personality structures—between the Consumer, on the one hand, and, on the other, the presumably more energetic and self-confident voters who responded to Mr. Stevenson. But there are, of course, overlappings. Even the most militant liberal has a little bit of the Consumer in him. Living in the midst of our relentlessly expanding business society, he cannot help it.

Perhaps that drop or two of Consumer blood which is in all Americans made Mr. Eisenhower look better to the opposition than he really was—especially at first. Perhaps they were daunted by that Medusa word, "magic." Again, they may have been unconsciously afraid that if they said the Emperor had no clothes on, they would at best be proved ridiculously and irretrievably wrong and at worst stoned in the market place. These, of course, are only hypotheses. What is certain is that there was a failure to distinguish between the Consumer-President's massive, astronomical popularity and the reality of Mr. Eisenhower's personality structure.

During Mr. Eisenhower's first term, the more articulate members of the opposition contented themselves with condescending to him as an untutored "man of good will." Although they were both dazzled and shaken by his popularity, he seemed like such an overgrown Boy Scout that they could not, in their literate hearts, take him very seriously. In a troubled way, they saluted—usually without any personal knowledge of it—his military glory; but in their hearts they regarded him, with his third-grade syntax and his everlasting I-don't-knows, as not much more than a freshly bathed chimney sweep.

Thus it was that while the liberal columnists discussed at some length Mr. Eisenhower's dexterity in picking up effective television mannerisms, what he actually said on television seemed to them so utterly unvital as not to deserve comment. When they criticised him, they did it by inference—failing to realize that inferential criticism is wasted on a Consumer. The liberals, geared to *Hamlet*, whirred around in neutral when confronted with *Abie's Irish Rose*.

It is possible to educate public choice to higher things than *Abie's Irish Rose*—but not by condescension. Every time the liberals publicly—whatever private opinions they may have had to the contrary—described

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Mr. Eisenhower as "a man of good will," they were guilty of unconscious condescension to the electorate. The primary weapon, however, against shallowness and superficiality is not hidden condescension, but outspoken criticism—the kind of fearless and unshrinking commentary that withers myths and lays bare the clean, white bones of reality. The human being as Consumer is above all else a man who likes to stay out of trouble, and had Mr. Eisenhower been the target of merciless appraisals, it would not have been possible for the Consumer to fuse with him so completely.

Nevertheless, Mr. Eisenhower's inaugural festivities may be more of a milestone than is generally recognized. It is not beyond credence that the relation between the President and the Consumer has reached a sort of natural terminus. There is nothing more they can do for each other. And the outside world having become indisputably no longer a place for virgins, the native shrewdness of the opposition may awake from its slumber. Mr. Eisenhower's popularity could then be seen for what it is—nothing magical, nothing that has to be respected and admired, and certainly nothing that has to be treated gingerly.

This is, of course, not to be interpreted as a confident prediction, but merely as an outlining of certain psychological possibilities. But one thing that is a certitude, and not a possibility, is that a Consumer dynasty is forming in the wings. Mr. James Finnegan, Adlai Stevenson's manager, has said that elections are won two or three years before the voters actually go to the polls. The *New York Times* may have had Mr. Finnegan's precept in mind when, on the day after the election, it ran a piece with a splashy headline reading, "Eisenhower, The Leader, Trained Nixon Carefully For Leadership."

Since Madison Avenue, though somewhat deficient in social vision, is by no means a collection of retarded children, we may take it for granted that Mr. Nixon is not scheduled to duplicate his Chief's role of American Consumer. There will be a slight, but refreshing variation. Mr. Nixon will be, not the American Consumer, but the American Consumer's Younger Brother—the crazy kid who may once have gone a bit wrong, but who has since straightened out and become a credit to the family.

If the liberals fail to scent out the Danse Macabre possibilities in the inaugural—if they are not, for instance, as forehandedly organized against Mr. Nixon as the newspaper of record is apparently organized in his behalf—we may live to see Young Brother elected to the White House on some such Consumer platform as that the Democrats sank the Lusitania. But other writers—notably Wayne Morse, as early as 1952—have already pointed out that the line of demarcation between Democrats and Republicans is becoming blurred.

A new line of demarcation is taking shape, and it might be roughly described as a division between Consumers and non-Consumers—between fleeing virgins, on the one hand and people who are more active and more sure of themselves, on the other. The unflattering allusions to the Consumer, hereinbefore contained, have of course had to be oversimplified. Actually, the Consumer is other things besides being a Consumer. He is not without complexity,

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nor is he totally impervious to competent leadership.

But—and it is the all-important proviso — the seductive, irresistible mirror-image must not be allowed to intervene between him and that kind of leadership. For the future, a great deal will depend upon whether the liberals can shake themselves free of the narrowly political way of looking at things and learn to recognize the underlying social currents of which politics is only the surface expression. Perhaps more, rather than less, eggheadism should be the order of the day.

2. THE SPECTACLE IS OVER

Bernard Rosenberg

To nobody's surprise, the amiable man of limited educability and his venomous protege won themselves a thumping victory. Ike, the charismatic non-leader, "manifested" himself here and there, brought his magic aura with him, smiled and tranquilized a restive people. While fantastic eruptions were taking place in other parts of the world, the United States continued to behave predictably, if somewhat peculiarly. It now appears that no combination of circumstances could have stopped Eisenhower from being re-elected. He was a sure thing in prosperity or depression, peace or war, and one almost feels, dead or alive. The personal magnetism of a man who can turn any political condition to advantage is an awesome thing, and widespread worship attendant upon it deserves to be called Ikenology. The specific image is apparently irrelevant; its features, though always radiant, are infinitely plastic. Ike soothes the people as a prince of peace—and thrills them to the point of paroxysm when he brings not peace but a sword.

The Republicans said, "A vote for Stevenson is a vote for Eastland." They were right. The Democrats said, "A vote for Ike is a vote Dickie." And they were right. So now we have both Dickie and Eastland. It takes an ingenious electoral system to achieve such results. But there were others, generated not so much by the good sense of voters who had suddenly become judicious ticket-splitters, as by the campaign itself.

For some time the Democrats thought they had discovered one chink in Ike's armor. The Administration promised to cut back on military expenditures, and actually did so. Its ineffable Secretary of Defense was eloquently threatening to go even farther in the same direction. The situation gave Senator Symington, himself a Presidential aspirant, material enough for the electrifying speech he delivered a hundred times in the last session of Congress. And it provided his party with an issue. Democrats were expressing deep alarm—none more so than Adlai who started out in good voice on this theme—over

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the "irresponsible" reduction in our air force and in the size of our standing army. Ike remained adamant in his conviction that the world could be blown up with fewer wings in the Air Force, and with the army largely converted into an elite guard of technicians to guide intercontinental ballistic missiles. His opponents, such as they were, claimed that he was jeopardizing American security. This position, on top of his conciliatory attitude at Geneva, even endeared him to an odd trio of supporters: Henry Wallace, Harry Bridges and I. F. Stone (the "Eisenhower Marxist" who later defected to Stevenson).

What happened next is not entirely clear. We may have to wait for the ghost of an inarticulate memoirist to supply us with details. However, several Washington correspondents provide a general outline. It seems that the President's advisers were casting about for a gimmick like the one that had clinched Ike's victory in 1952. Obviously he could not go to Korea again; but he could propose to end the draft, and he could offer to stop H bomb experiments. Democratic strategists somehow learned of the dramatic gesture Ike might make; a vice-president in charge of sales then decided that his candidate should steal Ike's thunder. Therefore, Adlai who had been bitter about military cuts, now adopted the administration point of view, favoring a small establishment equipped with modern atomic weapons. Moreover, he built the last half of his campaign around ending the draft and the H bomb experiments—which provoked Ike and his idolators into opposing what they had all along intended to propose. This, at least is the most plausible reconstruction of a mystifying episode.

THERE WERE other curiosities. On November 8, Marquis Childs made an original contribution to political science. In his syndicated column Childs indicated that we do not have a one party system or a two party system or a six party system, as various observers have contended, but rather that there exists in the U.S. a ninety-six party system! What, more parties than in France? By far, because of "the separateness of forty eight Republican and Democratic parties, each walled off behind state boundaries." Ninety six parties. And Carmine DeSapio couldn't find it in his heart to let three decrepit Socialist parties whose collective vote would have totaled, shall we say, four thousand to remain on the New York State ballot. It was nearly enough to make this socialist regret that he had not registered so that he could thereafter master the complexities of write-in voting to write-in even an uncounted vote for Darlington Hoopes. To be sure, the Vegetarian Party got its herbivores on many ballots, alongside the Pig Party's carnivores (they probably canceled each other out), and the Vegetarian Party's Vice-Presidential candidate declared with justice that his was the most radical group in the field since it "went to the roots of matters."

Hardly anything was said on the subject of civil rights. Why should politicians be agitated about them? The Smith Act, the Internal Security Act, the McCarran-Walter Act—a part of that larger legacy which also includes Taft-Hartley—all this legislatian has been institutionalized. One hears no more wild public talk about repeal. If these iniquities from the

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Roosevelt-Truman era are ever to be wiped out, it will not be on account of initiative exercised from the White House or from Capitol Hill, but simply because they all involve grave constitutional questions on which the Supreme Court may decide to pass.

Not that Ike is unconcerned with repealing much of the New Deal. When it looked as if Congress might be derelict in not turning Hell's Canyon over to the Idaho Power Company, which was panting for it, two calls came from the White House staff to every member of the House and Senate. While this pressure was brought to bear on a matter that *really* engaged the Administration, another, quite minor matter, the "President's" school aid bill, was laid quietly to rest.

Throughout the Northwest advocates of public power like Senator Morse won on this issue alone. To the superficial observer this would suggest a repudiation of the Eisenhower alliance with private utilities. Ten days after the election, when he had had time to think over its deeper significance, Interior Secretary Seaton explained in Salt Lake City, "If there is anything basically wrong with the Eisenhower concept of water and power development it's a question of salesmanship rather than right or Justice."

Nor is this an isolated expression of wisdom. By now an impressive list of witticisms and *apercus* uttered by the President and his official family could be assembled. Let us note a few:

- May 24, 1956, Mr. Seaton's Assistant Secretary, Felix Wormser: "There are business failures even in times of great prosperity. It is part and parcel of our American way of life. I do not think we would want it different."
- April 24, 1953, Under-Secretary of Agriculture True Morse: "Price support programs tend to keep the inefficient farmer in business instead of allowing the 'normal healthy adjustment' that should take place in agriculture."
- January 29, 1953, Mr. Seaton's predecessor, Interior Secretary McKay addressing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: "We're in the saddle as an Administration representing business and industry."
- October 12, 1954, as reported in the Baltimore Sun, Secretary of Labor Mitchell: "...a relatively big unemployment total... is a good thing, a sign of economic health and progress."
- May 23, 1956, the capstone to all this, Presidential Assistant Howard Pyle's own little gem: "The right to suffer is one of the joys of a free society."

Not to be outdone by his team the President is quite capable of dazzling us with his own pyrotechnics. In the first flush of victory, Ike held a press conference and made an extended statement on the meaning of modern Republicanism that deserves careful study. First he said, "We believe that it is free enterprise that has brought these blessings to America." The phrase, "these blessings," happens to have no antecedent in his statement, and it would be captious to search for one in any of Eisenhower's valuable off-the-cuff comments. He goes on:

> Therefore, we are going to try our best to preserve that free enterprise and put all of these problems in the hands of localities and the private enterprise of states [the what?—B. R.] wherever we can, because it happens that the great difference, as I see it, between myself and people of a philosophy that believes in centralized government, is that I believe to have this free enterprise healthy, you must have, first, integrity in

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> your fiscal operations of the Government; second, you must preserve a sound dollar or all our plans for Social Security and pensions for the aged fall by the wayside, they are no good; and thirdly, in this dispersion of power. Now, that, at home, as I see it, represents modern Republicanism.

However profound, the statement *is* abstract. Concretely, a modern or Eisenhower Republican has been defined as any Republican running for office. Regardless of their voting record, they all get letters of warm commendation from the President, and many receive personal bubble-top visits to bolster them. In vain. Charisma cannot be transmitted from the hero to those who live in his shadow.

Therefore, the unbeatable Eisenhower carried fewer members of his party with him than any other winning President in a hundred years. Where Republicans fared well, other forces were at work. For instance, in West Virginia, a grotesque racist, Chapman Revercomb, who failed to secure Tom Dewey's endorsement in 1948, came out of eclipse and was returned to the Senate. Urban centers and the South, both securely Democratic in an earlier day, switched to Ike and, in several cases, to his supporters. Doris Fleeson sums up part of the shift, "The city revolt affected Baltimore, Chicago, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Louisville, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland, Boston, St. Louis, New Orleans and lesser known but important industrial citadels in North Carolina, West Virginia and Tennessee."

We leave a precinct by precinct accounting to the pollsters. These changes are no doubt complicated. Nevertheless, one fact stands out: Negroes and those who care about them will not continue to be reliable Democrats. It is not without irony—or tragedy—that Southern Negroes should be forced to go Republican. The NAACP leader, Roy Wilkins, has pointed out that this time the Southern Negro vote was proportionately more Republican than the Northern Negro vote. The quetion arises: did Adlai Stevenson, darling of the ADA, have to spend most of his time between elections mending Southern fences? Did he have to dine with Talmadge? Was it necessary to fraternize with the ex-Governor, now, the Supreme Court help us, Senator from Georgia? Does it pay, even from the viewpoint of "practical" politics, to weasel on civil rights?

The shabby spectacle is over. Its aftermath will discourage only those who chronically put too much stock in elections. There are other, more important forms of political action, and other, more relevant traditions in this country. Once, and perhaps not by chance, the American environment produced a man like Henry David Thoreau. Civil disobedience spread from Concord to the minds of Tolstoy and Gandhi. As a testament of unwillingness to participate in injustice, it is very much alive all the way from Budapest to Montgomery, Alabama. We now know that such instruments will always be at our disposal, without the labor party that is so sorely needed in America or with it. Meanwhile, we reserve the right to keep laughing. It improves the digestion.

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"THE POWER ELITE": COMMENT ON CRITICISM

The recent publication of The Power Elite, *C. Wright Mills' study of American society, has aroused a great deal of discussion and controversy in the press. Perhaps because it contains a caustic criticism of much that is happening in American society and to American thought, the book evoked strong reactions from many reviewers. In the belief that* The Power Elite *raises issues of the first importance, the editors of* DISSENT *invited Mr. Mills to comment on his critics. Here is his reply.*

Dear friends:

I hope you will forgive me if—being more interested in criticism than in critics—I don't mention names but rather bring up points. I want briefly to comment on some of the criticism of *The Power Elite* not because I believe the book invulnerable to criticism nor because I want to take a crack at people who have taken one at me, but because I think the angry character of many of the reviews suggests political and moral questions that are of intellectual interest.

This anger, I believe, is due to the fact that whether it is generally right or generally wrong, the book is taken as a blow at the smooth certainties and agreeable formulas that now make up the content of liberalism. This liberalism now determines the standard view of American civilization; most reviewers are liberals of one sort or another, or at least think of themselves as such. But since they are often intelligent as well, their liberalism is rather insecure. Therefore they are easily upset. Therefore they become very angry. Therefore, they want to wiggle out of any arguments about the liberal platitudes and qualifications to which they cling.

What is interesting is the way they wiggle.

I

One journal of liberal opinion, rather than review the book, runs a piece containing one thought: professors who read *White Collar* "liked every part of it except the one about professors." They thought this part "only half true, a kind of caricature." So, concludes the reviewer, perhaps the pictures in *The Power Elite* of all the other groups —bureaucrats and politicians and millionaires—are also caricatures.

Of course they are. *All* concepts are "caricatures." They invite attention to selected features of some object. The question is to what extent they specify important features and to what extent they obfus-

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cate them. This critic suggests that the test of social conceptions is whether or not those to whom they refer find them pleasantly in line with their own self-image. He suggests further that *they* should know best since it is "one kind of life that they [know] about." It is difficult to think of a more misleading test. I've never studied any group that had an adequate view of its own social position. But whether that is always true or not, merely to assume the contrary, is to assume a degree of rational self-consciousness and self-knowledge that not even eighteenth-century psychologists would allow.

II

There's one question most liberal reviewers find quite unanswerable: If the American elite is all this bad, "how come it hangs together—and, despite defects, provides people with the highest content of economic, esthetic and intellectual opportunity yet offered a population block of 165 million?"

I can't really conceive, as the question assumes, that the American elite is the *author* of all the happy values of American civilization. Such an assumption makes them much more omnipotent than I've ever thought them to be. But many reviewers seem really to believe, and their question certainly implies, that American prosperity may be taken as proof of the virtues of the contemporary elite.

In the same vein one might ask: If the Soviet elite are such villains as all good Americans know them to be, how come in a mere thirty years they've raised an illiterate, backward, starving peasant mass into the biggest nation in the world, created one of the world's two foremost industrial plants, demonstrated for the first time in human history that classic capitalism is only one of the ways to industrialize, etc.?

In brief: such critics have swallowed the vulgar notion that the "success" of a nation, however defined, is the basis on which to judge that nation's elite. I think to state the assumption is to indicate its inadequacy.

III

To blunt the edge of an argument, contemporary critics often try to assimilate it to old stereotypes—the common coin of the lazier reviewer's mint.

To say "old stuff" or "new stuff" is equally irrelevant—unless you get very specific, as my critics in this line have not done. The argument ("It's all old stuff") equates "old" with "untrue." I don't of course accept that fashionable and easy equation. But apart from that, if this is all old stuff, where *is* the new stuff? If *The Power Elite* is about some world that's now long past, where is the image of the 1950's that stands in such irrefutable contrast? There isn't any documented image; what such reviewers are doing is wallowing in that intellectual climate, now so fashionable, which is based solely upon the fact of

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material prosperity. Given that, they can't conceive of *any* critical statement of a modern society being credible. That my book isn't primarily about prosperity and poverty but about power and status makes no difference to them. Having come of age in a time when poverty was the key problem, they can't really recognize any other.

The more interesting question underneath this charge of "old stuff" is how best to study trends. Quite deliberately, of course, I have stated in *The Power Elite* an "extreme position"—which means that in order to make matters clear I try to focus on each trend just a little ahead of where it now is, and more importantly, that I try to see all the trends at once, as parts of a total structure. It is much easier for the liberal to acknowledge one trend at a time, keeping them scattered as it were, than to make the effort to see them altogether. To the literary empiricist, writing his balanced little essay, first on this and then on that, any attempt to see it whole is "extremism." Yet there is truth in one reviewer's assertion that I tend to confuse prediction with description. These two, however, are not to be sharply separated, and they are not the only ways of looking at trends. One can examine trends in an effort to answer the question: "Where are we going?"—which is of course what I have tried to do. In doing so I have tried to study history rather than to retreat into it; to pay attention to present trends without being merely journalistic; to gauge the future of these trends without being prophetic. All this is very hard to do. You've got to remember that you are dealing with historic materials; that they do change very fast; that there are counter-trends. And you've always got to balance the precision of knife-edge description with the generality needed to bring out their meaning for your time. But above all, you've got to see the several major trends together—structurally, rather than as a mere scatter of happenings adding up to nothing new, in fact not adding up at all.

IV

"The judgment to be made of Mills," one scientific reviewer writes "is never that what he says is true but unimportant, as can be said for much of the reporting in the social sciences; rather what he says is clearly important but not unquestionably valid."

Of course the argument of *The Power Elite* is not "unquestionably valid." In the language of the social studies, it's an elaborated hypothesis, anchored, I believe, at key points to acknowledged fact. There is no other way to write now, as a social student, about such large topics.

In the social studies today there are many know-nothings who refuse to say anything, or at least really to believe anything, about modern society unless it has been through the fine little mill of The Statistical Ritual. It's usual to say that what they produce is true but unimportant. I don't think I agree with that: more and more I wonder how true it is. If you have ever seriously studied, as I have, for a year

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or two some thousand hour-long interviews, carefully coded and punched, you'll have begun to see how very malleable these thousands of bits of fact really are. Moreover, increasingly I come to feel that it is very important when some of the best minds among us spend their lives studying trivialities because the methods to which they are dogmatically committed don't allow them to study anything else. Much of this work, I am convinced, has become the mere following of a ritual—which happens to have gained commercial and foundation value—rather than, in the words of The Social Scientist, any "commitment to the hard [why hard?] demands of scientific social analysis."

On the other hand, there are many literary and journalistic people who distribute larger images of the social structure in which we live. By refusing to comment on these images, much less to take them in hand, the pseudo-scientific know-nothings allow, as it were, these literary types to create and to sustain all the images that guide and all the myths that obfuscate—as the case may be—our view of social reality.

That's one feature of the intellectual situation in which I think I—along of course with others—have been trying to write. We've tried to use what we found useful of newer research techniques, but we've refused to give up the larger problems because of any initial dogma about method. Above all, we've refused to become silly about transferring the models of physical and mathematical proof into the social studies. We've kept the *problem,* whatever it is, foremost in mind and we've felt, I suppose, as working researchers rather than self-appointed Statesmen of Research, that we'd just have to work out the best methods we could as we went along trying to solve the problem. The social studies, I am convinced, will not be advanced by pontifical dogma about method or pretentious cowardice about Social Science. It will go forward out of highly self-conscious work on real problems.

V

But, then, half a dozen reviewers exclaim: "In this book, you take it upon yourself to *judge;* now really, should a sociologist judge?"

The answer is: "Does he have any choice?" If he spends his intellectual force on the petty details of elections or boy gangs or what not, he is of course as a man of intellect making himself irrelevant to the political conflicts and forces of his time. But he is also, in a tacit way and in effect, "accepting" the whole framework of the society. Only he who accepts the basic structure of his society—and is not aware of his acceptance—can turn his back on the problem of moral judgment. Now I do *not* merely assume that structure. In fact, it is my job to make it explicit and to study it as a whole. *That* is my major judgment. Because there are so many myths about American society, merely to describe it neutrally is considered, in the words of one reviewer, a "savage naturalism." Of course, I have elected to do more than that. Such judgments as I wish to make I try to make explicitly. It would

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not, as you know, be difficult to hide them; there's a very pretty apparatus at hand for that: the jargon of modern social science, especially sociology. (You don't write "authority," for example, which has a clean, hard edge; you write "imperative coordination," which is neutral—and Scientific too.)

Whether he wants it or not, anyone today who spends his life studying society and publishing the results is acting politically. The question is whether you face that and make up your own mind or whether you conceal it from yourself and drift morally. Most social scientists are today uneasily liberal. They conform to the prevailing tone of liberal American politics and the accompanying fear of any passionate commitment. *This,* and not "scientific objectivity" is what is really wanted by those who complain about "value judgments."

VI

Teaching, by the way, I do not regard as altogether in the same case as writing. When you publish a book it becomes a public property; your only responsibility to your reading public is to make it as good a book as you can, and you are the sole judge of that. But you have further responsibilities when you are teaching. To some extent your students are a captive audience, and to some extent they are dependent upon you. If you are worth a damn as a teacher, you are something of a model to them. Your job—and it is your prime job—is to reveal to them just how a supposedly self-disciplined mind works. The art of teaching is the art of thinking out loud. In a book you are trying to persuade others of the result of your thinking; in a classroom you are trying to show others how one man thinks—and at the same time reveal what a fine feeling you get when you do it well. You ought then, it seems to me, to make very, very explicit the assumptions, the facts, the methods, the judgments. You ought not to hold back anything, but you ought to take it very slowly and at all times and repeatedly make clear what the full range of moral alternatives are before you give your own choice. To write that way would be enormously dull, and impossibly self-conscious. That's one reason why very successful lectures don't usually print well.

VII

What I suppose has to be called "highbrow" criticism tends to pay less attention to the content of a book than to its publication as an event and a strategem. As for content, I must say such "highbrow" reviews of *The Power Elite* as I've seen seem in rather complete agreement with it. They don't question the general idea I've constructed; they restate and accept my view of the newer relations of property and the state; they see quite clearly that the intellectual target of my attack is the classic liberal image of modern American society.

Basic agreement, however, is often hidden by the surface tone of the "highbrow" review. Considering the book as an event, one such

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reviewer makes the point that (like all other products) radical criticism in America can become a "saleable commodity." Of course. And so can reviewers' criticism of radical criticism. The only sure-fire way to avoid this situation is silence or suicide. Considering the book as political strategy, they make the point that it is negative in that it offers no "saving myth." Quite true. But then they call this "posturing." I don't quite see why, especially since they seem to agree with my judgment of the intellectual and moral character of the power elite as well as my statement of the mass society. The "highbrow" style, it seems to me, often consists merely of telling the revolutionaries they are not revolutionary enough, the theologians they aren't theologically pure, the Freudians that they disregard The Founder's biases. Perhaps the Craving For Authenticity stands in place of, or at least in the way of, a passion to know what's what. Writing for me has always been, first of all, an effort to state what is so, as I see it. When there's no public that might accept the ideas *and* act upon them with consequence, one still has to go ahead and try to say what's so. That's all one can usefully say of the weary complaint about possible misuse of radical criticism.

VIII

But the salient point about so much "highbrow" reviewing is that in it presentation simply runs away with belief. Such reviewers ignore their own agreement or disagreement with the book at hand and adopt a tone. It is a tone which assumes superior accomplishment without ever revealing it; it is an attempt to turn all questions, in particular the question of truth, into matters of taste. In such magazines as *Partisan Review* one finds writers who have made a real thing out of such pretension; in fact, it has become the very token of what is sometimes called "brilliant." In the post-war period it has gone very well with the ostentatious boredom with political questions of larger scope—which is to say, with conservatism.

In "highbrow" reviews of *The Power Elite* this posture doesn't come off because—for one thing—the "highbrows" try to stand outside or above the book, but in fact they have no place to stand. The tone they imitate from one another is therefore obviously a mere surface manner rather than intrinsic to some point of view that is truly their own. The key to this posture is simply a lack of moral confidence. The way to overcome it is also clear: to take on a substantive job of work, one that forces you to deal imaginatively with a mass of facts. Were they to do that, such critics might come to see more of the world they live in, as well as in the work of writers they read, than "strategies of presentation." In the meantime, in striving to be intellectually fastidious, they only succeed in displaying moral weakness.

IX

Contemporary reviewers make wide use of the *ad hominum* argument: anyway, it's all resentment, these shrewd psychologists con-

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clude—the implication being that therefore it's all a little personal show and nothing else.

Now, I take "resentment" to mean that I want to be like somebody else but can't be, so I dislike them. This is of course the expected imputation to make of any critical book about the higher circles. It is also cheap and easy in that it merely *assumes* that the book's author shares the values of those about whom he writes and therefore wants them for himself.

So far as the social fact of their existence and its consequence goes, my liking or disliking the power elite, whether it shows in the book or not, is altogether irrelevant. That's the foremost point. For it means that were I just dying to become a millionaire, this would not in itself effect the truth or falsity of what I've written about the millionaires in American society.

But I certainly am not aware of any desire to be more like the rich in the sense that I *am* sometimes aware of wanting to be more like some of the crack mechanics I know. Of course, although it means something to me, the comparison is a little unreal. I'm a third type of man—and on the whole glad to be such.

X

One type of reasonable liberal broadly accepts my "account of who holds the power in American society" but complains that I really don't say "*what* the elite does with its power..." This, of course, is to ask for a full-scale American history of our times, military, economic and political. And this I clearly have not done nor attempted to do in *The Power Elite*.. An account of the power elite, in one volume at least, must work from examples. Seemingly realizing this, such reviewers then object to the examples I use as "...the most obvious ones conceivable." They are of course the big events of our time which have involved major decisions: Hiroshima, Korea, etc. And of course they *are* obvious. Should I seek out esoteric ones? But I think such reviewers have the notion—although they certainly didn't get it from my book—that, if there's anything to the idea, the power elite *must* be all the time secretly at work doing secret things that nobody knows about. They then complain that I don't tell what these things are. Of course, my idea of the power elite is not of that order. It is an interpretation of well-known historical events, not a notion of a secret cabal making decisions. Such decisions do enter into it, but they are by no means its defining characteristic. Naturally I sought examples that were not questionable; it is their interpretation that we are arguing about.

This line of reflection permits reasonable liberals to accept much of my account with a little moral shrug which helps bury the consequences of accepting it. They do so by reiterating a few of my points with the comment that "most modern governments" are of this sort. This of course is merely to accept the facts as if they were inevitable

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and obvious while refusing to confront the democratic problem of responsibility, in fact any problems of democracy, to which they lead.

A second objection along the same line is that I don't really say "what are the interests on the basis of which the power elite decides policy." This again is either to ask for a detailed history—this time in large part a psychological one—or it is to assume that there must be some one all-embracing, unifying interest, in short, that the unity of the elite must be based on conscious interests, or even ideology. This, I believe, is too rationalistic a means of interpretation. It is possible to say, as I do, that socially their decisions run to a maintenance of the status quo and personally, to a consolidation of their personal stake, both materially and ideally, in it. But this, of course, is a quite formal assertion which holds of other groups as well as of those on top.

One key to such elite unity as exists lies in the "coincidence" of the several structural trends I've traced; another is the psychological and status facts on which I've spent so many pages. Only third and last have I brought into the picture the explicit following of explicitly known interests. The whole idea of the power elite is set up and presented in this way in order to avoid the kind of "conspiracy" theory into which some reviewers, with a rather crude lack of theoretical acuteness, try to force a much more complicated and quite different view.

Yet one reviewer, for example, believes that I am "hinting at" an idea needed by my argument but which I can't really accept—the idea of an elite interest in "a permanent war economy." The fact is I don't hint at all. I think it obvious that war and the preparation for war as we know it is a perfectly marvelous way of solving and of ditching all sorts of problems confronted by the several members of the power elite, as well as by many other people.

XI

Some of the most interesting reviews I've seen are given over to consideration of the several pivotal decisions which I've used to illustrate the nature of decision-making in our time: Hiroshima, Dienbienphu, etc. Such reviewers typically acknowledge the only points I felt the need to make in connection with these examples: that they *are* pivotal and that very few persons indeed had any real say-so about them. "In any case," one acknowledges, "the first atomic bomb was dropped on the responsibility of one man who was the beneficiary of very sketchy advice from a handful of other men." Exactly. And on Korea: "This decision was made in the course of a few hours by a few men." Just so.

But such reviewers seem to think that this refutes my idea of the power elite because (1) not a little crowd, but often only a few men, are in on such decisions; (2) these men don't always agree but are divided in their counsel; (3) in their decisions, they sometimes take into account the state of public opinion or the policy of other coun-

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tries; (4) sometimes the decision made is "taken against the better judgment of the power elite." Each of these points I readily accept, indeed I've stated them myself, and nothing in my conception of the power elite, or in the nature of the big decisions of our time, is upset by them.

The power elite is *not* a homogeneous circle of a specified number of men whose solidified will continuously prevails against all obstacles. Accordingly, I take such discussion of these pivotal events as an interesting and informed carrying on of the kind of social history I've urged, in which the idea of the power elite is refined and elaborated.

XII

The most important problem for political reflection in our time has to do with the problem of responsibility. I'm really sorry that only one reviewer takes up what is of course the chief moral theme of *The Power Elite.* He puts his point this way:

Mills sees himself standing outside society. Even though he's "generally humanistic in outlook," he makes a rigid distinction between life and history. "The tragic view of life is barred to them [people like Mills] . . . Feeling no personal responsibility—I do not mean accountability in the social and political sense but rather involvement in the tragic and comic sense—their view is almost certain to be irresponsible."

Here is my answer to this:

Yes, I do feel that I stand, with most other people, outside the major history-making forces of my epoch, but at the same time I feel that I am among those who take the consequences of these forces. That is why I do *not* make a rigid distinction between "life and history," and that is one major reason why I am a political man. No one is outside society; the question is where you stand within it.

The "tragic view of life," at least as it seems to be meant in this review, is not "barred" to me. Having examined it carefully, I have rejected it as a political blind alley, as sociologically unreal, and as morally irresponsible. It is a romanticism which in his social and personal loneliness the American adolescent finds very attractive, but it is not a mood that will stand up to even a little reflection. It is a way of saying to oneself: "We're all in this together, the butcher and the general and the ditch digger and the Secretary of the Treasury and the cook and the President of the United States. So let's all feel sad about one another, or if we're up to it, let's just see it all as one great comedy." But "we" are *not* all in this together—so far as such decisions as are made and can be made are concerned. "We" are *not* all in this together—so far as bearing the consequences of these decisions is concerned. To deny either statement is to deny the facts of power, in particular the fact that different men hold very different portions of such power as is now available. Only if all men everywhere were actors of equal power in an absolute democracy of power could we seriously hold the "tragic view" of responsibility.

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The difference between this "tragic view" and the romantic pluralism of ordinary balance-of-power theories is that, being more politically sophisticated, the tragedians generalize the "we" to the generically human and in so doing try to shove it beyond the political sphere. But I'm afraid the distinction between "political accountability" and "tragic responsibility" which they make will not hold up. Certainly not today, certainly not in the United States today. If it did hold up it would offer a convenient escape from the frustrations of politics, and at the same time provide a grand view of one's own role in human affairs. But, in fact, it is nothing more than a shallow form of fatalism, which, adorned with a little liberal rhetoric, leads to political irresponsibility.

XIII

I've seen only two reviews in which the reviewer tries to pigeon-hole the book from the left of it. One of them borders on an obstinate silliness over words like "capitalism" and "class"—words that have become cliches by which True Radicals try to retain the insurgency of their political adolescence yet avoid thinking freshly about what might be going on in the world today. Such a reviewer is likely to ask: "If the contemporary trends in corporate business power and its influence in government are as here suggested, why pretend that government and business are any longer importantly apart?" Why indeed? Since the war, neither business nor government can be understood as a separate realm of power. That is not enough for the True Radicals. They want to believe that the corporations and the state are identical, that they have become one big structure. Well, if not that, what do they mean? If they want me merely to evoke the good old party emotions that flood up in some people when they are told that the state is "a committee of the ruling class," I am sorry, I can't oblige. I don't believe it is quite that simple.

A second question occurs to the True Radicals. "Well," they ask (as if they'd just thought of it and all alone), are you implying "that big business is increasingly in the position to dominate political democracy?" Of course. And I not only imply it; I spell it out in detail. Nevertheless, they continue: "Mills' failure to deal with the meanings for democracy of the impressive power trends he analyzes is the colossal loose-end of *The Power Elite*." In fact, one of the major themes of the book is that many key decisions are made outside the parliamentary mechanism which thus drops to a secondary position, to the middle levels of power. On this level, there is very often a semi-organized stalemate. That is the key meaning of the power elite for democracy. But that's no answer for the True Radicals, for, you see, I've not used the old romantic words loosely enough to make them feel happy.

XIV

Several reviewers assert that I don't "really know what power is," but one radical critic spells this out: I put too much emphasis on

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force. Well, I do believe that in the last resort, coercion is the "final" form of power, but I also believe—despite Hungary and Suez—that we are not constantly at the last resort. *Authority* (or power that is made legitimate by the beliefs of the obedient) and *manipulation* (power that is wielded unbeknown to the powerless)—along with *coercion*—make up the major and well-known types of power which must constantly be sorted out when we think about the elite. The point that is relevant to this criticism, I believe, is that authority is no longer so explicit as it was, say in the medieval epoch, and that along with this, the ideology (justification or legitimations of power) of ruling groups is no longer so relevant to understanding phenomena of modern power. For many of the great decisions of our time, mass "persuasion" has *not* been "necessary"; the fact is simply accomplished. Further, more often than not such ideologies as are available for the power elite are neither taken up nor used by them. In modern times, ideology, and hence legitimate authority, arises as a response to effective debunking, to thorough-going criticism; in the United States such opposition has not been recently available, has not been effective enough to create the felt need for ideologies of rule. As a result, there has come about neither acceptance nor rejection of the old symbols of authority, but simply political indifference. This—and I use the word with care—spiritual condition seems to me the key to much modern malaise, as well as the key to many political features of the power elite in the United States. What we've recognized as conviction is not necessary, in either the ruling or the ruled, for the structure of power as well as its elite formations to persist and even flourish. So far as ideologies are concerned, that is one of the interpretative guides I've found most helpful in trying to understand the nature of contemporary types of power.

XV

Another complaint from the left is that all this business of the elite does not jibe with true "radical values." Such criticism is more likely to be buttressed by general statements about "the latent political bias" of "elite theory" than by concrete reference to *The Power Elite*. But what are "radical values?" "For radical criticism to have any meaning it must utter its judgments from some moral norm that transcends the system, or from some standard that recognizes an immanent, unfulfilled, potential in the existing state of things." I want to make very clear that in so far as this is the meaning, I am *not* a Radical Critic and never have been. I have never found either a transcendent or an immanent ground for moral judgment. The only moral values I hold I've gotten from right inside history; in fact they are values proclaimed by many and, within the possibilities of various life-ways, practiced by small circles in western history whose members I've taken as models of character. Moral judgment, I suppose, is a matter of wanting to generalize and to make available for others those values you've

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come to choose. Foremost among them is the chance of truth. Simple descriptions of elite persons and groups can be politically neutral, but I don't think they usually are. When little is known, or only trivial items publicized, or when myths prevail, then plain description becomes a radical fact—or at least is taken to be radically upsetting.

The study of elite groups, at least as I have carried it on, does not blind one "to the real potential for fundamental social change . . ." After all, the only "potential" mentioned by critics who make this charge ends up merely as the commonplace thought that "prosperity" and "contemporary trends" will not last forever. Surely. But no writer about such topics as these is writing "forever"; one writes for now. I don't of course believe that the contemporary power elite is here "forever." War and the preparation for war, is one of its major conditions, although not its only one. I don't suppose it could survive a really disastrous slump, but I don't see the conditions of such a slump in the immediately foreseeable future. Let us not be so urgent for hope of fundamental change that we slip over into the falsely wise mood of This Too Shall Pass, as many "radical" philosophers border on doing. The fundamental political error of so much "radicalism" is its tendency, borrowed directly from the optimistic bourgeois notion of progress, to confuse the cry for hope with the metaphysics of history.

XVI

But the "radical" criticism goes deeper: it holds that there is some "latent ideological bias" in "the elite theory" and that it's this bias that's against "radical values," whatever they are. My trouble here is that I don't really understand what is meant by "the elite theory." There is no one such thing. Merely to study elite groups is not automatically to accept some one definite theory of elites. Do the critics mean Pareto's theory of the circulation of the elite? I don't accept that. Michels' iron law of oligarchy? I think it's a fairly good description of what has in fact happened in most mass organization. But what is "the hidden ideological bias" in "the elite theory" or in empirical work on elite groups? Do they mean only that "elite theory" reduces power to "a conquest theory of politics?" If so, then certainly I do not hold "the elite theory." I don't think history is merely a succession of elites which, one after the other, conquer the institutional means of power. That is an omnipotent theory of the elite and an elite theory of history from which I have been very careful to dissociate my view. The structural mechanics of institutions must indeed be given due weight. My point, in this connection, is simply that the shape of these institutions—for example, their extreme centralization—makes the action and the policies of those who exercise such human control over them and through them as nowadays exists, more consequential, more relevant to an understanding of the history of our times—than, let us say, in the model society of the Jeffersonian scatter.

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The study of elites does not rule out an acceptance of the kind of structural view one finds, for example, in Marx. In fact, one must pay attention to both. The historical structure of opportunity is more important, I hold, than "the seizure of power" by elites of which some critics talk so much. The relation of institutional structure and elite formations is of course a two-sided play. Institutions, as I've repeatedly documented, select and form those who come to their top. In fact, sometimes the norms of selection and the shaping influences of institutional structures are more important to understanding human affairs and even the affairs of the powerful than the actual circles of men on top at any given time. I believe that is true just now, for example, in many corporations. But it's also true, given the shape of major institutions in the United States today, that those at the top are more than privileged persons: to a varying extent, in different historical situations, they are also powerful with all the means of power now at their disposal.

XVII

Many reviewers of *The Power Elite*—liberal, radical and highbrow—complain that the book is "too pessimistic" or "too negative." Only one of them it seems to me, has been self-conscious enough to be altogether honest about this: he writes that he does not "respond more readily" to the book "in part, no doubt, because [its] conclusions are gloomy . . ." What many reviewers really want, I think, is less of a program than a lyric upsurge—at least at the end. They want a big thump on the intellectual and political back. They want a sturdy little mood of earnest optimism, out of which we step forward all nice and fresh and shining. But the world I'm trying to understand does not make me politically hopeful and morally complacent, which is to say, I find it difficult to play the cheerful idiot. Many people tend, often without knowing it, to judge a position in terms of optimism-pessimism, the pessimistic being not nearly so good as the optimistic. Personally, as you know, I'm a very cheerful type, but I must say that I've never been able to make up my mind whether something is so or not in terms of whether or not it leads to good cheer. First you try to get it straight, to make an adequate statement. If it's gloomy, too bad; if it's cheerful, well fine. Anyway, just now isn't it obvious that it's not at all a question of what "we're" going to do; the question is what are a lot of other people doing? In the meantime, the charges of irresponsibility, the pseudo-crying for a program, are really signs of fear, of an incapacity to face facts as they are, even if these facts are decidedly unpleasant—and so irrelevant to the truth or falsity of my views.

Svanemollevej 64
Copenhagen, Denmark

Yours truly,
C. Wright Mills

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THE AMERICAN "INCOME REVOLUTION"

Gabriel Kolko

Few claims concerning the direction of the American economy have been more important to social and political theory than the assertion that income has been radically redistributed. The theoretical systems built around this theme have captured the imagination of a very substantial proportion, if not the majority, of social scientists.

David Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd* is an excellent example of an important contemporary study which is dependent on a theory of income redistribution. To Riesman, the development of a new personality type—the other-directed individual—is concomitant with the shift in the economy from an age of "production" to an age of "consumption." With this new age has come the "overprivileged two-thirds," a group whose consumption values are increasingly determined by "peer group" criteria which tend to minimize the use of material goods as pretentious displays of economic and social status. In place of the Veblenian picture of all economic groups consuming and displaying economic status in a hierarchic manner that reflects their access to economic power, we now have, presumably, a tendency to increasingly consume *in*conspicuously. This reflects, according to Riesman, both the equalitarian views of the "peer group" which sets criteria for consumption behavior, and the economic ability of the "overprivileged two-thirds" to purchase most of the symbols of economic and social status in the original or in virtually equivalent imitations.

The extent to which this belief has permeated social thought is especially surprising in view of the fact that few of those who assert it have bothered to supply empirical documentation. In their discussion of the topic, the sociologists Paul K. Hatt and Nelson N. Foote, for example, suggest that tastes and ability to consume have been "massified" in the last decade or so, because "In recent years the range of income distribution has been pulled in at one end through subsidization of consumption and the establishment of minima; at the other through progressive taxation . . ."[1]

Popular historians, such as Eric Goldman and Frederick Lewis Allen, have analyzed the functional and human value of the New Deal as a solution to economic problems at least partially on the basis of their belief that it redistributed income. According to Allen, " . . . through a combination of patchwork revisions of the system—tax laws, minimum

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wage laws, subsidies and guarantees and regulations of various sorts, plus labor union pressures and new management attitudes—we had brought about a virtually automatic redistribution of income from the well-to-do to the less-well-to-do."

While I do not intend to deal with the changes in absolute dollar incomes going to various groups, the relation of the relative income shares of each tenth of the nation to the distribution of economic power, consumption, and a decent standard of living will be made clear. It is, after all, the distribution of the relative shares of income that has occupied the attention of most theorists.

The General Pattern

Most of the commentators asserting that a radical redistribution of income has taken place over the past 20 years focus their attention on the relative positions of the upper one per cent and the upper five per cent of the income earners. While the economic status of these groups is doubtless of great importance, no discussion of income distribution which ignores the over-all relative position of *all* income groups can provide the context in which empirically founded generalizations can be made. For a grasp of the relative position of all income groups, the following table is crucial.

Table 1: Percentage of National (Money) Income Received by Each Tenth of Recipients, Before Taxes[2]

	Highest tenth	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	Lowest tenth
1910	34	12	10	9	8	7	6	6	5	3
1918	34	13	10	9	8	7	7	6	4	2
1929	39	12	10	9	8	6	5	5	4	2
1937	34	14	12	10	9	7	6	4	3	1
1941	34	16	12	10	9	7	5	4	2	1
1945	29	16	13	11	9	7	6	5	3	1
1947	33	15	12	10	9	7	6	4	3	1
1950	29	15	13	11	9	8	6	5	3	1
1953	31	15	12	10	9	8	6	5	3	1
1955	29	16	13	11	9	8	6	4	3	1

From the above figures it can be seen that the percentage of income going to the lowest three-tenths of those earning incomes has declined over the past 40 years, while the share of the next two-tenths has remained stable. The fifth-highest tenth has remained relatively stable, and in no category can one find what even remotely approximates a radical shift. This fact will become even more apparent in the discussion on after-tax distribution, income-in-kind, savings, and tangible holdings of economic wealth.

The importance of "income-in-kind"—home grown food, free housing, relief, company expense accounts, etc.—in the distribution of income has only recently become clear. In addition, trends in income dis-

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tribution must take into account the tendency of groups to underestimate their income for obvious tax reasons. Calculating the significance of these factors is subject to some arbitrary estimates, but certain detailed information, especially in regard to home produced food, charity, and non-money gifts is available. None of these factors has been taken into account in the previous chart.

Contrary to common belief, the dollar value of income-in-kind in rural areas tends to *increase* with the money income position of the recipient, so that in 1941, for example, farm families having a net money income of less than $500 also received an average of $417 in income-in-kind, while those in the $3,000 and above class averaged $719 in income-in-kind. In the same year, non-farm families earning less than $500 received $163 in income-in-kind, while those in the $3,000 to $5,000 income class averaged $213 and those earning more than $5,000 averaged $358.[3] Several studies corroborate this general pattern.

Obviously, the material difference between the above values of income-in-kind is substantial, especially in urban areas. No adequate calculations of income-in-kind going to the top income groups since 1941 is available, but since the Second World War and the subsequent introduction of higher taxation, the importance of "expense account" living for many in the upper income groups has been acknowledged by most economists. So while the poor farmer may grow his own vegetables and chop wood for fuel, the businessman or corporate executive may often have his car, fuel, vacations, and meals for himself and even his family marked off as business expenses. This is especially true among "certain categories of individuals with large incomes, notably owners of family businesses, [who] are able to charge off substantial amounts of personal consumption expenditures as business expenses and hence to exclude them in computing their 'adjusted gross income' for tax purposes."[4] "Since the beginning of World War II," writes George Garvy of the Federal Reserve Board, "high personal income taxes, combined with high corporate profit taxes, have created a situation where compensation in kind became more profitable to the corporate executive and key employee . . . Arrangements under which housing, entertainment, and vacation expenditures of executives are carried as business costs and overgenerous expense accounts are some of the techniques used . . ."[5] While no precise values can be given to such income-in-kind, it should be remembered as a crucial factor in income distribution analysis.

Of perhaps equal importance is the tendency for incomes to be understated and exemptions overstated. The majority of these cases occur in upper income groups which, unlike most white collar and factory workers, usually do not have their taxes deducted in advance and often have additional dividend, interest, rent, and cash fee incomes which are extremely difficult for the government to keep account of. One recent study of income data reports that " . . . the nonreporting rate

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tended to be higher in blocks with higher rent levels and with larger proportions of families at upper income levels, ranging from about 1 per cent at the under $1,000 level to 35 per cent at the $10,000 and over level."[6] All this indicates, as Simon Kuznets has stated, that present estimates of wealth in upper income groups are "... subject to a downward bias of unknown proportions..."[7]

Income After Taxation

It has become something of a stock argument that despite the great inequality of money income in the United States, the impact of taxation has compensated for the disparities. Reliable data for after tax income distribution before 1947 does not exist, but since this equalitarian situation is said to be a result of government and trade union pressures over the past 20 years, it should be reflected in recent figures.

The following table indicates the proportion of income received by each tenth of the spending units after federal income taxes.

Table 2: Percentage of National Money Income Distribution After Federal Taxes[8]
(Number in parenthesis indicates change from before-tax income)

	1947	1949	1951	1953
Highest tenth	31 (—2)	28 (—2)	28 (—3)	28 (—3)
2nd	15	15	15	15
3rd	12	13 (+1)	13 (+1)	12
4th	10	11	11 (+1)	11 (+1)
5th	9	9	9	9
6th	8 (+1)	8	8	8
7th	6	7 (+1)	7 (+1)	7 (+1)
8th	5 (+1)	5	5	5
9th	3	3	3	4 (+1)
Lowest tenth	1	1	1	1

When considered by tenths of spending units, the assertion that high tax rates have radically reshifted income is unfounded. Indeed, the slight shifts in after-tax distribution shown in Table 2 are of small importance, since they ignore the fact that all income groups show a net reduction in dollar income after taxes and that the vast bulk of the tax revenue is spent on armaments rather than welfare for lower income groups.

That there has been a significant change in income distribution after taxation thus remains an unproven assertion. Though the detailed figures are not available, it is known that almost two per cent of the national personal income in 1929 was received by the federal government in the form of personal income tax receipts and that it came almost entirely from the highest tenth of the spending units. Yet despite the increase in tax rates for upper income groups initiated by the New Deal, the federal receipts from personal income taxes in 1929 and 1940, when the size of the national personal income was almost identical, were about the same. In 1941 federal personal tax receipts

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increased by one-half over the 1940 level while personal incomes increased by about 15 per cent. In 1944 the personal income had doubled over the 1940 level but personal income tax receipts increased 12 times. And it was in 1941 that the economic élite began to search for new ways to maintain their incomes and standards of living while avoiding the highest tax rates. The lethargy of the New Deal towards the rich was changed by the necessity of winning a war, but the "transformation" which ensued hardly affected, as I shall later illustrate, the economic power of the upper five per cent.

The Upper Classes

Although there are fewer very poor and, relatively speaking, fewer very rich than there were twenty-five or fifty years ago, there are still grievous inequalities in this country, but they don't seem so important as they once did. This is partly because almost all of us are better off than we were, and therefore aren't so bitter against those who are still better off. It is partly because we know that the rich are heavily taxed and that their powers are curbed in many ways. GRANVILLE HICKS

From the point of view of access to economic status symbols, the position of the upper tenth of the nation's income earners should be the dominant concern of students of social inequality in America. For in almost any given year the average dollar income of the upper tenth of the income earners will be twice as high as the average income of the next highest income tenth, and about 25 to 30 times higher than the average income of the lowest income tenth. Recent assertions on the purported tendency towards income equalization have concentrated on the position of the upper five per cent of the income earners and the decline of the number of annual tax returns at very high figures—$100,000 and up. This latter assertion is of little relevance, since if it

***Table 3: Percentage of Individual Income Received by*[9]**

	Top 1%			Top 5%		
	Income before capital gains, taxes, gifts and transfers	Taxable income	After tax income	Income before capital gains, taxes, gifts and transfers	Taxable income	After tax income
1919	12.8	14.0	12.2	22.9	26.1	24.3
1933	12.1	14.4	12.6	24.6	30.8	29.3
1937	13.0	14.1	13.0	24.1	28.5	27.4
1941	11.5	12.5	10.0	22.2	26.0	23.2
1942	10.2	10.8	7.9	19.2	22.7	19.2
1943	9.5	10.1	6.5	18.0	21.1	16.8
1944	8.7	9.1	6.7	16.8	18.9	15.9
1945	8.9	9.5	7.4	17.6	19.5	16.8
1946	9.1	9.7	7.8	18.4	20.2	17.9
1947	8.6	*	*	17.6	*	*
1948	8.5	*	*	17.8	*	*

*not available

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can be shown that the centralization of economic power and status symbols has not moved out of the control of a small economic élite, then the problem of the élite's relation to society remains with us despite minor shifts within the élite itself.

The study by Simon Kuznets on the relative shares of the upper one per cent and five per cent of the total population is frequently cited as proof of the equalization of income. Kuznets' study ignores the factor of expense account living and the tendency of upper income groups to under-report taxable dividends, rent and interest by as much as 50 per cent. His data, however, at no point implies an income redistribution *throughout the population,* and Kuznets can be absolved of responsibility for the extravagance of his interpreters.

The Department of Commerce provides more data on the relative distribution among the top five per cent of the consumer units (families and unattached individuals) as opposed to Kuznets' calculations on individual income returns reporting the highest per capita income.

Table 4: Percentage of Money Income Received by Top 5 Per Cent of Consumer Units[10]

	Before Taxes	After Federal Taxes
1944	20.7	*
1946	21.3	*
1950	21.4	19.2
1951	20.7	18.4
1953	20.7	18.2

*not available

It is obvious from the preceding figures that taxation has only a minor impact on the relative shares of the economic élite, and that this is so can be easily understood from the tremendous disparity between actual tax rates on the highest incomes, and the legal rates which overawe most of the commentators on income distribution. In 1932, under Herbert Hoover, the legal rate on a $1 million income was 54 per cent, although in actuality the effective rate was 47 per cent. In 1938, though the legal tax on a $1 million income had risen to 72 per cent, the effective rate had fallen to only 44 per cent.[11] In 1951, with the theoretical tax rate on $1 million incomes at 92 per cent, only 62 per cent of the $1 million and up incomes were effectively taxed.[12] A large part of the tax rate has been avoided by the manipulation of capital gains income by the economic élite, and through other devices to be discussed later. As the Butters research group at Harvard concluded: "By far the most striking and significant feature of these charts is the large excess of theoretical over actual tax rates on upper income bracket individuals when these rates are computed for income inclusive of all net capital gains." Certainly taxation of the rich would have to parallel the extent it took in Great Britain from 1945 to 1951 for any measure of economic equality to be introduced.

The most important cause of the reduction of the share of the

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upper five per cent is attributed by Kuznets to the relative decline in dividend income as a percentage of the total income among this group since the beginning of World War II—while dividends to the lowest 95 per cent have also decreased.[13] Yet corporate profits have increased since World War II and, as I shall later show, the ownership of stock is at least as concentrated today as it was in the 1930's. The difference —undistributed profits—will be discussed later in this section.

"You can't compete for executive talent today without a gimmick," remarked David Sarnoff, chairman of Radio Corporation of America, several years ago. The increase in tax rates since 1941 has naturally stimulated the desires of the economic élite to receive income which will be taxed at preferential rates. As a result,

> Many companies, large and small, have adopted one or more of what are euphemistically called "tax deferral plans." Whether it be profit-sharing trust or a contingent deferred compensation contract, or something else with a fancy name, the basic aim of each plan is generally about the same—to put off the executives' income until after retirement, when they are expected to be in a lower tax bracket.[14]

The income is placed in a trust which accumulates tax free interest or dividends. When the executive retires his income from the trust is taxed at the much lower capital gains rate.

As a result of these and other tax-avoidance devices, there has been a shift among the economic elite away from the above $50,000 a year income categories into the $15,000-50,000 range. Needless to say, their deferred income would make a significant difference if it were included in the figures on income distribution.

Capital gains, which go overwhelmingly to those above the $10,000 a year income brackets, are probably the most important scheme now used for avoiding taxes. Capital gains, or income from the sale of stocks, property, etc., held more than six months, are taxed at a maximum rate of 26 per cent as compared to the top theoretical income tax rate of 92 per cent.

Less important devices include tax exempt interest on state and local bonds, tax free interest on savings invested through insurance companies, and stock options for executives which allow them to purchase their corporation's stock below the market price and have the profits taxed at capital gains rates.

In addition, trusts enable the rich to split family property into smaller units so that each income is taxed at lower tax rates. Under the 1952 tax schedule it is possible to save as much as 70 per cent on annual taxes of the income of property placed in a trust. As the recent study of the Butters group shows, the use of such devices is restricted almost wholly to the rich.

A factor of exceptional importance in measuring the economic power of the economic elite is undistributed profits. In closely held corporations undistributed profits can often be realized at some later date when tax conditions are expected to be more favorable. Undis-

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tributed profits that are divided later are taxed at the capital gains rates, and sometimes they are free of taxes altogether. In 1929 undistributed profits constituted 3.2 per cent of the private national income. With the advent of serious taxation in 1941 they rose to 5.3 per cent and in 1950 were 6.3 per cent of the private national money income. Since, as I will later show, corporate dividends go overwhelmingly to the economic elite, undistributed profits represent economic power held by groups within the economic elite which, if distributed, would go almost exclusively to the upper five per cent.

The Role of Savings

Power in the hand of the economic elite, in addition to money income, can exist in a number of forms. First, it can take the shape of control of investment funds and available savings, which can be significant factors in the creation and/or prevention of economic crises. Second, it can take the form of influence over the corporate and business structure, either by the control of stock holdings or managerial positions. Third, economic power, especially when accompanied by the first two factors, often controls political institutions and public media. In this section I will deal with aspects of the first two forms.

It is one thing to talk about the disappearance of a monied elite based on very high annual incomes, quite another to talk about the disappearance of a monied elite altogether. Figures on savings and stockholding suggest the extent to which minor fluctuations in income distribution will affect the position of the upper income groups in non-money-income economic power. Here, the figures show, if not increasing concentration, at least stability in the power of the economic elite.

From the point of view of power distribution, not only the relation of managers to stockholders, but the relation of the corporation to society is important. In the following section I give data on changes in stockholding concentration, mainly as an example of the extent to which the economic elite controls economic assets, and secondly to suggest necessary revisions in the theory about a purported separation between managers and stockholders which over the past two decades has assumed such an important part in discussions on power in America. The implications to social theory developed from this latter proposition are crucial. Riesman, for example, on the assumption that the separation has occurred, implies that the removal of managers from stockholding has meant they are generally above mundane considerations in their relations to labor and society, and are therefore leaders in the movement towards an "other-directed" culture. Adolf Berle, Jr., probably the co-initiator of the entire thesis, has even gone so far as to declare "The corporation is now, essentially, a non-statist political institution, and its directors are in the same boat with public office-holders."[15] Thus, using the dispersal of holdings and the separation of stockownership from management as a rationale, it has become possible for writers

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such as Berle and David Lilienthal to justify monopoly in terms of the public welfare.

Income inequality is partly reflected in the preceding charts, but the distribution of economic power can be understood fully only when tangibles such as net savings distribution, liquid assets, and stock ownership are correlated to specific groups within the income distribution spectrum. By measuring changes in these tangibles, one is better able to understand the full significance of income distribution changes related to the problem of "who owns what" in America beyond annual income receipts. As one study commented, "Some of the largest personal and family fortunes in this country have been built up from accretions to economic power most of which would never appear as a part of the owner's income in any existing source of income data."[16]

The following table indicates the extent to which net savings has been distributed among each tenth of the nation's spending units since 1929.

Table 5: Proportion of Net Saving Accounted for by Each Tenth of the Nation's Spending Units When Ranked by Size of Income[17]

	Per cent of total accounted for by each tenth:						
	1929	1941	1942	1946	1948	1949	1950
Highest tenth	86	73	46	63	78	105	73
2nd	12	15	18	16	19	26	20
3rd	7	6	13	14	15	13	11
4th	5	5	8	7	6	8	10
5th	3	5	5	4	6	1	4
6th	1	3	4	1	2	*	—1
7th	*	1	3	2	—1	—4	1
8th	0	—1	3	1	—3	—8	*
9th	—1	—3	2	—3	—5	—6	—2
Lowest tenth	—13	—4	—2	—5	—17	—35	—16

* Less than 0.05%

Except for 1945, when the backlog of wartime saving reached its peak, the upper tenth of the income earners has managed consistently to control the vast bulk of net savings.

Another criterion for judging the relative changes in the economic position of the elite is liquid assets.[18] In analyzing its significance it should be noted that the percentage of liquid assets held by the lower income groups is a much greater part of their total wealth than among high income groups.

Since 1947 the top tenth of the nation's spending units have owned from 36 to 44 per cent of the liquid assets, while the lowest tenth have owned from three to five per cent. Nevertheless, liquid assets holdings are far from being universal, and when they do not exist among lower income groups usually they are without savings for the inevitable "rainy day."

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In 1947 about 22 per cent of the spending units, all earning less than $5,000, held no liquid assets, but in 1952 and 1955 about 27 per cent of the spending units, all earning less than $5,000, held no liquid assets. This rise is an important fact for any serious discussion of the national economy. In 1947, about 24 per cent of the spending units, all earning less than $5,000, held from $1 to $499 in liquid assets, and in 1952 the figure was identical. In 1955 the figure had dropped to 20 per cent of the spending units, though the dollar was worth 15 per cent less than in 1947-49.

Because of the above trends, one can only agree with a leading expert on savings, Raymond Goldsmith, who in 1953 concluded:

> ... it is fairly clear from a grouping of the individual forms of saving ... that the upper income groups have always accounted for the major part of the total personal saving, particularly if allowance is made for the undistributed profits of corporations. This fact, of course, has been known from all investigations made of the distribution of saving.[19]

Stock ownership reflects the ability of economic groups to invest, and investment roughly reflects the margin of surplus income concentrated among various economic groups. Although no systematic comparative studies of stock ownership and concentration have been made in recent years, accurate miscellaneous data is available for the years 1927-37 and the post-World War II period.

The Temporary National Economic Committee estimated that there were four to six million shareholders in 1927 and about 8,500,000 in 1937-39. In 1949, according to the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, there were about 4,500,000 shareholders in the United States. The Brookings Institution set the figure of 6,490,000 shareholders for 1952. It is not, however, the number of shareholders but the amount concentrated in each group that indicates the important trends in shareholding.

Table 6

	Number of Persons and Percentage of National Population Receiving One-Half of Cash Dividends[20]						*Number of Persons and Percentage of National Population Owning From 65 to 71 Percent of Marketable Stockholdings*[21]
	1927	1929	1931	1933	1935	1937	1949
Number of Persons (in thousands)	38	51	59	45	47	61	50—100
% of National Population	0.032	0.042	0.048	0.036	0.037	0.047	ca. 0.01—0.02

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By and large, the bulk of all stock is concentrated within a very small group in the economic elite, and according to available figures, has been for at least two decades.

The available detailed studies of stock ownership unfortunately fail to use the same procedures, so that precise comparisons of year to year changes cannot be made. Nevertheless, their broad conclusions can be used to accurately suggest the direction recent stock concentration trends have been taking. The TNEC study of the share distribution of 1,710 corporations in 1937-39 indicates that the top 4.0 per cent of the stockholders of common shares held 64.9 per cent of the stock, while the lowest 56.2 per cent of the shareholders held 4.9 per cent of the common stock. The Brookings study of the share distribution of 2,991 corporations in 1951 indicates that the top 2.1 per cent of the common stock shareholders held 58 per cent of the stock, while the lowest two-thirds of the stockholders held about 10 per cent of the common stock. The same TNEC study reveals that in 1937-39, 4.5 per cent of those owning preferred stock held 54.8 per cent of that type stock.[22] The Brookings study indicates that in 1951 the top 1.1 per cent of the preferred stockholders held 46 per cent of the preferred stock,[23] while the lowest 82 per cent of the holders owned 20 per cent of the preferred stock. These figures suggest an increasing concentration of stockholding at the highest levels.

According to the Butters study, 65 to 70 per cent of the total marketable stock held in 1949 was controlled by groups with a total net worth of at least $250,000—or a very small fraction of one per cent of the population. Additional studies made by the Survey Research Center indicate that these holding groups are almost never found among clerical, skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled, farm workers, and all lower and middle income groups.

These trends suggest that a very detailed investigation of which occupational groups own what percentages of all stock is needed, and that the thesis of the separation of management from stockholding, with all its theoretical implications, is now in need of serious retesting.

The information provided in the Survey of Consumer Finance data on ownership by occupation suggests a heavier concentration of major stockholding among the managerial groups today than among any others. In addition, in early 1952 only two per cent of the managerial class was found in the group owning more than $25,000 in stock, as compared to five per cent in early 1955.[24] The Brookings stock study in 1952 indicates that 44.8 per cent of the "high administrative executives," equal to 4.6 per cent of the total stockholders, held stock. 19.4 per cent of "operating supervisory officials" consisting of middle-level managers, department heads, etc., constituted 9.6 per cent of the total stockholders. A larger percentage among these two groups owned stock than any other occupational category, and save for housewives, "operating supervisory officials" were the largest single occupational group

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among stockholders. "Housewives" composed 32.8 per cent of the stockholders, but their husbands' occupations, especially since the Security and Exchange Act does not prevent the use of relatives by executives for many speculatory or manipulative schemes, is obviously vital information.

The Standard of Living

... millions of families in our industrial cities and towns, and on the farms, have been lifted from poverty or near-poverty to a status where they can enjoy what has been traditionally considered a middle-class way of life: decent clothes for all, an opportunity to buy a better automobile, install an electric refrigerator, provide the housewife with a decently attractive kitchen, go to the dentist, pay insurance premiums, and so on indefinitely.[25]

The relative quantity, as well as the quality of consumption, is largely a function of income. Equality is a function of similar modes of life styles based on relative equality of income and consumption, so that the thesis of "massification" of status symbols is by necessity based on a concomitant change in income distribution. Sooner or later, where income is unequally distributed, the power of high income groups will also mean access to high prestige positions and symbols and a hierarchic structure of social stratification.

In the following section I will discuss the relative shift of consumer units receiving incomes below the level of "health and decency" set by Works Project Administration or Bureau of Labor Statistics since 1935-36. While the figures do not take credit spending into account, this factor will be discussed later. Those living below this level, as a later discussion on auto consumption will indicate, have a very inadequate access to "massified" status symbols.

Since 1935 there have been a number of reliable government studies of what constitutes what has alternately been called the "American," "maintenance," and "minimum health and decency" standard of living. Since the government studies are usually a synthesis of data on what families do spend with a scientific evaluation of what they need, there is general agreement that

> This budget does not approach the content of what may be considered a satisfactory American Standard of living, nor does its cost measure what families in this country would have to spend to secure 'the abundant life.' Such a standard would include an automobile, better housing and equipment, a more varied diet, and preventive medical care. Provision would be made for future education of the children and for economic security through saving. These and other desirable improvements above a maintenance level of living would require annual disbursements considerably in excess of the money values of the budget used in this investigation.[26]

In terms of social status and economic security,

> ... this level of living represents essentially a breaking point in our society. It divides the population into two groups, the lower of which is struggling to attain a physically more adequate existence. It is only above this level

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that people have enough to begin to think largely in terms of the quality of their living.[27]

In 1935 the WPA made what was probably the first thorough survey of the cost of a maintenance budget for a family of four.[28] Surveying 59 cities, they included in their standard a four or five room house or apartment with private toilet facilities in fair repair, gas, electricity, a small radio, a daily paper, a movie once a week, minimum medical care, clothing and furniture, no car, an adequate minimum cost diet, and slight incidentals. There were no savings except for a small insurance policy. To maintain this level in 1935 required $1,261.

The WPA study and a subsequent National Resources Committee investigation form the basis of the post-war Bureau of Labor Statistics family budgets for cities, which are set at a level designed " . . . to maintain a level of adequate living according to prewar standards prevailing in the large cities of the United States."[29] In 1941 it required an average of $1,367 to meet this level, in 1947 an average of $3,300, an average of $3,717 in 1950, and in 1951 an average of $4,166.

Minor shifts of consumption appear in the post-war budgets, but in its essentials the quality of living is the same. The one change of importance is the allowance for a car for 74 per cent of the families at this income level, save for Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York, where only 40 per cent are allowed cars. The car is expected to be from six to nine years old, and no allowance is made for the purchase of a new car more than once every 12 to 18 years. Save for an extra 32 copies of popular priced magazines and a reduction of movie attendance to once every three weeks for three members of the family and once every two weeks for the fourth member, the level of life is the same. The father is allowed one heavy wool suit every two years and one light wool suit every three years. The children may have toys in "moderation," the family has no phone but may make three pay calls a week, it may write one letter a week, and every three or four years, depending on the distance travelled and time involved, the family may take a vacation. In 1950 the family was allowed to spend a total of $80 to $90 on all types of furniture, house furnishings, electrical goods, and laundry equipment. The mother does all cleaning, cooking, and laundry, and the family may eat cheaper cuts of veal, pork, and beef "several times" a week, though on Sundays and holidays chicken or roasts may be had. The family may divide among themselves, any way they wish, two five cent ice cream cones, one five cent candy bar, two bottles of soda, and one bottle of beer a week. There is no debt according to this theoretical level, savings only in the form of a small insurance policy, and presumably no fear.

Any study of the percentage of spending units earning incomes below the "maintenance" level must take into account a large number of important variables, the most important of which is family size. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a family of two needs 65 per

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cent of the maintenance budget for a family of four, a family of three needs 84 per cent, a family of five needs 115 per cent, and a family of six needs 129 per cent. Save for the WPA study of 1935 budget standards, there is no recent criterion for determining what is an "emergency" level. According to the WPA study it is 70 per cent of the maintenance budget, and those on or below this level are in poverty and exposed to serious health hazards. In this study I will assume 70 per cent of a maintenance budget as the emergency level.

Statistics indicate that *the concentration of large families below the maintenance level has remained constant since the WPA study.* There is, in addition, the factor of income-in-kind. In determining the percentage of the spending units below the maintenance level, one can ignore the income-in-kind going to the upper income groups. In 1941 income-in-kind averaged about 10 per cent of the money income of those earning below $1,500 in urban areas. In 1935-36 income-in-kind in the form of food among farmers amounted to 50 per cent of the money income of those earning less than $500, 37 per cent of the income of those earning from $500 to $1,000, and 29 per cent of the income of those earning from $1,000 to $1,500.

Since World War II and the continued decline of the farm population, the importance of this disparity between farm and city income has diminished, so that occasional price differentials between goods sold in rural and city areas has become smaller, while the importance of income-in-kind as a percentage of farm income has declined substantially. Since a large part of the income-in-kind going to lower income groups in the urban areas was in the form of relief and charity, it can be assumed it has become negligible with full employment. Unfortunately, data correlating family size to income in rural and urban areas are not available for either the pre-war or post-war period, and only data giving combined farm and urban family income and size correlations are avail-

Table 7: Percentage of National Consumer Units Earning Less Than the W.P.A. Maintenance and Emergency Income Levels, 1935-36[30]

Size:	% of national consumer units: below maintenance level	below emergency level
2 persons family (no relief)	4.8	2.7
3—4 persons family (no relief)	12.8	5.5
5—6 persons family (no relief)	6.8	3.9
7 or more persons family (no relief)	4.0	2.9
Single men[31]	6.2	3.8
Single women	5.1	2.9
Families receiving relief[32]	ca. 9.1	ca. 6.6
Totals:	48.8	28.3

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Table 8: Percentage of National Consumer Units Earning Less than the B.L.S. Maintenance and Emergency Income Levels, 1947 and 1950[33]

Number of persons in household:	% of national consumer units: below maintenance level		below emergency level	
	1947	1950	1947	1950
1	6.0	5.8	3.9	4.9
2	10.7	12.3	8.1	8.3
3	9.6	9.7	5.7	5.4
4	9.1	9.2	4.7	4.3
5	5.7	6.3	2.8	3.6
6	3.5	3.7	2.2	2.3
7 plus	4.0	4.3	2.9	3.2
Totals:	48.6	51.3	30.3	32.0

able for the post-war period. Because of the declining farm population and smaller importance of income-in-kind, no attempt will be made to calculate its role in the post-war figures. The figures for 1935-36, however, include income-in-kind. All calculations are adjusted for family size according to BLS standards.

Preliminary data for 1955 indicates that since 1950 the number of consumer units earning less than the BLS level has dropped to around 48 per cent.

The remarkable failure of the New and Fair Deals to significantly dent percentages of consumer units earning less than the maintenance level, much less the emergency level, in the post-war period is in itself in fundamental conflict with the "big change" thesis. Relatively low unemployment over the past 15 years has most assuredly made for a significant change in the causes of poverty. But in place of such "old-fashioned" causes as unemployment and low wages—causes that are diminishing in importance but still of real significance in many industries—have come "new fashioned" causes which provide ample justification for skepticism in regard to eulogists of the status quo.

The poverty originating in "new fashioned" causes is sociological and demographic in origin but economic in its consequences—and equally intolerable in human terms. The increased divorce rate, for example, has placed a larger number of traditionally lower paid women in the position of chief family earner, so that in 1949 thirty per cent of the lowest fifth of the income earners, as opposed to twenty per cent in 1939, were women living alone or as family heads. From 1940 to 1954 the percentage of women 14 years and up who were divorced increased from 1.6 per cent to 2.3 per cent.

Of greater importance is the unanticipated result of the social security system in placing larger numbers of aging workers in the lowest income brackets. In 1930, 54 per cent of the males 65 years or older were in the labor force, as compared to about 41 per cent in 1950. A quarter of the families receiving less than $2,000 a year in 1948 were headed by persons 65 years and over. By 1954 the propor-

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tion increased to almost a third, and 64 per cent of all spending units headed by a person 65 years and over earned less than $2,000 (the average monthly old age assistance benefit in May 1956 was $54.37). Similarly, the 65 years and over population has increased at a far more rapid pace than the total population since 1900, and as the proportion of the aged grows, the number of spending units living at a depressed income level will in all probability increase with them. Government population projections indicate that while the total population will by 1975 have grown about 180 per cent over the 1900 level, the 65 years and over population will increase by about 572 per cent —from 4.1 per cent of the total population in 1900 to 8.4 per cent in 1954, to about 10 per cent in 1975. Thus, as the retirement age is lowered for both humane and economically practicable reasons, larger numbers of the retired, particularly those who have not been able to accumulate any substantial savings, can expect a life of quiet desperation along with their long overdue leisure.

There are additional major "new fashioned" causes of poverty. The declining age at which marriage now takes place has put more families in lower income brackets during the period workers are below their peak earning capacity. Similarly, the growing percentage of workers aged 55 years to 64 has increased the proportion of workers well beyond their peak earning periods.

Full employment, while it has significantly decreased the *bulk* of poverty caused by unemployment, has not prevented inflation from forcing many wage and salary workers into low income categories. In 1935-36 about three per cent of the clerical workers fell among the lowest fifth of the spending units, as compared to 15 per cent in 1955. Concomitant to the declining economic position of an important sector of the clerical and sales workers is the growth of the entire group between 1940 and 1954 at a rate over twice as fast as that of blue-collar labor.

But the lowest income workers today are generally farmers, unskilled, service, and semi-skilled workers, with a generous portion of skilled and clerical workers who approach but do not reach the BLS level. Although they earn more than the $2,000 erroneously assumed by Congressional committees to be the sole qualification for a low standard of living, many do not, or would not be able to maintain the ascetic BLS level for four. In all these groups Southern and especially Negro workers are overrepresented.[34]

Census data on average annual incomes of wage and salary earners indicate that in 1949, eighty-eight of ninety-four listed salaried, clerical, and blue collar occupations earned less than the BLS decency income for a family of four, though it must be remembered that in 1950 sixty per cent of the households were composed of three or less persons. Indeed, the average income of the upper quarter of 58 of the occupations was insufficient to meet this standard, and the average incomes

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of 42 occupations fell below 70 per cent of the BLS level for four.

Nevertheless, while many Americans earn incomes which would nominally place them below the minimum decency line, the tripling of the instalment debt since 1948 has made possible greater consumption for many who would otherwise be unable to enjoy *Business Week's* prosperity. But it is also true that the bulk of instalment buyers can be found among the $4,000 to $10,000 income groups—those already over the decency level or only slightly below it. Among the spending units earning less than $3,000 in 1955, only a minority were obligated to any instalment debts in early 1956, and the bulk of these were for relatively small amounts. But about twice as many blue collar workers, or 60 per cent, held some instalment debts in 1955 as compared to 1935. Should an extended recession or unemployment persuade a significant percentage to return to conservative buying habits more in line with their incomes, the cumulative impact on the economy would have enormous consequences on production and employment.

The majority of instalment purchases have gone into autos, and the distribution of auto ownership itself reflects the larger consumption patterns income inequality creates. Beyond its economic importance, however, the auto has become the hallmark of economic status and prestige rank idealized in the mass media and lived by the economic elite.

From 1917-19 to 1935 car ownership spread from 15 per cent of the consumer units to about 55 per cent. By 1941 it crept to 59 per cent, and in 1955 about 70 per cent of all consumer units owned some type of car. Given the vast increase in credit, the growth of auto ownership since 1941 cannot fail to impress one as being slight; nor can it be said that America's capacity to consume has been exploited anywhere near its full potential. Even in 1955 only 29 per cent of the 11 per cent of all consumer units earning less than $1,000 owned autos, while 94 per cent of the top 14 per cent of the consumer units—those earning $7,500 plus—owned cars. Between the two extremes was a pattern reflecting income inequalities.[35]

But erudite sociologists, such as Talcott Parsons, have written that economic status symbols have become "massified," and that "... many very high status people drive Fords and Chevrolets, (and some not-so-high drive Cadillacs)...."[36] Nevertheless, the value of autos corresponds directly to income, so that in early 1955 less than one-half of one per cent of the consumer units earning less than $2000 who owned cars had models worth $2500 or more. Only three per cent of the car owners in the $5000-7500 income category owned cars valued at $2500 or more. Yet 18 per cent of the car owners with an annual income of more than $7500 owned such models. The bulk of the new cars have always been purchased by members of the top income groups, most of the lower income groups restricting themselves by necessity to used autos. The same patterns exist for durable goods purchases of all sorts.

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After all is said and done, therefore, abundance and full consumption has been denied a vast segment, if not the majority, of the nation's population. Given fundamentally the same income structure as existed either fifteen or fifty years ago, we have seen that *at any given time* a capitalist economic structure will create a grossly unequal income stratification, and with it the social and prestige stratification which unequal access to economic status symbols brings. So long as the present income structure exists, however, a full consumption and full production economy will be a pious but unrealizable goal for those insisting on the preservation of the fundamental economic inequalities which have flourished under Republicans and Democrats alike.

Conclusion

Robert Merton has written that the confident error generates its own spurious confirmation, so that a myth evolves and becomes self-perpetuating. There is no justification for this state of affairs in the writings of social theorists on income distribution. Despite the economists' general lack of interest in over-all income distribution patterns, enough data can be gleaned from government sources and existing monographs to suggest that the present social theorists are sorely misinformed on the facts of income distribution. Granville Hicks, who, despite his literary background, documents his assertions on the matter as well as most trained social scientists, has summarized the general consensus on the topic. "If we add it all up, we can only conclude that this is a prosperous society, with a larger and larger proportion of the people sharing the prosperity. Distinctions diminish between country and city, between rich and poor, between men and women, between old families and the children of immigrants, even—though much more is to be desired—between black and white.... The degree of success we have achieved ought to offer hope to mankind so long as mankind survives."[37]

In the social theory based on such assumptions, the process of change is seen to be mechanistic in the tradition of naive versions of the idea of progress. In Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd,* for example, one finds notions strikingly parallel to the Marxist concept of the "progressive" stage of capitalism and an implicitly positive judgment on the necessary, and hence desirable, stage of our society in its development towards an "autonomous" culture. Despite the excessive conformity of the corporate bureaucrat, his being the leader of "other direction" justifies the institutional arrangement which he controls and which in turn has made it possible for our society to be evolving out of an age of "production" into an age of "consumption."

Consonant with a mechanistic view of progress, Riesman implies that radicalism in social and political problems is characteristic of "inner-directed moralizing," and is in large part still a reactionary stage in national character development. As in laissez-faire or Marxism, Riesman sees justice impersonally evolving from bureaucracy,

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changes in population development, and mass consumption. Reason, social action, "inner-directed moralizing" are not only vestiges of a society gone by, but ineffective as well. "The two most notable achievements of the twentieth-century corporations have been their ability to concentrate economic power in themselves and their ability to increase production and distribution," writes Adolf Berle, Jr., in an another example of this line of thought. Distribution justified concentration, just as other-direction rationalizes private bureaucracy.

Despite this, the myth of income redistribution still arises from a general agreement among most theorists as to what constitutes economic and social "good." We wish relatively equal consumption not only because of the equalitarian tradition in American society, but because of a desire to create the economic stability which can arise only from mass consumption, and to avoid the totalitarian or disintegrated social order potential in every economy where large groups have no material "stake" in the value system. If we call into doubt the ability of our present economic order in achieving this egalitarian end, we challenge an institutional structure resting on mythos, interest, and inertia.

So the promise of America is seen as at least partially fulfilled by the new social theorists, but instead of emphasis being given to ends which are desired, the means have become the central focus. And since the means towards egalitarian ends are purported, in so many cases, to be dependent on a specific institutional arrangement fortuitously not too unlike that with which we live, the good society is supposed, to a significant extent, to have already been realized. Implicit in this notion is that the mechanics of progress and social change are impersonally involved with, and being settled by, a benevolent economic arrangement, and that social reform and individual participation in social action is irrelevant, if not damaging, in such a situation. As a result, there is no longer an important area in our democracy where radical reform or personal participation is possible.

Obviously, whether intended or otherwise, the present current in social thought which is dependent on the mythology of an effected radical income redistribution is a block to the formation of a rational institutional analysis of American society today. But the juggling of statistics, when theorists deign to resort to them, is not sufficient to change the reality with which the figures are said to correspond. The facts on income distribution suggest that the claim for an income redistribution over the past 40 years has yet to be proven. And this, in turn, suggests that most of the contemporary sociological and political concepts based on an income redistribution are more the product of a self-satisfied decade than the result of serious analysis.

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1 Nelson N. Foote and Paul K. Hatt, "Social Mobility and Economic Advancement," *American Economic Review*, May 1953, pp. 366-367.

2 The figures for 1910 through 1937 are taken from the U.S. Bureau of Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States*, 1789-1945, Washington, D.C., 1949, Series A 185-194. They are the only reliable figures for this period available. Figures for

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1941 through 1951 are taken from the *Federal Reserve Bulletin,* August 1948, p. 923, and September 1951, p. 1067. Subsequent figures are from Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1956, p. 569.

3 Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Spending and Saving of the Nation's Families in Wartime,* Bulletin 723, Washington, D.C., 1942, p. 5.

4 J. Keith Butters, *et al, Effects of Taxation—Investment by Individuals,* Boston, 1953, p. 81.

6 George Garvy, "Functional and Size Distributions of Income and Their Meaning," *American Economic Review,* May 1954., p. 243.

6 National Bureau of Economic Research, *Studies in Income and Wealth,* New York, 1951, vol. 13, p. 518.

7 Simon Kuznets, *Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings,* New York, 1953, p. xxx.

8 *Statistical Abstract,* 1955, chart 353.

9 *Statistical Abstract,* 1952, chart 314 for definition and data.

10 Office of Business Economics, *Income Distribution in the United States by Size,* 1944-1950, Washington, D.C., 1953, p. 15, 1950-51-53 data from *Survey of Current Business,* March 1955, p. 24.

11 All statistics from Bureau of Internal Revenue, *Statistics of Income for* 1939, Part I, pp. 63-64, and *Statistics of Income for* 1950, Part I, Washington, D. C., 1954, pp. 319-320.

12 *Wall Street Journal,* June 30, 1954, p. 1.

13 See Kuznets, *Shares,* 1953, p. 668-677.

14 Arch Patton, "Executive Compensation: Tax Gimmicks vs. Incentives," *Harvard Business Review,* Nov.-Dec. 1953, p. 113.

15 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., *The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution,* New York, 1954, p. 60.

16 National Bureau of Economic Research, *Studies in Income and Wealth,* New York, 1943, vol. 5, p. 89.

17 Data for 1929 from Maurice Levin, *et al, America's Capacity to Consume,* The Brookings Institution, 1934, p.96. Since 1929 data excludes net savings for unattached individuals, concentration at the highest levels is probably slightly exaggerated. Subsequent data from *Federal Reserve Bulletin,* August 1948, p. 923, and September 1951, p. 1067. "Positive saving comprises the saving of all family units with money incomes in excess of expenditures, negative saving comprises the dissaving of all family units with expenditures in excess of money incomes, and net saving (plus minus) is positive saving less negative saving for all family units combined." *Statistical Abstract,* 1952, p. 259.

18 Liquid assets consist of checking accounts, government securities, saving accounts in banks, postal savings, shares in savings and loan associations and credit unions. Currency is excluded.

19 Raymond W. Goldsmith, "Trends and Structural Changes in Savings in the Twentieth Century," in Walter W. Heller, *et al,* eds., *Savings in the Modern Economy,* Minneapolis, 1953., p. 151.

20 Temporary National Economic Committee, *The Distribution of Ownership in the* 200 *Largest Nonfinancial Corporations,* Monograph 29, Washington, D. C., p. 18. The TNEC did not prepare similar data for its study of 1,710 corporations in monograph 30.

21 Butters, p. 378 and p. 382. The figure 50,000 is given by the Survey Research Center and 100,000 is the Butters estimate. The stock indicated is the estimate of marketable stock held. The value of the stock is about the same, and I assume that dividends are also about 65-71 per cent of the total. As a percentage of the total number of stockholders in 1949, these figures would be from one to two per cent.

22 Temporary National Economic Committee, *Survey of Shareholdings in* 1,710 *Corporations with Securities Listed on a National Securities Exchange,* Monograph 30, Washington, D. C., 1941. p. 2.

23 Lewis H. Kimmel, *Share Ownership in the United States,* The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1952, p. 43.

24 *Federal Reserve Bulletin,* September 1952, p. 1001, and June 1955, p. 622.

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[25] Frederick Lewis Allen, *The Big Change,* New York, 1952, p. 213.
[26] Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Handbook of Labor Statistics,* 1941 ed., vol. 1, Bulletin 694, Washington, D. C., 1942, pp. 97-98.
[27] Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Workers' Budgets in the United States: City Families and Single Persons,* 1946 and 1947, Bulletin 927, Washington, D. C., 1948, p. 2.
[28] Margaret Loomis Stecker, *Inter-City Differences in Costs of Living in March* 1935, 59 *Cities,* Research monograph 12, Division of Social Research, Works Project Administration, Washington, D. C., 1937.
[29] "City Workers Family Budget for October 1951," *Monthly Labor Review,* May 1952, p. 520.
[30] These and subsequent figures were obtained by determining the percentages of each family below the adjusted maintenance level and calculating the total proportion of that family size's percentage of national consumer units. As the information in footnote 33 indicates, the results are reasonably close approximations of the overall situation. The 3-4 persons families were calculated at 100 per cent of the WPA level ($1,250 for the sake of calculation), but the 5-6 persons families at only 120 per cent and the seven or more persons families at 140 per cent. All subsequent calculations for seven or more persons families are 140 per cent of the BLS level, giving a somewhat conservative bias to these figures. For individuals it is 50 per cent of the BLS level for four. Data for 1935-36 from National Resources Committee, *Consumer Income in the United States,* Washington, D. C., 1938, p. 22 and p. 95.
[31] The figures include relief and non-relief income. They include all single individuals receiving less than $500 and three-fifths of those earning between $500 and $750, assuming that this covers those making between $500 and the WPA level of $675 for one person. About 80 per cent of the individuals collecting relief, or 3.0 per cent of the consumer units, are assumed to be below the WPA level for one person, since 93.1 per cent had an income or less than $780. On this 3.0 per cent, 1.5 per cent is assigned to each of the sexes. Data from N.R.C, *Consumer Income. . .,* p. 95 and p. 100. In subsequent calculations it was sometimes necessary to estimate the number of consumer units below the maintenance level by dividing an income category and the consumer units in it by about the income division line of the WPA or BLS maintenance or emergency level. For example, where a maintenance level was $1661, it was assumed that three-tenths of the units earning between $1500 and $2000 were below the maintenance level. The net results give conservative estimates.
[32] No breakdown of family size is available, though it is safe to assume the families were weighted towards large membership. These figures include 80 per cent of the relief families, 58 per cent of which received a total income of less than $780, while 35 per cent received between $780 and $1450. Of the latter group, the bottom four-sevenths alone were included. Data from NRC, *Consumer Incomes. . . .,* p. 95.
[33] All figures for 1947 from *Statistical Abstract,* 1949, charts 31 and 333. For 1950, from *Statistical Abstract,* 1952, chart 320, and Current Population Reports, p. 20, Feb. 12, 1951, p. 14. Lumping three and four persons families and five and six persons families together and using the NRC methods (excluding relief families) and the same criteria used in calculations for 1935-36, I find that 48.1 per cent of the consumer units received incomes below the BLS level in 1947. Using a different set of data found in the *Federal Reserve Bulletin,* June 1948, p. 651 and p. 656, 48.0 per cent of the consumer units are below the BLS maintenance level and 31.0 per cent were on or below the emergency level. Thus it can be assumed that all totals are reliable within two per cent.
[34] Data taken from Herman P. Miller, *Income of the American People,* New York, 1955, pp. 173-186; Subcommittee on Low-income Families, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, *Characteristics of the Low-income Population and Related Federal Programs,* 84th Congress, 1955; *Federal Reserve Bulletin,* July 1956, p. 703 ff.
[35] *Federal Reserve Bulletin,* June 1956, p. 567, August 1956, p. 820.
[36] Talcott Parsons, "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Lipset, eds., *Class, Status, and Power,* Glencoe, Ill., 1953, p. 122.
[37] Granville Hicks, "How We Live in America," *Commentary,* Dec. 1953, p. 509, p. 512.

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AMERICAN NOTEBOOK

Some Brief Comments On the Domestic Scene

1. The Mike in the Bosom

Murray Hausknecht

The television show *Person to Person* employs a technician whose job is to hide a small microphone in the bosoms of women who appear on the show so that the women may be heard without the apparatus being visible to the audience. This tactful technician—he is said to do his job with courtesy and discretion—is, I would suggest, symbolic of the main drift of contemporary society. In the dim world of mass culture he stands out as a startlingly clear figure.

Consider *Person to Person* as we see it after the tactful technician has done his work. With Edward R. Murrow we look at a picture of one of the homes we are going to "drop in on" that night. Then, as Mr. Murrow turns to our "host," the exterior of the home disappears and we plunge inside. After a few minutes of conversation in which we are introduced to the host, his family and pets—the inevitable whimsy—we are taken on a tour of the home. Along with Mr. Murrow, the ubiquitous camera, and the hidden mike we poke and pry at nearly everything that is exposed to us—television doth make *voyeurs* of us all.

This process must be understood with reference to a cliché that haunts all discussions of television: It brings the world into our living rooms. Obviously, Mr. Murrow has hit upon the most intriguing variation of this theme; he brings other living rooms into ours. And with the help of his tactful technician he allows us to snuggle up closely to this other living room; the artfully hidden mike eliminates another barrier between us and what is happening in that room. It is also clear that Mr. Murrow, like the rest of his fraternity, has a ready answer to the question, Do we *want* the world continually pouring into our living room? Another question, Does it make a difference *how* it pours?, has apparently never been considered at all.

I pick on Mr. Murrow and his show because more often than not it is conducted with urbanity and wit, which distracts our attention from its inherent vulgarity. Mr. Murrow seduces us while his competitors try to rape us. For what we are often tempted to forget is that *Person to Person* is merely one end of a continuum at the other end of which is *This is Your Life* and *Strike It Rich*. These two shows are notable for their exquisite refinement

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of the process of alienation. The industrial worker sells his labor power and relinquishes control over his tools and product; but on *This is Your Life* and *Strike It Rich* what the sponsor buys are the feelings, emotions, and intimate relationships of the participant, that is, precisely those elements of life, beside work skills, which define him as a distinct human being. *Person to Person* is not as crude as all this, but it differs only in degree.

To be sure, the process of breaking down the private sphere of life has been going on for a long time; television is only the latest instrument. But it is the most important, if for no other reason than that in mass communication the printed page is not as powerful as what can be seen or heard. As a Madison Avenue philosopher might put it, a mike in the bosom is worth 100,000 words on paper. This same philosopher could also point out that the people appearing on these shows are usually "celebrities"; people who live their private lives publicly. But this argument misses the point.

Not all celebrities have equal value or the same symbolic status. This simple fact is the basis for one of Mr. Murrow's most fascinating wiles: *Person to Person* consists of two "visits" on the same night, and, with real ingenuity and obvious enjoyment, he tries for incongruity rather than harmony. One of his earliest programs epitomized this strategy—Krishna Menon and one of the Gabor sisters within the same half hour. Such a juxtaposition, while it tickles our fancy, also blurs the distinction between the meaning of a Krishna Menon and a Gabor; by giving both equal value it trivializes the significance of one of them. Such trivialization of symbolic figures is the obverse side of the transformation of emotions and intimate experiences into commodities.

Since privacy is an end in itself, the destruction of privacy is to be condemned. But the significance of the mingling of living rooms and the lowering of barriers must be seen in a broader context.

II

Every society or group has the persistent problem of getting people to behave in a way that maintains the existent social structure. The norms which prescribe the approved behavior may be conceived of as the "discipline" of the society or group; it represents the standard of conformity. But the amount of conformity that is required varies. On the one extreme there is the discipline of a military organization where the goal is as much uniformity of behavior as possible. Toward the other extreme is the discipline of science: The norms of the "scientific method," unlike military norms, prescribe behavior and thought only within very wide limits.

The main drift of contemporary society is clearly toward the first of these. When we talk of the pressures for conformity we are saying in effect that it is increasingly difficult for individuals to bring their own distinctive styles to their social roles. We are saying that it is becoming harder to seize upon the ambiguities which pervade all spheres of action and use them to explore other alternatives, because the disciplines are being so narrowed as to eliminate these ambiguities.

This brings us back to the Peeping Toms of television. First, and most obviously, the penetration of the home by camera and microphone creates a frame of reference for accepting this

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as expected and conventional behavior. *Life in a goldfish bowl is transformed from metaphor into accepted reality.* The strength of television as a promoter of discipline does not derive solely from its intrinsic appeal; it is also congruent with other forces pushing in exactly the same direction. *Fortune* reports that in the "new-middle class" communities it is virtually impossible to keep the neighbors from invading one's living room at the slightest pretext or without any pretext at all. This, combined with the uncritical acceptance of the *Person to Person* show, suggests how far we have come from the innocence of the nineteenth century with its motto, "A man's home is his castle."

III

We may now have a perspective from which to view the social consequences of the trivialization of emotions and intimate relationships. As soon as these aspects of personality are transformed into commodities, as well as means of titillating the sado-masochistic impulses of an audience, they become alien characteristics, and, as such, they cannot serve as bases for a defense against the pressures of a restrictive society. We must not be deluded into thinking that this is the participants' problem and not ours. For, as with the invasion of privacy, this continual exposure to the disintegration of other people's identities creates an environment in which it is difficult to maintain a high valuation of our own identity.

Increasingly, support for behavior and thought which deviate from the ever tightening norms comes from such small groups as the family, one's friends, etc. The invasion of privacy is, in effect, a subversion of these groups. Perhaps this will become clearer once we recognize that television is first cousin to the informer. Once the latter becomes institutionalized—as he seems well on his way to becoming—one must always act in strict conformity with the prescribed discipline since the betrayer may be professional colleague, son, or trusted friend. By destroying the solidarity of a group which depends, in large part, upon almost unlimited trust, the informer undermines the supports for behavior which challenges the accepted norms of society. But the basis for the establishment of trust is *privacy* which, in turn, is being destroyed by television and other media.

When any group has control of the environment it is comparatively easy to socialize the members through the classical methods of censorship, etc. But there are other methods beside censorship or physical isolation which do not require the same degree of environmental control. One such method involves the distortion of the meanings of certain symbols and actions which represent alternative beliefs and behavior. That is, if you throw a Krishna Menon in with a Gabor, bill the entire "package" as entertainment, and sell it through television you have gone a long way toward creating an image of an unambiguous world.

What I am getting at here may become clearer by way of a Norman Vincent Peale. His success in converting the New Testament into a gospel of Positive Thought is, in part, due to his ability to destroy his own symbolic status as a minister. Will Herberg points out that a biblical faith is a declaration of resistance against the claims of society. The minister can be a symbol of that resistance, but if one resorts to the mass media it is impos-

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sible to be taken as a figure of "resistance," since these media are not organized for the expression of resistance.

Nor is resistance the only thing which cannot be expressed. A medium which is predominantly devoted to the production of entertainment and the use of individual talent as a come-on for the hard sell, cannot simultaneously be used for "education" or the "spread of culture." Each requires its own setting; to put them into the same "medium" is to invoke a kind of Gresham's Law of Communication.

Again, television is not the only medium which distorts the meaning and significance of symbolic figures. *Person to Person* is, after all, a lineal descendant of the covers of *Time* which within a month may feature anyone from Howdy Doody to David Riesman. What is crucial is the fact that the mass media present the world in such a manner that the inherent complexities and ambiguities which challenge the norms of society cannot emerge.

In the *lingua franca* of contemporary sociology there is the term, "anticipatory socialization," which means, roughly, behaving now in a way which will make adjustment in some future situation easier. It adequately describes, I think, one meaning of popular culture. When the man slips the mike into the bosom, without causing anyone perceptible embarrassment, he helps train us for the time when we shall willingly do the job for ourselves; he is teaching us adjustment to a future nightmare.

2. Labor and Civil Liberties —A Troublesome Problem

Max Awner

Some time ago the Fund for the Republic sponsored a poll to discover how Americans felt about "Communism, conformity and civil liberties." The general findings of the study make highly illuminating reading; they are available in book form (*Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties,* by Samuel Stouffer). Two leaders in workers' education, Benjamin Segal and Harry Fleishman, have since managed to obtain exclusive and complete data on the 750 rank-and-file union members, 687 wives of union members, and 107 local union presidents included among the 6,500 persons interviewed—data not broken down as such in the book. They published a good part of this material in July 1955 in a series of articles in *Labor's Daily,* a newspaper sponsored by the International Typographical Union.

The samplers found that the average trade unionist, like the average American, worries little about either Communism *or* civil liberties. Less than one per cent of the union members mentioned either of these as matters that concerned them most. Among union presidents, as among other community leaders, the proportion was a

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little higher—five per cent. This despite the fact that the survey was made in the summer of 1954, the time of the Army-McCarthy hearings.

Though they did not seem to be worried about civil liberties, the majority of those who were polled gave answers that should make genuine civil libertarians worry plenty about *them*. For example:

77 per cent of those questioned would revoke the citizenship of an admitted Communist. 51 per cent would put him in jail merely because he is a Communist.

Sad figures. But surely union members, with their heritage of militant liberalism, present a more encouraging picture? Among rank-and-file unionists, from 46 to 59 per cent, depending on their level of education, would throw all avowed Communists in jail. Between 78 and 83 per cent, again depending on past schooling, would revoke a Communist's citizenship. Among the union presidents, to be sure, a substantial majority were against jail—but an equally convincing majority were for deprivation of citizenship.

LEST IT BE imagined that only Communists aroused such intolerance, here are a few further statistics:

64 per cent of rank-and-file unionists who did not graduate from high school said that a person who is "against all churches and religion" should not be allowed to make a speech in the community. 89 per cent would not permit him to teach in a college. 67 per cent said a book written by him should be removed from the public library.

Among those with a high school education or more, 53 per cent would allow him to speak, 54 per cent would retain his book, but 73 per cent still would not permit him to teach.

Even among union presidents with a high school education or more—the highest classification in the sample—though a slim majority were on the tolerant side on the book question and a more solid one on the speaking question, 65 per cent would not allow an atheist to teach at a college.

As with atheists, so with socialists and assorted other varieties of radicals and noncomformists. Union members in almost all cases come very close to the norm established for all classes of citizens—a little more tolerant of socialists, a little less tolerant of atheists.

A significant aspect of the study is the conclusive showing that on all questions of civil liberties, community leaders were more liberal than the population at large. *Leaders of the most intolerant groups—e.g., American Legion and Daughters of the American Revolution—were more tolerant than the rank-and-file members of supposedly more libertarian groups—including organized labor.*

In comparative ratings among the community leaders themselves, the union group made its most desolate showing. Of 14 categories of leaders, union presidents ranked eleventh in their readiness to tolerate civil liberties for Communists and other deviants; only Federated Women's Club presidents, DAR regents and Legion post commanders trailed them, in that order. A nice foursome for anybody's afternoon bridge game.

One thing came clear through the statistics: What was feared was not the espionage aspect of Communism (which would have been understandable) but the ideas and teachings of Communism. How else explain the al-

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most equal intolerance of atheists, socialists and other radicals?

So MUCH for statistics. How do they square with actual instances of labor's activities in the field of civil liberties? An incident of which I have first-hand knowledge is perhaps typical and certainly revealing.

An organization professing to be concerned with civil liberties, but unquestionably with Communist leanings, had engaged a hall in the leading labor center in a city of a half-million, for a meeting at which a Puerto Rican Smith Act defendant and avowed Communist was to speak.

The local press carried a routine story on the meeting, giving time and place. As might have been expected, messages of irate protest immediately began pouring in (at least it was claimed the protests reached "pouring" proportions) on officials of the center. Half a day before the meeting was to have taken place, the hall was withdrawn and the meeting had to be cancelled.

The manager of the center, in justifying his action, said: "The guys whose nickels and dimes built this place have been raising hell." Later it was claimed that the very fact the hall was rented to the group in the first place was due to a misunderstanding of the nature of the meeting.

The union officials could hardly have been expected to withstand the pressure and allow the meeting to proceed, even if they had wanted to. The point is that the clamor for suppression was, if not overwhelming, at least unchallenged by any significant opposing voices. (At least one of the labor leaders involved felt that the meeting should have been permitted but, typically, he added that he could express this opinion only in the strictest privacy.)

Another example: The International Association of Machinists is unquestionably one of the better led and generally more enlightened unions. Yet its official weekly publication, *The Machinist,* in its May 21, 1953 issue, carried an elegant two-page spread devoted to the Attorney General's latest list of "subversive" organizations —with this introductory endorsement:

"Read over the lists of organizations on these two pages carefully. Below are listed 192 organizations which the U.S. Attorney General's office recently designated, after the most careful investigation, as subversive. At the right is a list of 62 groups Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr. recently announced will be added to the larger list unless they can prove they are not subversive. [Innocent until proven guilty!—M.A.] This Department of Justice list of subversive organizations is used in the government loyalty check-ups . . . Look over the list carefully. Then clip and save it for future reference. It is a good reference any time someone asks you to join an organization you think might be subversive. Know what you join."

But perhaps this same Machinists union has had a change of heart. Today, after some of its own members have been victimized, it has joined with other newly-enlightened labor groups in condemning certain aspects of the government's loyalty-security program. These unions can be expected to cease their protests and drop back into character, however, as soon as what they see as certain kinks in the program have been ironed out.

THE RECENT MERGER of the AFL and the CIO into what has been called

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the greatest labor federation in the history of the world has brought unionism into a new focus in the eyes of most Americans. The words of labor leaders, therefore, may be expected to carry a somewhat greater impact than before. As president of the sixteen-million-member AFL-CIO George Meany is certainly a potent personality. He has strong convictions and expresses himself forcefully if not always fluently. Of his sincerity there can be no question. But his rise poses serious questions as to the role the unions will play when it comes to rights that do not affect labor directly.

Recently, Meany made a speech, widely heralded in the labor press, that contained some significant clues to his outlook. The speech bristled with the standard polemic against Communism, but this time Meany added a note which at least had not been very prominent before. He delivered a "slashing attack" (as the AFL-CIO News put it) on "liberals" who use less vitriolic language in excoriating the Communists. Giving alarming evidence that he was at least implicitly condoning the means (there has never been any doubt of his approval of the ends) of a McCarthy, Meany said:

"I know of nothing more positive and constructive than a total struggle against [Communism] in the body of modern society... Liberals must be on guard against developing a certain type of anti-McCarthyism of their own. [Here, the record is not clear as to whether Meany said "anti-McCarthyism" or simply "McCarthyism," but it is a semantic curiosity that in this context his meaning would appear to be the same in either case.] They must shun like the plague the role of being anti-anti-Communist." (Here there is no doubt as to the number of antis Meany used!)

It might be expected that men like Walter Reuther and others of the former CIO, plus a handful of the more enlightened leaders of the old AFL, would recognize the dangers in this trend and exert their influence for more political balance in the labor federation. Perhaps such a process is going on. But Reuther and his followers have, temporarily at least, taken a back seat in the union omnibus. The fact remains that the voice that is speaking for labor today is that of George Meany.

Moreover, the AFL-CIO constitution, justly acclaimed for its forthright stands on many matters of social concern, has little to say about civil liberties. There are a couple of broad statements pledging to "protect and strengthen our democratic institutions," and no more. The contrast between the relatively strong stand taken on the "race, creed, color or national origin" side of the liberty coin and the regression on the free-expression side is disturbing to say the least.

Dozens of other bits of evidence could be culled to show labor's overall delinquency in the field of civil liberties: failure to object strenuously to even the most flagrant abuses of Congressional investigating committees; the rather hypocritical position of most unions on the anti-civil libertarian non-Communist oath provision of Taft-Hartley; the lack of strong reaction to such baneful phenomena as loyalty oaths, denial of passports, the army's shocking policy on "undesirable" discharges; the general failure to protest the cynical persecutions of controversial figures—including many

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labor leaders who had the misfortune to dwell beyond the pale of "respectable" unionism. Indeed, when a labor group does on occasion take a strong stand on a crucial civil liberties issue today, this is likely to be regarded in some quarters as *prima facie* evidence of Communist domination or infiltration.

ALL THIS IS not to say that organized labor has done nothing to advance basic freedoms in this country. Some of today's labor leaders, and a good number of unions, have spoken vigorously for the right to deviate from pre-cut patterns of political and economic thought. A few of them—far too few—have been among the civil liberties pioneers. The United Packinghouse Workers, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen and, as certainly should be expected, the American Newspaper Guild and the American Federation of Teachers have spoken out more or less consissently for freedom of information and expression.

Some of the larger international unions have a civil liberties record with some bright spots—the United Automobile Workers, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the Hotel and Restaurant Employees, the International Union of Electrical Workers, the Machinists, even the ultra-conservative-led Teamsters and Steelworkers. The old CIO itself, before its conservative drift which brought it to the point, before the merger, where it could hardly be distinguished from its AFL big brother, took some commendable stands.

But while there are worthy exceptions, the problem remains: the facile assumption that the labor movement is necessarily or inevitably a defender of civil liberties is open to challenge on empirical grounds. Why many unions have a spotty and in some cases bad record on this problem could well be the subject for a fuller analysis; here I have tried only to present a few disquieting facts. It is easy to say that labor's dereliction on so basic a matter as civil liberties is rooted in its lack of a social ideology or goal; it is possible that with the growth of "business unionism" and the increasing absorption of the union movement into the structure of corporate society, there will be even less opportunity for those unionists who are concerned with more than immediate bread-and-butter issues. But whatever the explanation or the remedy, I think this is a matter that merits further discussion in the pages of this journal.

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HISTORIANS IN AN AGE OF ACQUIESCENCE

William L. Neumann

The modern historian generally recognizes that his writings are to some degree tied to the contemporary climate of opinion, *zeitgebunden* as the Germans say. The common assumptions of the time are all-pervasive; for the scholar to filter all of them out of his work is impossible. In subtle ways his views about even the most remote ages are shaped by the impact of modern times. History as written is in part a reflection of the present.*

Today's American historian probably reflects his age more completely than in any previous generation. Three major wars within a half century have razed the ivory tower; historical works produced by long years of work in undusted and secluded rooms are a rarity. The typical historian's working place is likely to be a glass-walled carrell in a busy library with a telephone only a few steps down the corridor. The historian works at a "project," usually financed by a foundation grant after its merit and respectability have been approved by boards of recognized scholars. Often there is a publisher in the background to give encouragement after a careful survey of the marketability of the future product. American historical writing is now in the main stream of American life; it embodies the prosperity, the conventionality and the nationalist emphasis of the Truman-Eisenhower years.

Doors to the life of abundance have opened for the historian with nimble typewriter fingers and a ready flow of words. The economic historian can profitably turn to the compilation of the official chronicles of major businesses and industries. The specialist in the middle period of American history is presented with a lucrative field by the Civil War cult. Any readable rehash of the military history of that conflict is assured of profitable sales. Biographies of Civil War generals, resurrected eye-witness accounts, and any grubbings associated with the magic name of Lincoln offer opportunities for royalties. But the greatest future is promised by the bullish market for textbooks. The

* Perhaps I should say that in this article I am concerned not primarily with those serious historians who have been revising certain "progressive" ideas about American history; these revisions, whether one agrees with them or not, merit separate consideration. My topic is a large-scale trend in recent popular and text-book histories, which in turn reflects something of the general temper of post-World War II American life.

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rapid rises in high school and college enrollments are expected to continue for at least a decade; the teaching of American history has been given new emphasis as a neutralizer of alien intellectual influences. A survey in 1950 found twice as many colleges and universities requiring a course in the history of the United States as before World War II. The present and potential consumers for attractively packaged synopses of the American story mount up into the millions, and historians are rushing to meet the demand.

THE AMERICAN HISTORY TEXT is a significant sample of the contemporary temper. While it offers school boards, college trustees and teachers what must be an approvable version of the national past, it also represents the latest judgements of scholarship, tailored down to a student level. From a commercial point of view the text expresses the most successful techniques of packaging reading matter. High school and even some college texts now aim at the stylistic banalities of the *Reader's Digest* along with the photographic appeal of *Life*. Older texts have had to be modernized to conform to these standards. The *American Nation,* written by John D. Hicks of the University of California, has been a best seller nationally since its first appearance as a college text in 1937. In its third edition in 1955 its sober format was discarded for a two column page in which the illustrations rival the reading matter in allotment of space.

The techniques of the assembly line have been found to be adaptable to text production; an increasing number of volumes are the work of two or more authors. This speeds the completion of manuscript, and since the authors usually come from different colleges and universities the guaranteed number of adoptions is increased. It now would be an improvident and rare teacher who failed to push his own text. One recent text of some merit carries the names of twenty authors from seventeen colleges and universities. There are now approximately fifty American history college texts on the market, and since many of them are by historians who have done little or no research outside their narrow area of specialization, the majority are little more than rewrites of the older texts with new chapters added to bring the story up to date. Deficiencies in originality and quality are countered by an emphasis on the more saleable characteristics; an attractive cover, a profusion of pictures, cartoons and charts, and a chatty style of writing.

These new sources of wealth and the general atmosphere of prosperity have turned many historians away from the limitations of capitalist society in their reviews of the past. The more sordid details of American economic growth are deleted, and the nineteenth century empire builders, once crudely labeled as "robber barons," have become the paragons associated with the tales of Horatio Alger. One historian, Harvard's Samuel E. Morison, in reviewing the critical treatment once given the rich, charged these writings with "robbing the people of their heroes" and "insulting their folk-memory of great figures whom they

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admired."* Men have been turned to Communism, Morison claimed, by such deviations from uncritical acceptance of capitalistic folklore. Some historians, to be sure, did go to extremes in muckraking the capitalist and his system in the years when the economy appeared to be crumbling, but now the scholar is asked to go to the opposite extreme. *Time*'s recent discovery that among American intellectuals "The Man of Protest has to some extent given way to the Man of Affirmation," applies to many historians.

ONE OF THE MOST VIGOROUS leaders of the campaign for an amiable treatment of the capitalist's excesses is Allen Nevins of Columbia. An able scholar who has made major contributions to American historical writing, Nevins has become in the last decade one of the most prolific writers in disseminating the new orthodoxy. With the assistance of teams of graduate students Nevins has turned out a number of company histories including one on Ford Motor and the Rockefeller empire. Not only has he put in practice the heroic approach to the builders of our industrial might, but Nevins has called upon other historians to follow. In an address given in 1953 entitled, "New Lamps for Old History," he predicted that "the architects of our material wealth... will yet stand forth in their true stature as builders of strength which civilization found indispensable.... Here is a wide field for the re-writing of American history, and the re-education of the American people."

Nevins has been a bitter critic of Charles Beard and Beardian relativism. In his *Gateway to History* (1938), Nevins went so far as to claim that Beard's doctrines were the same as those used in the distorted historical writing of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. (In 1938 Soviet historiography was apparently not in the same category.) More recently Nevins has claimed that Beard found in the past only what he thought would be socially desirable for the present. But in arguing his own position Nevins has pleaded "the need for every generation for a reinterpretation to suit its own preconceptions, ideas and outlook."† The preconceptions and outlook of the Truman-Eisenhower years obviously call for a description of American business which meets the standards set by the glowing elegies of *Fortune* magazine, and the Nevins school of business historians is meeting this need.

Textbooks written in the climate of the depression or in the days of New Deal attacks on "economic royalists" require drastic revision if they are to sell today. One of the most striking examples of radical revisionism is furnished by the rewrites of another Columbia historian, Louis Hacker. In 1932 Hacker and another colleague produced a text which became popular for its emphasis on economic history and its iconoclastic treatment of American capitalism. Revised in 1939 it retained its pungent criticisms, directed at that time at the New Deal

* "Faith of a Historian," *American Historical Review*, LVI (Jan. 1951), 261-275.
† "Should American History Be Rewritten?" *The Saturday Review*, Feb. 6, 1954.

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variety of capitalism. When the second revision appeared in 1949 a new era had begun. As one review of Hacker's writings concluded, he had "jettisoned most of his Marxist assumptions—and perhaps substituted a few from Hayek."* Gone was the attack on "Capitalism in Crisis" of the 1932 edition and the strictures against New Deal patchwork of the 1939 edition. Instead the Franklin Roosevelt administration was charged with carrying intervention too far and hampering the vitality of the economy; the rugged individualists of the 19th century were given full measure of respect. Few texts have required as fundamental reworking as Hacker's, but the same lines have been followed by others.

The mood of affirmation rather than criticism is also strongly reflected in the treatment of American foreign policy. One of the deans of American diplomatic history, Yale's Samuel F. Bemis, explained at a recent historical meeting that when American foreign policy is under sustained attack from abroad the American scholar should not contribute to the work of the nation's enemies. Bemis' position has been widely accepted. When the London *Times Literary Supplement* reviewed American historical writing in 1954, it complained that the American historian was "called on, too often and too loudly, to perform specific patriotic tasks." Treatment of American diplomacy in the Roosevelt years and after now frequently sounds as if it were a rework of the State Department *Bulletin* with rhetorical flourishes added from the speeches of the Secretaries of State. A college student who learns about his country's foreign policy from his history text will find little or nothing to suggest that recent American diplomacy has been anything but a smashing success. NATO, SEATO and the rearmament of Germary are treated without qualification as major American contributions to peace and security. Communist success, if mentioned at all, is analyzed in terms of subversion and without regard for its utopian appeal to underdeveloped areas.

NOT ONLY IS RECENT American foreign policy treated benignly, but what were considered sound criticisms in earlier decades are being toned down or deleted. Bemis's *Diplomatic History of the United States,* since 1936 a standard text, was noted for its assault on the four great blunders of American diplomacy beginning with the annexation of the Philippines. In the 1950 edition Bemis began to soften his judgements: "at least it can be argued the Open Door may have been a second blunder of American diplomacy in the Far East." When a revision of the third section of this text appeared in 1955 as *United States as a World Power,* the world "blunders" disappeared completely. Secretary Knox's proposal for the commercial neutralization of Manchuria which was called a blunder from 1936 through 1950 became in 1955 only "an unsuccessful *démarche.*" Similarly John Hicks who in

* John F. Gerstung, "Louis M. Hacker's Reappraisal of Recent American History," *History,* XII (Spring 1950), 140-166.

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1941 criticized Woodrow Wilson's Mexican policy and refusal to recognize President Huerta as "an act of intervention in the internal affairs of Mexico," in 1955 found that Wilson's policy "probably saved the Mexicans from another reactionary regime."

Any suggestion that there is a relationship between economics and foreign policy seems to have become passé along with the concept of economic imperialism. Mention of the interests of American investors in our Mexican policy in Hick's 1941 edition disappears in the postwar revisions. The role of war-bred prosperity in contributing to American departure from neutrality in 1917, a factor which always received a few lines in the texts written after the Nye Committee investigations, now bears the odium of a Marxist interpretation. When Thomas Bailey of Stanford wrote in 1940 his *Diplomatic History of the American People* —until recently Bemis' major competitor—he pointed to the pressure on Congress from "interested financial and industrial groups" to vote for war. In a 1946 revision Bailey dropped these lines and added a paragraph which denied any economic explanations. America went to war in 1917, he explained, because she was attacked and the decision for war was really made in Germany rather than in the United States.

George Kennan, an outsider, entered diplomatic history with his *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* in which he suggests that American entry into World War I was a mistake. By contrast the professional historians who were once sympathetic to that point of view have come to accept both the first and second World Wars as necessary if not inevitable. Bemis wrote in his 1936 edition that the first World War accomplished only the overthrow of the German empire for a generation and concluded that the price of this achievement was "excessive." After World War II the wording of the same sentence was altered slightly to change the meaning completely so that the price of the first World War "while high, was hardly excessive." Bailey's first edition (1940) said of C. C. Tansill's *America Goes to War,* a book attacking American entry in 1917, that it was "the most important work on the subject . . . detailed and penetrating." In 1946 the same book became "the most critical work," but it was still "penetrating." In the 1955 revision Tansill's volume ceased to be "penetrating" and was instead "isolationist."

Prosperity and the smugness of self-righteous nationalism have led the American history text writer to skip over the disturbing aspects of the national scene. A few texts comment on the dangers of McCarthyism, but the continuing threat of federal and industrial security programs remains unmentioned. The creation of a mass-circulation culture with its implications for American education and intellectual development is not a phenomenon to be pondered in the concluding chapters on American society. One individualistic text, that of Leland Baldwin of the University of Pittsburgh, actually devotes some pages to an exploration of Durkheim's concept of *anomie* as it applies

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to the American scene, but such a concern is unique. Even the implications of thermonuclear warfare are frequently met with a bluff optimism. As the *Times Literary Supplement* discerned, Americans assume that the study of their history "must breed hope and faith, if not charity."

The attitude of acquiescence is most marked in the treatment of the military elite and the blunders of the professional soldier. Although the experience of serving in World War II might have been expected to have led historians to scepticism about the infallibility of the military mind, no flood of historical criticism followed the war. By contrast the nineteen-twenties saw a great many analysis of the blunders of the military leaders. Hanson Baldwin's *Great Mistakes of the War* is the work of an able journalist on World War II rather than of a professional historian and is too brief to treat of such important setbacks as the Battle of the Bulge. This paucity of scholarship is in part due to the coming of the Korean War which not only diverted energies but also made criticism of military leadership "partisan" if not unpatriotic. More effective has been the aura of untouchability which surrounds General Marshall, particularly after McCarthy's attacks, and extends to the military career of President Eisenhower.

Samuel Morison, who has combined the scholar's robes with the uniform of an admiral as the official naval historian of World War II, believes that American historians have in the past sinned in their lack of the warrior's spirit. In his address as president of the American Historical Association in 1950 Morison complained that war-hating historians like Charles Beard had left the younger generation "spiritually unprepared for the war they had to fight." The idea that the historian is responsible for preparing young minds for war and must himself plunge into nationalist polemics is relatively new to American historiography. The ideal at least has always been to struggle for detachment and objectivity. But Morison's approach was given even blunter approval by his predecessor in the presidential chair, Conyers Read of the University of Pennsylvania.

A distinguished scholar in the field of Tudor England, Read's address in 1949 was entitled "The Social Responsibilities of the Historian." The traditional goal of detachment, "dispassionate behaviorism" and the "liberal neutral attitude" were all castigated as irresponsible. "Total war," said Professor Read, "whether it be hot or cold, enlists every one and calls upon everyone to assume his part. The historian is no freer from his obligation than the physicist." The comparison of professions is a suggestive one in view of the problems of America's leading physicists. Perhaps the historian should also be security-cleared before he goes about his business of affirmation, of cultured chauvinism, and his huckstering of optimism and the military virtues. If this has an Orwellian 1984 ring to it, it may be because it is already 1956. Alas poor Clio! This muse was never meant for profit or propaganda.

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BRITISH SOCIALISM: FERMENT AND POLEMIC

G. L. Arnold

R.H.S. Crossman, reviewing John Strachey's *Contemporary Capitalism*• last summer, began by observing that British socialists have run out of fresh ideas. This is true, but the explanation lies not, as he seems to think, in their overwhelmingly successful concentration upon practice ("under the Labor Government they were so busy changing the world that they had no time to understand it"), but rather in the exhaustion of a certain intellectual heritage which was never quite as ample as the beneficiaries had been led to suppose. Laborists of varying tendencies continue to write pamphlets and books, but the hard core of scientific analysis is difficult to locate. An exception must be made for the Keynesians; but then, for all the well-meant efforts of the left-wingers among them to pass themselves off as Socialists, no one has yet quite succeeded in demonstrating that socialism, laborism and Keynesian liberalism all come to the same thing in the long run—a demonstration not required, let me hasten to add, in the interests of politics, since the Labor Party is quite happy to accommodate all of these conflicting strains. When one speaks of intellectual doubts one refers to the state of mind now prevalent among the socialists in the Labor Party, i.e., those who still believe that the welfare state and the mixed economy are stages on the road to something less banal.

Mr. Strachey's book, itself the first instalment of a projected major theoretical work dealing with the whole corpus of socialist doctrine, thus comes at the right moment. But before trying to assess its significance, it will be necessary to devote some observations to the prevailing party orthodoxy which he sets out to challenge. This procedure is distinctly unfair to him, as will be immediately obvious to anyone who reads *Contemporary Capitalism* together with the bulky pamphlet entitled *Twentieth Century Socialism*. Whatever criticism may be advanced on Mr. Strachey's work, the professional economists cannot afford to pass him by: he is himself one of them, as well as being that rarest of phenomena, a British socialist who has made a serious study of Marx; whereas it is extremely difficult to think of a specialist in any field who would be likely to benefit from reading *Twentieth Century Socialism*. Yet there is no doubt which of the two books is the more important politically.

WHAT THE MODERN WORLD has to make up its mind about, if we

• Random House, 1956.

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are to believe the authors of *Twentieth Century Socialism,* is really a matter of the utmost simplicity:

> At bottom the conflict between capitalism and socialism has always been a conflict of values. Capitalists have accepted material values as the main criterion of progress. What socialists have wanted to see embodied in the economy were the universal human ideals of equality, freedom and fellowship. These ideas all express in their various ways the basic worth of every human personality. They make man the measure of the good society. It is his equality, his freedom, his fellowship—not only his economic advantage—which have been the ends of socialist endeavour.

This is the opening paragraph of the book. It sets the tone for what must in all conscience be described as one of the dullest, most dispiriting and least original literary productions put out by any major political group in recent years. As an example of moral self-congratulation phrased in civil-service prose it is paralleled only by the official Party statement, *Towards Equality,* of which it is indeed an elaboration. But there are ideological refinements hidden from the official platform-drafters which in this Socialist Union manifesto are explored to the point of exhaustion. The chief one is the contrast between "capitalist" materialism and "socialist" concern for "ethical values." It never seems to have struck the editors of this collective work (two professional social scientists, backed by a further array of university talent) that the proper distinction lies between *liberals* and socialists—not between an abstraction called "capitalism" and a utopia labelled "socialist society." Nor does the reflection appear to have passed through their minds that the "human ideals of equality, freedom and fellowship" were given an earthly resting-place by the French Revolution over a century and a half ago. Indeed the whole slogan is nothing but a feeble rendering of *"Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité"—liberal* values first proclaimed (and in a measure translated into reality) by the "bourgeois" revolution of 1789.

Now it is open to socialists to assert that they are the inheritors of this particular tradition—although the claim is unconvincing when made on behalf of movements like the British which stem from a different national background. But it is emphatically not open to any socialist, whatever his intellectual antecedents, to pretend that he is the sole custodian of values which in actual fact are to this day professed by the overwhelming majority of non-socialists in all civilized countries. The official ideology of modern society is liberalism, and liberalism is the historical incorporation, as well as the original source, of the demand for "freedom, equality and fellowship." Socialists who wish to distinguish themselves from liberals (or, for that matter, from the conservative Christian-Democratic parties in Europe whose general philosophy is in tune with that outlined in *Twentieth Century Socialism*) must find more solid ground on which to stand than a lachrymose repudiation of the cash nexus. To say nothing of the naivete implied by the suggestion that the conflict is simply one of "values."

It may seem a waste of time to labor this point, but in fact the current malaise in British socialism is closely bound up with the prevalence of a mentality which would have seemed equally vulgar to a Schumpeter or a Marx.

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It is not necessary to share Schumpeter's unbounded admiration for the historic achievement of capitalism to sense that there is something faintly repellent about the assumption of moral superiority which breathes through all the 150 pages of *Twentieth Century Socialism*. Schumpeter of course appreciated Marx precisely because (whatever his blind spots) he was totally free from this kind of pettiness. It is likewise no accident that Schumpeter, no less than Marx, is a bugbear to a good many Laborite ideologists. His combination of an essentially scientific intellectualism with a rational acceptance of the technical (not moral) superiority of socialism is offensive to what, notwithstanding one's reluctance to employ clichés, must be called the petty bourgeois mind. Marx of course was even worse--he actually believed that the producers should own their tools!

The authors of *Twentieth Century Socialism* are miles removed from such utopianism. The best hope they can hold out to their countrymen is a further dose of gas-and-water socialism, combined with even stiffer taxes (as if the present ones were not enough to discourage the acquisition of professional skill) and some vague talk about "responsible participation in industry," to be brought about apparently by exhorting the dull mass of managers and workers to become more public-spirited. This, plus the standard demand for greater educational equality, represents the sum and substance of what the official propagandists of the British Labor movement have to say in the second half of the present century.

It is, by any standard, a come-down even from the theory and practice of the Labor Government. For one thing, the ideal society advocated in this manifesto already exists in large measure in two British Commonwealth countries—Australia and New Zealand—and shows signs of coming into being in a third, Canada. Neither of these is socialist by any definition of the term, but all three are a good deal more democratic and less class-ridden than Britain, and all possess considerable elements of that mixed economy which this school now regards as the *aim* of socialist planning. It follows that Britain need only reach the level of an adequately functioning welfare state in a reasonably democratic environment for the official school to have nothing left to complain about, except the continued prevalence of "material values," i.e., the cash nexus, and the immoral desire of people to "keep up with the Joneses"; and these surely can be cured by a little intensified preaching. Now it is true that British society is still somewhat remote from this ideal, but the causes of this insufficiency have little to do with the absence of socialism. They are rooted partly in economic difficulties about which the manifesto has nothing worth-while to say, and partly in the accumulated heritage of pre-liberal, pre-democratic, and—when all is said and done—pre-capitalist attitudes. These lacunae the official school proposes to fill by making society more egalitarian, more fluid—in short, more like America (this of course cannot be avowed).

The aim may be worthy, and even important; but it is irrelevant to the socialist issue. It is also self-contradictory. The breaking down of inherited

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caste distinctions—which is what Laborists mean when they talk of "doing away with classes"—can only generalize the attitudes now prevalent among the more moneyed strata which the authors deplore. In plain terms, it means making it possible for everyone to have a car. Now this is the precise opposite of what the Socialist Union doctrinaires really want, since in their private philosophy the satisfaction of material wants comes a long way behind the achievement of such noble but vague strivings as "the longing for a society in which people, no longer divided by the barriers of privilege, can be conscious of their common humanity." But "materialism" is the inevitable consequence of making society more egalitarian. Incidentally, what is wrong with wanting to have a car?

It may seem absurd to devote so much space to this undistinguished production. But the shift of emphasis away from social ownership and towards "equality" within the present mixed economy is rapidly becoming the dividing line between socialism and Laborism. The division of course is not absolute: there are points of agreement, e.g., acceptance of the need for public control over the key sectors of the economy. On this the official school—to judge from Mr. Gaitskell's recent Fabian Tract, *Socialism and Nationalisation*—is firmly although cautiously insistent. But then the existence of a state-controlled sector, as he himself points out, is only a means to an end. The end, if one is to go by the current literary orthodoxy, is greater equality within a somewhat more democratic framework. This may be all that can be achieved during the next decade or two, but in that case why call it socialism and pretend that it represents a break with the principles and practices of the ages?

FROM THESE TRIVIALITIES one turns with some relief to Mr. Strachey. Here at last is hard thinking (though not as austere as Mrs. Joan Robinson's new volume, *The Accumulation of Capital,* which is aimed at professional economists only). Here, too, the economic and political strands are pulled together in a unified concept, so that political activity becomes meaningful, instead of bombinating in a vacuum. Moreover, we are spared the sermons of the ethical school, to say nothing of their ghastly style. For this alone Mr. Strachey wins an outsize medal.

It is less easy to admire the construction of his work. The two principal themes—Marx's theory of economics, and the impact of democracy on social processes—are rather tenuously linked by an argument which lays a little too much stress on the "immiseration" issue. Contrary to what the layman may tend to gather from Mr. Strachey's explication of this well-known subject, Social-Democratic Marxism on the European Continent was never seriously perturbed by the rather academic question of how much good trade-unionism was likely to do the workers under free, i.e., un-controlled, capitalism. Mr. Strachey is himself a Social-Democrat in the European sense, i.e., a democratic socialist who has studied Marx and adapted his concepts to the reality of modern, post-liberal capitalism.

Because he is tempted to devote a good part of his argument to a refutation of Leninism, the reader may gain the mistaken impression that the Com-

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munists have somehow made off with the substances of the Marxian case. This is not so, and here and there Mr. Strachey comes close to saying it. But then he is once more drawn back to the pauperization issue, to which he attaches a quite disproportionate degree of importance. He even seems to think that Marx expected capitalism to break down in his own life-time! It really ought not to be necessary to demonstrate once more that the European "revolution" Marx and Engels were always referring to in their correspondence was the democratic one which was aborted in 1848 and eventually took place in 1918. But then Lenin made the same mistake, so perhaps Mr. Strachey can be excused.

When he is not bothered by his King Charles's Head, Mr. Strachey is highly effective as a socialist theorist who has absorbed the Schumpeterian argument as well as the Marxian, and consequently transcended the customary parochial concern with what Keynes may or may not have meant. His rather detached treatment of Keynes is in itself a substantial irritant to liberal orthodoxy, and probably accounts for some of the peevishness with which his offerings has been received in those quarters.

The politically relevant part of his argument, it needs to be added, is in conformity with strict Labor Party orthodoxy: liberals and Communists are both mistaken, the former in regarding capitalism as viable, the latter in believing that it will break down. The true course consists in modifying the economic structure through democratic-political pressure, until state capitalism has passed by gradual stages into socialism, democratically controlled. This, of course, is a realistic prescription only for advanced countries in possession of a democratic tradition and a politically mature working-class: in short, for the Western world. Beyond it there lies an uncertain twilight zone in which capitalism and Communism are battling for control of the industrial revolution. This is true, and needed saying. But Mr. Strachey could have been a little more plain-spoken in characterizing the cost of Stalinism to the populations under its control.

Notwithstanding its eclecticism, and also notwithstanding a certain prosiness, this is a significant book, if only because it shows that socialist theory retains a capacity for development. In Britain at any rate this kind of double-edged critique of liberalism and Communism has practical relevance. For all the Labor Party's regrettable penchant for "ethical" twaddle as a substitute for theory, the doctrinal substance of British socialism remains sufficiently tough to repel both Keynesian and Leninist assaults. Given the present political stalemate this is perhaps the most hopeful indicator of the movement's capacity for further maturation. By 1960 or thereabouts the political fruits should begin to become visible.

AND NOW BACK FROM SOCIALISM to Keynesian liberalism; for although space does not permit the inclusion of a review of Mr. C. A. R. Crosland's important book *The Future of Socialism,* which made its appearance last fall, a few words must nonetheless be devoted to the long-range political significance of this bulky and learned volume; the more so since Mr. Strachey

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has publicly come to grips with it in the columns of the *New Statesman* (October 5), thereby demonstrating once more the presence of two distinct schools of thought within the Labor Party: one addicted to greater equality within the frame-work of the mixed economy, the other convinced that social ownerships of the means of production is what really matters, and that the decisive transfer of power from the possessing class to public administration has not yet occurred.

An adequate review of Mr. Crosland's work would have to take in a good deal of territory, for the author has not only revised socialist theory to suit his purpose, but added a fairly comprehensive blueprint of the good society, complete with legislative prescriptions for reforming the educational system and the social services—all conceived in terms of what is practicable in Britain, and written in the manner of a rising young statesman with fairly good prospects of inclusion in the next Labor Government. But this is no place for considering the technicalities of such a program, or the conceptual frame-work that lies behind it. Fabianism is strictly a national affair: there has never yet been a Fabian manifesto or treatise that could profitably be dissected for the benefit of people outside the British Isles. Whether Mr. Crosland is right or wrong matters less than that he is in tune with the current fashion of "Little Englandism," which also affects the Conservatives: neither party at the moment has much to say to the outside world.

What needs to be said about his work is simply that it does for the official leadership of the Labor Party (i.e. for Mr. Gaitskell and his friends) what Mr. Strachey is trying to do for the group represented by Aneurin Bevan (now promoted to second place in the hierarchy). In short, it summarizes all the intellectual arguments at the disposal of those who feel that the transitional period between capitalism and socialism is going to be long, and that the bulk of the British electorate is in no mood for short-cuts. And it does so in an optimistic manner—somewhat to the surprise of economists (right, left and center) who were under the impression that Britain has to face urgent and crucial problems of economic survival.

Now this opens a very wide territory for debate. A debate of this kind, however, must be conducted mainly in terms of what the British economy is or is not capable of achieving during the coming decade. Such questions are best left to specialists. The non-specialist can only register a faint feeling of surprise at the title chosen for Mr. Crosland's work—might it not have been wiser to call it *The Future of Fabianism?* And if Fabianism should turn out to have no future, what are the Keynesians in the Labor Party going to do about it?

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LENIN, TROTSKY AND STALIN

(The Background of Russian Politics)

The recent events in Russia, particularly a number of references made at the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, have brought back into public discussion issues and problems concerning the history of 20th century radicalism that for a good many years had been confined to specialized circles. The following article, though written before the 20th Congress, provides a useful summary account of the events that have led to the recent revelations.

Benno Sarel

I

Lenin believed that the socialist movement alone could endow the workers with political consciousness. As he saw it, the socialist movement and idea had their birth and existence apart from the proletariat: "By their social situation ... Marx and Engels were bourgeois intellectuals. Similarly in Russia the theoretical doctrine of Social Democracy arose quite independently of the spontaneous growth of the labor movement: it was the natural and inevitable result of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intellectuals."

As for the spontaneous struggle of the workers, "the labor movement isolated from Social Democracy declines and inevitably founders in the bourgeois mire," and "the working class loses its political independence...."

At the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party in 1903, Lenin relentlessly opposed an amendment to the Program stating that the political consciousness of the proletariat increases as the struggle of the oppressed and the contradictions of capitalism increase. "This amendment," said Lenin, "could convey the idea that the development of consciousness occurs spontaneously.... [But] aside from the influence of Social Democracy, there is no conscious activity of the masses." And in *What Is To Be Done?* (published in 1902) Lenin wrote, "The workers ... *could not yet* have Social-Democratic consciousness. The latter could come to them only from without."

One might recall here Marx's own appraisal: "That which is new in my teaching is the demonstration ... that the class struggle leads inevitably to the dictatorship of the proletariat." For Lenin, this vision of the goal of the proletariat is conceived independently of its spontaneous struggle. The pro-

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letariat can arrive at an understanding of its historic role neither through its own powers nor as a result of the class struggle.

To schematize Lenin's thought: the proletariat is no more than an essential element with which a socialist movement prepares to construct workers' power. It is, according to Lenin, first and foremost the professional revolutionaries who make up the Party and who have the mission of bringing socialist consciousness to the proletariat: "We must form men who consecrate to the revolution not their free evenings, but their entire lives," unlike the "organization of the workers" which should be broad in scope and based on the trades.

The Party of professional revolutionaries was to be made up of intellectuals and workers. In *What Is To Be Done?* Lenin advised taking out of the factory the worker who showed ability as an organizer or agitator. "We must see to it that he lives at the expense of the Party, that he is able, when necessary, to take part in illegal action, or move to another locality: otherwise he will not acquire much experience." Lenin did not then consider this measure as anything exceptional. Nor did he indicate that after a period of activity as a professional revolutionary the worker should be restored to his old milieu. Lenin did not believe, as did Rosa Luxemburg, that the struggle of the workers should merge with the socialist consciousness to form one superior category, but rather that the consciousness incarnated in the Party should remain apart and ahead of the workers' struggle, prepared to lead the way.

The professional revolutionaries as a distinct group could not be defined with respect to the class to which they belonged. They not only had a separate (and necessarily separate) role from that of the working class, but they constituted, as it were, a profession above the classes. Those workers who entered it thereby cut themselves off from their former class.

Two facts are here worth noting: First, Lenin did not envisage having his political experiment performed on the working class except through professional revolutionaries, who could not truly be called workers themselves. Second, pressed by political opponents, Lenin later affirmed that these national campaigns against the autocracy in the course of which the professional revolutionaries moved among all classes, were socialist because they were organized by the Party and the Party was a party of the workers.

It is a fact that Lenin and, following him in caricature, the Stalinists, have always had a tendency to consider the Party as a revolutionary factor *per se* rather than as a relative instrument.

Taking into account the role which Lenin had assigned to the Party, it could not be otherwise. For Lenin, the professional revolutionaries were more than warriors—they were heroes. They formed the vanguard of the mass of workers, who themselves only made up a minority of the nation. To lead the workers and to maneuver among the other classes, the most rigid discipline and efficiency were indispensable. As we shall see, Lenin in some cases assigned also the Party the task of keeping in check workers and revolutionary peasants.

To freedom of opinion—within the bounds of Marxism—in the heart of the organization, and to the principle of democratic election of its staff, Lenin opposed mutual trust and the spirit of brotherhood-in-arms which should prevail in a professional revolutionary group.

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> In matters of organization, the only serious underlying principles for the militants of our movement must be: strict secrecy, rigorous selection of members, preparation of professional revolutionaries. Once these conditions are met, we shall have something more than "democratisms": we shall have complete fraternal confidence between revolutionaries.

At the head of this group of combatants, Lenin placed an adequate general staff: "... without a dozen talented leaders, leaders tried and taught by long experience, in close agreement with each other, and knowing perfectly their respective roles, no class of contemporary society can carry on the fight unswervingly." And Lenin went on to express his admiration for the stable general staff of the German Social Democracy.

Illegality and the surveillance of the Okhrana* certainly counted for much in Lenin's rejection of democratic principles inside his organization. It is nevertheless impossible to accept this as the whole explanation. In his "Letter to a Comrade on the Question of Organization" (September 1902) Lenin recommended holding non-periodic meetings of from thirty to a hundred militants, in the forest, for example. During these meetings there would have been nothing to interfere with the democratic election of local committees. Lenin himself later admitted that the non-application of democratic principles in the organization had been exaggerated.

Can we assert that the practice of the Leninist organization corresponded point by point to the principles set forth at the beginning of the century? Most certainly not. Often there were divergences, and on occasion Lenin allowed himself to be convinced by his adversaries. As a matter of fact Lenin, who had an excellent grasp of reality, showed himself more flexible at decisive moments than any of his collaborators. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the general tendency of Bolshevism in matters of organization remained the same as that defined so forcefully from the end of 1901 on.

II

It was clear at the beginning of the century that Russia was on the eve of a revolution. Pressed by strategic needs and by their policy of grandeur, the Czars had made great efforts to modernize the country. The industry created had enabled them to subjugate lesser or more backward peoples than Russia: at the same time, it had introduced a charge of gunpowder into the foundations of society. For feudal Russia, the working class, and in part the bourgeoisie, were destructive elements. Then too, in order to create the new industries, the governing party had been obliged time and again to bleed the peasant and load down the landowning nobility with taxes. The whole of society with the exception of the top governmental bureaucracy was waiting for a change.

Lenin believed that the revolution would be above all a peasant revolution, the key to Russia's social problem being the agrarian question. But Lenin demonstrated that every agrarian revolution is also a bourgeois and national revolution, in the sense that it is not directed against private property as such and that the whole nation more or less participates.

* Czarist secret police particularly charged with ferreting out revolutionaries.

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The bourgeoisie, Lenin explained, was against the Czar. But since it was weak and fearful when confronted by the workers' demands, and too bound up with the imperial bureaucracy, it would betray its own revolution along the way. The peasantry, like the middle strata of the towns, was not homogeneous: at one pole it inclined toward the bourgeoisie, at the other toward the proletariat. But as a whole it would "go along" in the fight against the government, and its assault, coupled with that of the workers, should be decisive. The working class would be the most resolute, because it was the only class which desired to pass beyond the bourgeois revolution.

Lenin asked himself, what would be the fate of this bourgeois revolution made against the bourgeoisie, in the absence of a strongly organized Social Democracy? It seemed certain to him that without a disciplined cadre this revolution, made by diverse and fragmented segments of society, each bound to its own narrow milieu, was in danger of dissipating itself.

The revolution, said Lenin, must set up a provisional government which would expropriate the feudalists, but not the capitalists. On behalf of the workers, it would proclaim the eight-hour day. It would be impossible to go further, he pointed out, because material conditions in Russia were not ripe for the establishment of socialism; and also because it would be necessary to take into account the peasant, who would consider himself satisfied once his thirst for land was appeased.

Trotsky, in his 1905-1910 polemics with Lenin, emphasized that the working class, having played a principal part in the overthrow of feudalism, would proceed of its own accord to the expropriation of the capitalists, its immediate enemies and allies of the feudalists. Trotsky termed the revolution as formulated by Lenin a "Lenten Revolution," a "revolution of abstinence for the working class." To these arguments Lenin made no direct reply; he merely stressed again the importance of the peasant element.

Having decided that a socialist development of Russia was impossible, Lenin drew all the conclusions, and did not wish, either in the country or in the city, for a too radical social revolution which would compromise the chances of a capitalist development. Just such a radical revolution was, however, desired by the most disinherited elements of Russian society. In short, Lenin, the great revolutionary figure of our century, presented fifty years ago nearly the same program as the Jacobins of the French Revolution. We can be sure that in some measure this Jacobinism in social issues led him to Jacobinism in questions of organization. Lenin was for a dictatorship against the partisans of the autocracy, and for this a strong force was essential. The dictatorship was to be a popular one ("democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants"); and to maintain the equilibrium between the antagonistic segments of the population, pushing some forward and holding others back, a strong and disciplined party was necessary.

In short, Lenin found himself in a terrible contradiction; he approved the appointment of a bourgeois government set up by the socialist movement, a capitalism put in place by the working class. Lenin hoped to escape this contradiction by limiting capitalism, by making it follow an "abridged" route,

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more "rational" and less "harmful." And above all, he hoped to escape from this contradiction with the aid of the Western proletariat.

In regard to the time limit, i.e., the necessity for Lenin to create a disciplined party quickly, before the outbreak of the revolution, it would be well to specify that nobody else would have been able to accomplish this task as well as Lenin himself. In comparing Lenin to Marx, Trotsky wrote in 1924 that even if Marx had not been the creator of the First International, he would still have been what he was through his writings, but that Lenin, even if he had not written anything, would have been just as great, because he was the leader of the Russian Revolution. This is certainly true. In spite of his excellence as a theorist, Lenin will go down in history as a man of action, and as a man of action representing the Russian working class at its best. Everything about Lenin, his style, his manner of speaking, his action, was marked by his tremendous drive towards the goal. His writings are sober, pared down, and utilitarian; but even when they are as technical as the "Letter to a Comrade on the Question of Organization" they radiate enthusiasm by their very compactness, by the extraordinary will to advance which one feels in every line. In his ability to communicate with the Russian workers, to grasp the trend of their thought and to translate it into a line of action, Lenin remains a genius as yet unequalled.

But, great as he was, Lenin was a product of his time and his environment, and subject to error. It was not *his* conception of the Russian Revolution which proved to be right, but Trotsky's. Lenin's immense will to help the working class of his country through the Bolshevik Party failed to the extent that, the Russian workers remaining isolated, his attempt was to become a grandiose experiment, but one made in a time and an environment not yet ripe. His work, the Party and the Soviet State, was to transform itself into an enemy of the Russian workers, and, by a tragic reversal, this degeneration was facilitated precisely by those elements of rigid discipline, cohesiveness, and heroism with which Lenin had invested Bolshevism.

His opponents have often accused Lenin of a lack of scruples, of amoralism. This much is true: in ideological disputes and in clashes between different groups within Russian Social Democracy, Lenin was often rather unscrupulous. But this was not really amoralism. His convictions and his attachment to the cause of the Russian proletariat were so genuine, and everything else was so naturally subordinated to them, that his "amoralism" seemed to him to correspond to a "higher" morality.

This "moral amoralism" fitted in with the tension, the straining toward an objective, which all those who drew near Lenin noticed. This too can be traced to the youth of the Russian working class, to the fact that history had shortened all its respites, and piled on its shoulders from childhood on an adult's task. It was necessary to work fast; there was no place for long argumentation; there were only a few years in which to build up a party, and not a half century as in the West.

In the case of the Party organ *Iskra,* Lenin "arranged" things so that the secretaryship was held by his wife. The latter notes in her memoirs that "the operation was delicate." Thanks to the secretaryship, Lenin controlled the

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connections with Russia, correspondence and arrivals. *Iskra* had some salaried agents who circulated in Russia; Lenin controlled them as well. Thanks to this beginning of a machine, Lenin "worked on" the delegations to the Second Congress, where the split with the Mensheviks occurred. After the Congress, Lenin controlled both *Iskra* and the Central Committee which remained in Russia. At first he favored the primacy of *Iskra*: but when he lost control following Plekhanov's change of front, Lenin found arguments in favor of the primacy of the Central Committee. When he lost control of that also, he convoked a Bolshevik conference which baptized itself the Congress of the Party. In 1906, after he had written that the Mensheviks "sold out the workers' votes to the bourgeoisie," the Mensheviks summoned Lenin before a tribunal of the still-united Party. Lenin there declared that his aim was

> not to correct the mistakes of the opponent but to destroy him, to wipe his organization off the face of the earth. This formulation is indeed of such a nature as to evoke the worst thoughts, the worst suspicions about the opponent and indeed, as contrasted with the formulation that convinces and corrects, it "carries confusion into the ranks of the proletariat." [The words in quotes are taken by Lenin from the Central Committee accusation against him.] ... It is wrong to write about Party comrades in a language that systematically spreads among the working class hatred, aversion, contempt, etc., for those who hold different opinions. But *one may and must write* in that strain about a seceded organization.... Are there any limits to permissible struggle based on a split? There are no limits to such a struggle set by any Party standards, nor can there be such, for a split implies the cessation of the existence of the Party.... The limits of the struggle based on a split are not Party limits, but general political limits, or rather general civil limits, the limits set by criminal law, and nothing else....

Lenin knew that the Mensheviks were sincere revolutionaries, but the revolution was then in full swing, and he considered their tactics injurious.

III

To the youth of the Marxist movement in Russia corresponded the youth of its combatants. Mostly intellectuals of petty-bourgeois origin, their devotion to the socialist cause was boundless. Through the force of circumstances, however, they, themselves non-workers, were led to take over the leadership of the workers, gradually relegating the latter to the status of pawns.

The life of the professional revolutionaries was very different from that of the workers. Secret meetings, journeys, conferences, reports to prepare or study, took up the best part of their time. When they directed a strike, they most often worked clandestinely, and above all had to avoid compromising themselves. They held secret meetings with the Bolshevik group of the union, or with some workers in their confidence.

The professional revolutionaries had a sense of efficiency. They too were ambitious to work fast. Little by little, they had become true technicians of the problems of labor organization. But the workers themselves, although frequently sympathetic, advanced slowly. Very often illiterate, wrapped up in the cares of their daily life, few among them could rise to the level of political organizers. And as for those who did succeed, the professional revolutionaries

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heeded both the advice of *What Is To Be Done?* and the crying need of their own ranks, and took them out of the factory. Very rapidly, the former worker acquired the habits of his new environment and detached himself from the factory. The next step was a boundless confidence in the virtues of the committees, a pride and complacency which were hardly to their credit. By this time, the professional revolutionaries were no longer anything but "committeemen." They were on the way to constituting a new caste within the Party.

By about 1905, these stages had been completed. "The Party suffered from a vainglorious pride in its committees, and this was the beginning of bureaucratization," said Trotsky *(Stalin)*. And Krupskaya, Lenin's wife, notes in her memoirs: "The committee-man was usually a man full of assurance; he knew the enormous influence which the committee had on the masses; as a general rule the committee-man did not allow any democracy in the Party."

However, the situation was such that the committee-men were indispensable to the organization. They maintained communications, arranged for the printing and dissemination of political literature. Thanks to them, many workers succeeded in breaking through the official obscurantism, to arrive at a broader understanding of political problems.

The Revolution of 1905 surprised the committee-men and put them at a loss, for the burden of activity was now in the street and no longer in the committees. The reaction of Stalin is typical of the state of mind which prevailed in the committees; following the massacre of January 9, 1905, at St. Petersburg, which marked the beginning of the Revolution, Stalin wrote in a call to arms, "Let us join hands and rally around the Party committees. We must not forget for an instant that the Party committees alone can lead us properly, that they alone can illuminate for us the way to the promised land."

During the subsequent reaction, the committee-men were, in the proper sense of the term, the conservative element of the Party, the maintaining element; that was all that could be done at the time. And it was because Lenin foresaw a future uprising of the workers that he again backed up the committees of Russia.

It was with this prospect that Lenin "pushed" Stalin: "Where is Stalin? What is he doing?" Lenin asked in letters which are now prize targets for criticism. In 1912 Stalin participated in the Bolshevik conference at Prague. A Central Committee was elected of which he was not a member; he was still too little known. But immediately after the conference, on the proposal of Lenin, Stalin was co-opted. After this, again on the proposal of Lenin, Stalin was made responsible for the Central Committee's Delegation for the Interior of Russia. Stalin was now a leader recognized by all the committee-men, he had been invested by Lenin, and he had arrived at this post by the typically committee-man route of co-option. And from the standpoint of efficiency, Stalin was certainly the man for the job in 1912.

After the Social Democratic Congress of Stockholm of 1906, when the Revolution was already receding and the Soviets no longer existed, Lenin wrote, in the course of his controversy with the Mensheviks: "The Party has never concealed its intention of making use of certain agencies outside the Party, such as the Soviet, in order to spread the influence of Social Democracy among the

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working class. At the same time, the Social Democratic organizations should understand that if their work among the masses is conducted in a serious and comprehensive manner, such institutions can now become superfluous." This surprising attitude, after the support granted the Soviets the preceding year, can become clear only in the light of the Leninist conception of the Party as the only form of organization capable of assuring continuity of the work, because it alone could be disciplined, centralized, and "united" (the expression is Lenin's) to socialist theory, the latter existing, as we have shown, outside the spontaneous movement of the masses.

Until 1917, the soviet idea was of virtually no concern to Lenin. As late as January 1917, on the occasion of the commemoration of the Revolution of 1905, Lenin made a speech at Zurich in which he barely mentioned the part played by the Soviets. The following month the Revolution burst out at Petrograd, and the masses chose the soviet form of representation.

Very few days were needed for Lenin to revise his position on practically everything, without, it must be added, formally repudiating his previous stand. His slogan "All power to the Soviets" signified a break with his idea of a provisional government with the "democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants."

In the existing situation, the slogan "All power to the Soviets of workers and soldiers" meant to the proletariat: struggle, with the prospect of setting up its own power against the bourgeois government. This signified, moreover, that the new workers' power—being no longer worker-peasant—would no longer apply a bourgeois program, as the Leninist formula of 1905 had forecast. In his famous April thesis, Lenin for the first time put forth the dictatorship of the proletariat as a task of the revolution in Russia.

In the meantime, the corps of professional revolutionaries reacted according to its own laws: a combination between its revolutionary ideology and its position as a social group of petty-bourgeois origin which did not belong to the proletariat except by ideology. Abruptly the Bolshevik militants exchanged illegality for posts close to power: Soviets, official commissions, various committees. Meanwhile, for the bulk of the proletariat, as for the mass of Bolshevik sympathizers, the situation had changed more in appearance than in reality. Then something happened which had already happened so many times in the history of political parties: the interests of the governing apparatus of the Party and those of the mass which it represented came into conflict. The governing body had a tendency to confuse its own interests with those of the workers. Its social origin, the fact of having led a life more or less between classes, and the fact of being separated still more from the workers, all combined to make the Bolshevik leaders slip little by little under the influence of classes extraneous to the proletariat. Without the slightest doubt, the old Bolshevik ideology helped somewhat to justify this evolution; for was not the provisional government a step toward the popular coalition government which Lenin had foreordained? Even if the Bolsheviks present at Petrograd in February and March wanted a more radical government, they gave it as yet only a bourgeois content, in conformity with the old Leninist formula.

The committee-men's state of mind continued to live on, half hidden in the midst of the new situation, which was dominated by the activity of the

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masses. At every recession of the revolution, at each retreat of the workers, no matter how transistory (e.g., in the month of July-August, 1917) the relative importance of the Party apparatus grew, and again tried to get the upper hand. This was the fundamental law governing the commitee-men.

During the Revolution, said Trotsky, the masses became their own executive instrument. The Soviet regime ought simply to have perpetuated and organized the power which the Revolution had placed in the hands of the masses. The misfortune of the regime of October, 1917, however, was that it lacked the means to realize its intentions. To be sure, it did distribute land, and this assured it considerable prestige. But the soviet system, which was supposed to guarantee the direct participation of the masses in public life, soon broke down, and, for practical purposes, was dead in two years.

The Civil War was rampant. From 1918 on, the Soviets of the Red Army units were deprived of all powers of decision; in the same way, the Soviets of the areas where the units were stationed no longer had any say about the matter. To win the Civil War, it was necessary to return to the time-honored methods of individual command.

The second breach in the soviet system, more important than the first, was the creation in 1919 of a political secret police, necessarily beyond the direct control of the Soviets. In his memoirs Victor Serge gives a most striking description of how this police, the Cheka, tended from the very beginning to make itself independent, how, like all police forces, it grew bigger and then drummed up "business" to justify its own importance.

As a parallel to this, from 1918 on, a tragic crisis of production obliged the authorities to put into effect in the factories a system of bonuses and piecework salaries, which shattered the solidarity of the workers. In the same way, a return was made to the system of personal responsibility—the responsibility being that of a director appointed by the administration. The Soviet was given a purely supervisory role, which continued, however, to be effective for some time longer.

In the meantime, the working class itself began to withdraw, especially after the end of the Civil War. What had the government done for it? What was the use of the collectivization of the factories, when there were neither raw materials, nor—often—any competent technicians? Famine was rife, and the old rule of "every man for himself" had come back into its own. From 1920 on, the factory Soviets no longer had any real life, and the only ones to come to meetings were the Party members and the inevitable careerists.

Everything combined to help the committee-men regain their privileges. Their activity had in any case not been submerged in that of the masses, except for a rather short time: two years, perhaps. The committee-men had every right to consider themselves a key element of Bolshevism: since the beginning of the century, they had assured the continuity of the movement, they had borne the burden of the repression, and during the Civil War they had been in the front ranks. Balanced against these records of service what weight could be carried by the years of "disorder," 1905 and 1917?

As early as April 1920, on the occasion of Lenin's 50th birthday, Stalin could permit himself to speak with the presumptuous assurance of a man con-

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vinced that he represents an indispensable element. His article on "Lenin as Organizer of the Party" is of value in judging the state of mind of the committee-men after the end of the Civil War, when the administration was no longer threatened. "The most important contribution which we must ascribe to the credit of Comrade Lenin," said Stalin, "was his furious assault on the absence of any principles of organization among the Mensheviks." (Speaking of Stalin, Trotsky said: ". . . everything dealing with program and policy was for him no more than an ornament of the fundamental organization.")

It should not be forgotten that, well before the illness and death of Lenin, Stalin already held the key positions of the Party apparatus, and that their relative importance grew every month. From the beginning of 1919 on, Stalin was the only person to be at the same time in the organizational bureau and in the Politburo. Stalin was named Commissar of the Worker's and Peasant's Inspection, and so obtained unlimited rights of supervision over the whole administration of the Soviet Union. His rise is symbolic of the rise of the bureaucracy, of which the main leaders were the committee-men. By 1924, Zinoviev said, 10,000 former professional revolutionaries held the key positions in the Party and the State.

I do not adhere to the theory advanced by certain critics of Bolshevism who believe that the professional revolutionaries are the source of the degeneration of the USSR. The general economic and political causes seem to me decisive. The retreat of the masses was inevitable. But, admitting this, it is certain that the professional revolutionaries accelerated the degeneration. They were Bolsheviks; by virtue of their past, they were entitled to a place of honor in the edifice erected by the Revolution; by the force of circumstance the administration of this edifice fell to them. They simply showed themselves faithful to their already long tradition of decisiveness in the committees and in the groups; and the Soviets, whose methods were the reverse of those used by the committees, perished all the faster.

IV

At the center of the complex polemics which Lenin and Trotsky conducted during a period of more than ten years was their disagreement on the motive power of the Russian Revolution. Trotsky admitted with Plekhanov and Lenin, in opposition to the Populists, that Russia was moving toward capitalism. He agreed with Lenin, against the Mensheviks, that the Russian bourgeoisie was incapable of accomplishing its own revolution. He alone maintained that the dynamics of the Russian Revolution would bring the proletariat to power, and that the latter, as part of the world proletariat, could maintain itself in power only within the framework of a revolution spreading to the principal capitalist countries.

Unlike Lenin, Trotsky claimed that there were in Russia only two political forces, two social groups capable of concerted action: the Czarist bureaucracy and the proletariat. The peasantry, by its action, could disorganize Czarism, but limited by its narrow horizons it could not manage a decisive attack, and, above all, it was incapable of creating a political program of its own. In his *History of the Russian Revolution,* Trotsky said later: "What counted for the

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peasants was to smoke out the nobility ...afterwards—well, that remained to be seen!"

It is certain that, under these conditions, Trotsky's organizational concentrations had to be different from those of Lenin. For Trotsky the proletariat would create, must inevitably create its own doctrine. ". . . Ultimately the working class must conquer, and it would be victorious even if Karl Marx had never existed, even if there had been no Ulianov Lenin. The working class would have been able to formulate the ideas of which it had need, the methods indispensable to it, by itself, but this work would have been slower." It follows that for Trotsky the Party could not be what it was for Lenin, the separate (but not isolated) vanguard. Furthermore, the necessity of creating by sheer force of will a well-knit, strong, centralized socialist cohort also does not fit in with Trotsky's earlier idea of the Revolution. Trotsky was not concerned with complex alliances with diversified classes ten times more numerous than the proletariat. His idea was simple, because it was founded on belief in the capacity of the Russian proletariat to attain power, and on that of the European proletariat to aid in keeping it.

For Trotsky, the spontaneous struggle of the workers, socialist theory, and socialist organization were all organically connected categories, continually reinforcing each other. While inevitably becoming separate at various points, they ultimately tend toward unity, the workers' struggle assimilating to itself the theory, the latter enriching itself through the movement, both continually crystallizing within the organization which is itself rising, changing shape, and constantly strengthening theory and movement. This organizational theory was very similar to that of the "organizational process" formulated by Rosa Luxemburg in her controversy with Lenin.

Nor can this conception, based like Trotsky's theory of the Russian Revolution on faith in the historical process and in the destiny of the proletariat, be dismissed as fatalist: it left much to the organized will, and besides, neither Rosa Luxemburg nor Trotsky were figures of fatalism and passivity. It was simply that to Lenin it seemed impossible not to take the peasant factor into full account, not to try to take full advantage of it; whereas Trotsky, a man of the next generation, took more account of capitalist interdependence in an area of imperialism, and oriented himself more on the common destiny of the world proletariat. One could say that if Lenin represented the Russian worker with his peasant past, Trotsky symbolized the same worker as a part of the world proletariat.

In organizational practice Trotsky was closer to the Mensheviks. He was separated from the latter by the essential question of the tactics to be adopted toward the bourgeoisie, but the Menshevik organizaton was more democratic, more flexible, and more organically bound up with the workers than was that of the Bolsheviks. In 1905, for example, the Mensheviks from the first took sides with the Soviet of Petrograd; it was in their name that Trotsky, who like Lenin did not hesitate to support the Soviet, gained admission. Trotsky expected that the Menshevik Party would be forced to abandon its opportunism once the dynamics of revolution had brought the working class and

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the bourgeoisie into irremediable opposition. Here, of course, Trotsky was mistaken. He had underestimated the conservative stability of an organization of long standing. Relations between leaders and militants, loyalty to the tradition represented by the leaders, conservatism and maneuvering of the ranks, all these together proved to be stronger than the pressure of the working class: in 1917 the Mensheviks chose alliance with the bourgeoisie.

From this point of view we can understand Trotsky's joining of the Bolshevik Party after the February Revolution. Trotsky came to Lenin without changing anything essential in his conceptions. Events proved him right: things were moving toward the proletarian revolution. The workers came to the Bolsheviks, who were the only ones to be against the bourgeoisie. Like Trotsky, the Bolsheviks were now in favor of the Soviet form of government. The ossification and bureaucracy which already existed in the Party committees were engulfed and weakened by the popular wave. If this wave could have combined with a world revolution, as Trotsky had anticipated, the question of Bolshevik bureaucracy would have been relatively unimportant. No doubt this was the view of Trotsky when he joined Lenin's party in 1917.

But the world revolution having aborted after immense spasms, the old narrowness and routine of organization decided against Trotsky. After the popular wave had ebbed, he found himself stranded in a world absolutely foreign to him, if not hostile from the outset: that of the old Bolshevik committee-men. But now it was no longer possible for him to back out, as he had done a few years earlier with the Mensheviks. Side by side with the Bolsheviks, he had undertaken a gigantic work which he could not abandon. It was now possible to influence this work only through the Party, and being in the Party meant accepting its law. The alternatives which were offered him by the committee-men were to submit, or to break with the Party and the Soviet government, which were now merging together. Trotsky could not choose either one. But because of this fact, the course he adopted was bound to be contradictory.

Stalinism has a legacy from the anti-democratic aspect of the old Bolshevism. To escape the contradiction of the first years of regime—a workers' government incapable of ameliorating the lot of workers—Stalin more and more frequently took refuge in the pure and simple denial of the fact that a deep-seated workers' opposition existed. And as the latter reverberated in the Party in spite of everything, there were periodic purges.

Trotsky claimed kinship with Leninism, and called to witness his periods of agreement with Lenin to proclaim himself the rightful heir of Bolshevism. It is a fact—as we have seen—that the crucial moments, in 1907 and 1917 when Lenin fought the committee-men and drew on the support of the masses, he was joined in his position by Trotsky. But, calling on Leninism, adopting the Leninist formula of the Party, Trotsky introduced into his doctrine a grave element of contradiction, which played a part in preventing him from clearly analyzing and separating himself from the regime of Stalin.

Translated by CONNIE BUTTINGER

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WITH THE YIDDISH WRITERS IN SIBERIA

Bernard Turner

At the end of March 1949 a number of us were transferred from Camp Zaiarsk to "our" headquarters at Bratsk, Siberia. We were each given two kilo and 400 grams of black bread, four herrings and 60 grams of sugar—our food for the four days' march.

About 2,000 men and women had assembled at the point of departure. Our way lay through dense forests. The marching columns were surrounded by armed guards, aided by dogs trained to attack any stragglers among the slaves. We made 40 kilometers a day. Only at night could we warm our frozen, weary limbs at the fires built in the melting snows of spring.

We arrived at Bratsk on the fifth day. The camp, covering an area of some 800 yards, was surrounded by a ten foot high wooden fence, topped by 14 strands of barbed wire. Machine-gun towers loomed from each of the four corners. There were 36 barracks and 8 guard tents in the camp area.

Soon after our arrival, I was swallowed up into one of the most overcrowded barracks. The din made by its more than 500 inmates was like that of a beehive. All the peoples of the vastness of Russia were represented in this sea of humanity. Political prisoners and "enemies of the people" were mixed with the worst of common criminals. On the wooden bunks that lined the barrack walls, human bodies were crowded together, like bundles of rags. Those unable to find place on the bunks lay on the earthen floor.

Not far from the faucet, almost at the door, an old Jew sat on a stool. His physical state was such, it seemed, that he was good for nothing but to be the barracks-sweep. Terribly weary, I searched for a place to lie down. My eyes met those of the old man. His penetrating glance and intelligent face aroused a feeling of trust. Approaching, I asked him where I could lie down. Turning to one of the lying figures, the old man said:

"*Khaver* Feffer, would you be good enough to move a bit, so that this man could lie down?"

The name and sight of the crouching figure shook me to the very core. His frightful appearance did not

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Bernard Turner, now in Israel, was Moscow correspondent of the London *Daily Mail* and *Davar* of Tel Aviv in 1941-43. In 1943 he was sentenced to ten years' forced labor. He was freed after Stalin's death and, after much travail and wandering, escaped the Soviet Union and reached Israel. He is now engaged in writing a book about his experiences. The article here printed appeared originally in *Di Goldene Keyt*, Tel Aviv, No. 25 (1956), pp. 3-37.

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prevent me from recognizing him at once. This was the noted Jewish poet, colonel in the Red Army, Itzik Feffer. In 1943 I had met Feffer and the famous actor Shlomo Mikhoels in the Grand Hotel in Kuibishev, on the eve of their departure for America as representatives of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. The unhappy Feffer was now a skeleton of a man. All his limbs shaking, nervously biting his blue lips, he stared vacantly about, mumbling to himself. I wept silently at this sight. Itzik Feffer, the prominent Soviet Jewish poet, now lay in the filth. He was clothed in rags, his trousers held up by a string, from which dangled a military mess kit. His glasses, those characteristic Feffer-glasses, were broken, kept together by bits of string.

Later I learned that the old man, the barracks-sweep, was David Bergelson, the great Soviet Yiddish writer. During the week we remained together we talked at great length. I learned from them that Peretz Markish [another Soviet Yiddish writer] had also been in this camp. He had composed a great epic poem of sorrow and suffering, "The Third Roman Empire." Unhappily, the NKVD discovered the manuscript (some 6-7 notebooks, closely written) during an inspection and sent it on to Moscow. The order soon came that Markish was to be put in solitary confinement. He got a note to Bergelson that a new trial was being readied for him. This was the last trace of Markish.

Feffer and Bergelson told me that their arrest was a culmination of developments that went back to 1944. It was then that they learned for the first time of the anti-Semitic policy pursued by party and state in the Soviet Union. In 1944 the Soviet Foreign Ministry suffered from a dearth of diplomats, intensified by the expanding relations with the West. A foreign service training institute was opened in Moscow, headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanozov (who later shared the fate of his comrade, Beria). The institute had a rigid quota for Jewish students. Feffer and Bergelson raised this question at a closed meeting, which included Deputy Foreign Minister Lozovsky, former Soviet Ambassador to Rome, A. Stern (then on the faculty of the institute), Ilya Ehrenbourg and Shlomo Mikhoels. Lozovsky vainly brought the matter to the attention of Dekanozov. He later conferred with Foreign Minister Vishinsky, who denied the very existence of any discrimination against Jews. Lazar Kaganovich [the sole Jew in the Politburo] refused even to talk about the matter.

Subsequently, Bergelson went on to say, it became crystal-clear that the anti-Semitic policy in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union had been fully sanctioned by Stalin and the Politburo. Jewish Communist circles learned of a top secret decree issued by the Central Committee of the Party that Jews, Communist or not, were to be excluded from the Polish and Czechoslovakian "national armies" which had been formed by Colonel Berling and General Svoboda on Soviet soil.

The decree expressly stated that every Jew of typical Jewish appearance (a "Jewish nose," curly hair, Yiddish accent) was to be excluded from the Polish Army of Liberation, the Red Army and the NKVD units attached to the Polish Army. Jews of "good" appearance could remain in

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the Polish Army, but would be compelled to change their names to pure Polish and eradicate any trace of their Jewish identity.

Lozovsky had informed Bergelson that Wanda Wasilewska, member of the Supreme Soviet and wife of Deputy Foreign Minister A. Korneichuk, who had easy access to Stalin, had had a major share in the "new" anti-Jewish policy. This policy was now being systematically followed not only in the Soviet Union, but in those lands of East Europe in which Communist regimes had been established. Bergelson and Feffer told me that this policy, so diametrically opposed to the Communist idea, was one with which neither they nor other Jewish Communist writers and cultural figures could make their peace. The newly-created situation was often discussed in their circles. Among those participating in these gatherings was Ilya Ehrenbourg.

IN THE MEANTIME, mass arrests continued, particularly of Jews who were not Soviet citizens. The anti-Semitic course was obvious to all. At this stage, came the arrest of the members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, which set off a total war against Jews and Jewish culture in the Soviet Union. The chief witness against those arrested, accused of Jewish nationalism and Zionism, was none other than Ilya Ehrenbourg. He also had a hand in the arrest of many other Jews, including his relatives, doubtless in the attempt to save his own skin. He didn't even hestitate to turn Lozovsky, his closest friend, over to the NKVD.

Feffer, moreover, was accused, he told me, of having had intimate contact with the [Jewish Socialist] Bund leaders Ehrlich and Alter during their stay in Kuibishev, notwithstanding the fact that he, Feffer, had been in Tashkent at the time. He was also charged with having cooperated with Zionists and Bundists in New York.

Feffer, Bergelson and the other Jewish Communists were subjected to bestial torture in the course of their investigations. Feffer recalled having seen Lozovsky in the Lubianka prison: his arm broken, his face a gaping wound. Rumor had it that Lozovsky had committed suicide, but Feffer quite correctly pointed out that it was impossible for anyone to have committed suicide in the Lubianka, prisoners having been deprived of every conceivable means for doing so. There can be no doubt that Lozovsky was tortured to death.

Bergelson told me that, among other things, he himself was subjected to the well-known treatment of being seated on a two-legged stool and compelled to remain there 20 hours at a stretch. At the slightest movement, he would lose his balance, falling to the stone floor. Bruised again and again, he would be compelled to right the stool and continue sitting. More than once the stool broke, and another would be brought... This went on for days, weeks. Finally, stools of particularly durable material were brought...

On parting from Bergelson and Feffer, I told them of my plans to escape this hell. They made the following request of me: Should you ever meet Ilya Ehrenbourg, ask him in our names to place flowers on the unknown graves of those innocents murdered, in whose martyrs' deaths he had a goodly share.

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SIX YEARS LATER, in October 1955, I had the opportunity—and the satisfaction—of fulfilling this last wish of Bergelson and Feffer. It was at the Vienna airport. In the presence of the chairman of the Soviet Writers' Union, Nikolai Tikhonov, I transmitted to Ehrenbourg, in their very words, the last wish of his comrades of the pen, Bergelson and Feffer. Ehrenbourg turned pale as chalk. His lips began to tremble, foaming at the mouth. A lost soul, he began to back away, and fled from me.

Translated by AARON ANTONOVSKY

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Miscellany

The Professor As Informer

IN EARLY July 1956 James Burnham made his appearance as a government witness at a Department of Justice hearing held as the climax to a six-year-long effort by the Independent Socialist League to have its name removed from the Attorney General's "subversive list."

James Burnham had been a member of that organization once, when it was known as the Workers Party. In May 1940 he had resigned from the group, in a letter notable for a certain friendliness of tone, as if he were writing to people with whom he disagreed but nonetheless recognized as, in some sense, his intellectual kin. The final paragraph of that letter reads:

"Believing as I do, I cannot wish success to the Workers Party; but I can and do wish its members well. To the extent that each of us, in his own way and arena, preserves the values of truth and freedom, I hope that we shall continue to regard ourselves as comrades, whatever names we use and whatever labels may be tied around our necks."

Burnham has since kept moving steadily to the right; today he is an editor of the McCarthyite *National Review*. His career is one that I find distressing, even repellent, yet I recognize his right, as that of anyone else, to hold whatever opinions he wishes and to change his opinions whenever he feels obliged to. What concerns me at the moment is something else, something more fundamental.

At the government hearing finally granted to the ISL, there were other ex-radicals—Daniel Bell, Dwight Macdonald—who also appeared as witnesses. They appeared for the defense, testifying that the tiny Marxist but anti-Communist ISL did not advocate the overthrow of the government by force and violence. Burnham, however, came as a *government witness:* apparently he no longer hoped "that we shall continue to regard ourselves as comrades." He came, to avoid putting any undue niceties upon the matter, in

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the role of government informer. Cross examination brought out that he had started to volunteer information to the FBI about his former comrades since at least 1948.

DURING THE HEARINGS there developed a remarkable exchange between Burnham and the attorney for the ISL, Joseph Rauh:

> Q. Did you ever state anywhere that you had to use Communist methods to defeat them?
> A. I don't know whether I have used that phrase, but I have said in effect that some of the methods used by Communists are appropriate to struggles against—
> Q. And lying is one of them, isn't it, Mr. Burnham?
> A. On some occasions, yes.

Somewhat later in the hearing there occurred the following exchange:

> Q. Why is it all right to lie against a nation which does these things but not all right to lie against an organization which is a threat to do these things?
> A. You lie as part of your duty to your country.

In days gone by American universities used to insist that teachers be "scholars and gentlemen." Those days are gone. Yet the action of James Burnham in lowering himself to the role of an informer, and the moral quality suggested by his testimony concerning the permissibility of employing methods characteristic of Communists, raises an interesting question:

Is it possible to be a philosopher and a paid informer at the same time?

FICHTE in his moving definition of the scholar wrote that "We do not only teach by our word; we teach much more effectively by our example... the scholar hence must be the most morally superior man of his age: he is called to represent the highest stage of ethical development that it has been possible to reach." These may seem impossibly high demands, yet the intellectual has always been more than a mere mental technician and whenever he was granted a certain privilege and respect it was, at least in part, because he was looked upon as a man devoted to the disinterested pursuit of truth.

James Burnham no longer satisfies this description. He is not only an ex-radical: there is nothing morally shameful about that. He is an ex-intellectual.

Will he perhaps presume to call to his aid the name of Machiavelli which he has appropriated without warrant? The author of *The Prince* wrote: "A prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by doing so it would be against his interest"; but Machiavelli himself was not a ruler, he was an intellectual, and his own life was without blemish. What Machiavelli, with whatever irony, preached, Burnham, the intellectual who yearned to be ruler, practised.

I understand that James Burnham is not presently teaching at New York University, where he is a member of the philosophy department of which Sidney Hook is chairman. But if he were to return to his post, would Sidney Hook, so deeply committed to purging Communists from our faculties on the ground that they cannot be trusted to the pursuit of disinterested truth—would Sidney Hook urge the dismissal of James Burnham, stool pigeon and defender of lying in the name of patriotism?

L. C.

Faye von Mering

We have lost a friend. From the beginning we had learned to count upon her judgment, her criticism, her generosity. She had shared in our hope and our vision.

At 35, she is gone. So much of her talent and life remained without use, it is hard to accept her fate. May her memory become part of us.

I. H.

What, No Books?

For reasons of space we were compelled to omit our Book Section, and much other material. In our Spring issue we will print an *expanded* Book Section, a larger letter section, etc.

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LETTERS

Beyond South Africa

Editors:

The [Summer] issue, on Africa, was highly revealing and dramatic. I was impressed with the eloquence of Peter Abrahams' statements. There was, however, one remark to which I objected. In replying to a question as to his opinion on whether the race problem in South Africa could be satisfactorily solved, Abrahams took pains to deplore certain attitudes toward this problem which he characterized as wishful thinking or "Cry The Beloved Countryism," as he put it. It is this phraseology to which I object, with its implication that Paton's book is excessively visionary (one can hear the whispered "crackpot" in the background). Certainly "Cry The Beloved Country" offers no concrete political solution to the problem of South Africa today. It does offer an awareness and a warning of the tragedy inherent in any human relationship founded on oppression which engenders fear and hatred. Had its great ethical spirit been more pervasive, the human condition might have advanced considerably in opposition to the anti-human dogmas that have dominated this terror-ridden century.

New York City MARTIN RYZA

Yes, They Should

Editors:

I like the openness of mind that most of your writers display together with their firm commitment to radicalism. But I wish that the editors would do something about the kind of writing that sometimes creeps in. I refer to the tendency of some of your contributors to employ sociological and political science jargon: to write in a kind of academic trade-lingo which no doubt has its uses in specialized journals but is just a handicap to communication in a magazine like DISSENT. It's good that some of your contributors bring specialized scholarly skills to their writing; but why need their styles be so limp, so awkward, so verbose, so stoop-shouldered? Don't you think the editors ought to do something about this? THEODORE DRYDEN

How Communicate?

Editors:

Henri Rabassiere's tirade in your summer issue was listed as a "communication," but to whom was he communicating and how could anyone possibly reply?

He is perfectly justified in pointing out to Gunther Anders that mass media are not, in themselves, evil and that, whatever our pretensions, we should keep in touch with the people. But why, for this purpose, the digs at Heidegger, *Partisan Review*, etc. Why rant at all? When can we learn that we ought not to blow our tops every time we get into print, and that we can act like reasonable people and not hopeless cranks? It is true that behind some ideas there lie evasion, bad faith or even dishonesty, and a certain rhetoric in exposing them is only natural. But there undoubtedly also exist ideas contrary to our own that are not evil in their inspiration.

Worse still is the custom of attacking groups instead of individuals. Can we help it if some of our approaches to our situation become fads? There are, after all, only so many possibilities, and they can all be taken up by others and furnish material for satire once they are in the public domain. Reading too much into Li'l Abner and Pogo is at least as much a fad, and as shameful, as endless talk about alienation. We must learn to speak as individuals and within the limits of our subject, otherwise communication is impossible and our intellectual and political life will fall into despair...

San Francisco LESTER HAWKINS

Isaac Rosenfeld

Editors:

Friends of the late Isaac Rosenfeld are trying to collect enough money to ensure the higher education of his children. Those who knew him or were taught by him or read his work are asked to send what they can in a check made out to Russell M. Cooper, Treasurer, and mailed to Dean Russell M. Cooper, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 4, Minnesota.

We shall be grateful for your help in bringing this request to your readers.

SAUL BELLOW, RUSSELL M. COOPER,
RALPH G. GROSS, ALLEN TATE
(Committee for Isaac Rosenfeld Fund)

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AMONG OURSELVES

It is with gratification that we anaounce that in response to our appeal for $6,000 to assure DISSENT's life for the next two years, $5,600 has been received in cash and pledges. To the several hundred people who made pledges we can only express our thanks, urge them to honor the pledges promptly, and promise to do all we can to improve the magazine. Those of our friends who have not yet pledged are, of course, urged to do so—contributions are welcome, and *needed,* at any time.

Note: One reason the fund drive went better this time than two years ago is that our friends engaged in organized activities. In New York City a DISSENT forum drew 100 people; in Boston, 75; in Detroit about 35. These discussion meetings not merely allowed for an exchange of ideas, they also helped raise funds. In other cities—Chicago, Washington, San Francisco—friends of the magazine have done systematic work to help the drive.

The special number we put out on the east European revolutions met with an enthusiastic response. Readers wrote in to praise it, and it quickly sold well on the newsstands in New York City. Unfortunately, we couldn't get it placed in all our outlets in other cities. You can still get a copy by sending in 25c. Though written hurriedly, under the pressure of events, it has not become significantly dated.

Library circulation is not as good as it should be. Experience indicates that if you simply ask your local or main library—or your college library—it is likely to subscribe. We are planning a full mailing to libraries, but local requests are even more valuable.

The *Dissent* Forum

The following item appeared in the editorial columns of *The Nation,* December 15, 1956:

"The editors of DISSENT ... recently sponsored a forum in New York City on the developments in eastern Europe. A stimulating group of speakers, including A. J. Muste, Lewis Coser and Milton Sachs,* presented different aspects of the situation, and the floor was then open for discussion. Sadly enough, there was no discussion—only recitation and harangue. Strewn through the audience were the deadwood representatives of official Socialist 'splinter groups' who rose to the day's occasion with the worn-out phraseology of their own particular sect, shaking their fists as of old, condemning the discussion for being only discussion, for being a 'wake,' a display of soul-searching and a harbor of heresy from their own splintered orthodoxy. As the fists waved and the afternoon wore on, most of the people who had come out of interest to hear—and not to harangue—had left the hall.

"Irving Howe ... got up to give the closing remarks and said that 'most of the people I wanted to talk to have already gone.' They were, he pointed out, driven away by the 'professionals' who hoped to use the occasion for singing their old tired tunes again. Mr. Howe speculated that 'even if we had come here to discuss the novels of Henry James and Edith Wharton,' the 'old pros' would have said the same lines that they did that afternoon.

"It was a discouraging experience to watch one of the few honest attempts at dissenting discussion dry up in the stale language of the splinter-off-of-splinter groups. The hall had been filled; there were people who had felt the need for an honest, Socialist-oriented discussion of the world-shaking events in eastern Europe. The DISSENT forum would plainly have filled a vital need—if only the splinters hadn't gotten here first to block the way."

* Emanuel Sherer also spoke.—Ed.

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continued from page 2

to bring about such a restoration, encouraged by certain American groups which, however, at the decisive moment did not dare support them effectively. We also know that these same Hungarian emigrés actively participated at the side of our own fascists in the attack on the Communist Party headquarters [in Paris] (an attack which all of us condemned); in a word, we do not deny the existence of a reactionary danger in the Hungarian events, but we doubt that these facts assume the significance you accord them. We particularly believe that they cannot be separated and isolated from the whole political context which is vastly different otherwise and which consists of essentially positive elements. To see only such facts is to fall into the same kind of error as found among us and which consists, for example, in claiming that since there are Communists who are fighting with Algerian nationalists, the uprising of the Algerian people is the work of Moscow.

Generally speaking, it seemed to us that TASS agency information and *Pravda* articles tended to exaggerate grossly certain facts, without always offering proof, and to give a unilateral—that is to say, a deformed—interpretation. That is why it appears to us that you, for your part, do not possess the complete truth you ask us to examine, and that your government itself has without doubt been badly informed of the real conditions, since you admit it did not help the Hungarian leaders to repudiate their errors in time.

Here are two examples:

a) The Soviet troops, stationed in Hungary in conformity with the Warsaw Pact, were withdrawn from Budapest—so you say—as soon as requested to by the then government of Imre Nagy which, in the first place, had itself insisted that these same Soviet troops come to its aid.

You seem to be unaware of the fact that Imre Nagy *formally denied* having called for Soviet aid at the very moment he took power. In reality, that appeal was made by Geroe. But it is of prime importance to fix the truth about this point. In fact, the return of Imre Nagy was passionately awaited by the whole Hungarian people. In replying to Geroe's appeal, the Soviet troops might have thought that they were answering the people's call, but in fact, that appeal was only the tragic crowning of the whole sequence of mistakes which you denounce in the beginning of your letter. It was indeed this first arrival of troops that succeeded in exasperating minds already overexcited by the October 23rd speech of Geroe, that transformed the demonstrations of the masses into a true insurrection and made it possible for reactionary elements to enter the battle under the guise of a nationalist reflex, always very strong in Hungary.

b) We think that both the Soviet journals and the Communist press minimize in the extreme the participation of the popular masses and a large section of the Communist Party in these events (as if only a few discontented workers had been deceived by the Horthyites), and maintain silence on the socialist character of the workers', soldiers', peasants', and students' councils.

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Even at Gyoer, which has been presented to us as a center of fascist dissidence, the old Communist militant, Attila Szigati, head of the workers' council, stated to a reporter: "We want real socialism and the departure of the Russians; we want no truck with the former Horthy régime." There were thousands and tens of thousands of Szigatis!

Even today, when the insurrection has been crushed and there can no longer be any question of fascism in Hungary, what subsists among the ruins is the workers' resistance with which the Kadar government is obliged to negotiate. Yesterday morning, November 23, the general strike for the eight points demanded by the population was resumed, upon order of the Workers' Councils. In the evening, an agreement was signed to go back to work, but the government recognized the authority of the workers' council in running the factories and the latter reserved the right to take up the strike again in case the governmental promises were not kept. Thus, despite cold, hunger, arrests, the Hungarian working class has shown itself ready to die rather than yield on its essential demands.

2. THIS IS WHERE our elevation is opposed to yours. Don't you think that in a country which has lived for the past ten years under a "Peoples' Democracy" which had expropriated the big feudal landowners, and nationalized the major sectors of its economy, that the social and economic base for fascism was weakened in the extreme and that it was just about impossible to turn back so far as these essential conquests are concerned? In this respect, the Hungarian situation seems to us quite different from that of the Ukraine in 1919; that is, less than two years after the October revolution when the new structure was barely constituted. In our days, the camp of the "Popular Democracies" continued to extend and strengthen itself. We also cannot see in the Hungarian reactionaries any danger comparable to that represented by Hitler in 1939.

We don't deny that in certain places where reactionary elements were dominant, Communist militants were victims of their violence. But all the documents which have come to us show that terror was directed chiefly against the detested functionaries of the secret police, guilty of innumerable exactions and tortures. As for us, we believe that a working class which is today capable of maintaining its demands with such a fierce energy and under such destitution, would have been quite capable, along with the soldiers' councils, of subduing its own fascists and maintaining order in the country. We believe that such a task not only was within the measure of its forces but, by right, belonged to it, with all the accompanying risks and sacrifices. We believe that only the Hungarian workers, peasants, soldiers and intellectuals could advance a socialist régime adapted to their country's conditions and we profoundly regret that the Soviet troops, finding it impossible to distinguish between the population and reactionary insurrectionists, striking blindly at the right and at the left, have seriously compromised this experience and hope.

In your justification of armed intervention isn't there an underestimation of the popular forces at work and a lack of confidence regarding the capacity

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for struggle of the masses? On the very morning of the second Soviet intervention *Pravda* wrote, "The Hungarian people, its working class, and all true patriots will find *within themselves* the forces necessary to destroy reaction." Don't you know that it was the worker's centers of Budapest, and particularly those of Csepel, which were the last to depose their arms? We believe that should the Red Army now withdraw it could not be accused of retreating before fascism; it would withdraw before the united will of the Hungarian workers and would thus fulfill a role which is its; a role no less glorious than that it played when facing Hitler's armies.

You ask, what price must be paid for the mistakes made in Hungary? But from this moment on a very heavy price will have to be paid in the West for the Soviet intervention. It isn't only the intellectual circles that are now convulsed. The working class again finds itself profoundly divided; the overwhelming majority of the workers in Western Europe condemns the attitude of your government; in the French CGT unity was safeguarded only to the extent that regional committees avoided taking any position on the Budapest events.

For all these reasons we cannot support your opinion and we must maintain the views of our original statement. But we are ready to meet with you in the country of your choice so as to pursue further this examination and debate, to confront our brief of the Hungarian drama with yours and to attempt to determine with you both the chain and hierarchy of responsibilities since the beginning of these events. We are likewise ready to take part in a committee of inquiry which would go to Hungary to inform itself as completely and as rigorously as possible. It seems to us that such a meeting and inquiry as we propose would constitute the best means of arriving at that complete truth whose pursuit remains our objective just as much as yours.

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, AND JULY 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) SHOWING THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION OF DISSENT, published quarterly at New York, N.Y., for October 1, 1956.

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3. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: none.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

5. The average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed, through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during 12 months preceding the date shown above was: (This information is required from daily, weekly, semiweekly, and triweekly newspaper only.)

(Signed): Stanley Plastrik,
Business Manager.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 29th day of September, 1956. (Signed): BENJAMIN ELSHITZ, Notary Public, State of New York, residing in N. Y. county. (My commission expires March 30, 1957.)

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